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Abstract 
Title: The good governance agenda for decentralization in Uttarakhand, India: implications 
for social justice 
By Nicola Giordano 
This thesis explores the link between social justice and decentralization at the theoretical 
and empirical level. The central argument is that decentralization as prescribed by the good 
governance agenda has compromised the constitutional guarantees of social justice in India. 
Initially, the thesis provides a detailed analysis of good governance, comparing the 
viewpoints of proponents and critics. It is initially analyzed, in detail, from the point of 
views of its claims and critiques. The implementation of decentralization is discussed in 
relation to its good governance rationale and principles of social justice. 
Critiques from various schools of thought shed light on the controversies and potential for 
change emerging out of the current approach. The empirical analysis is based upon field 
data collected from eight villages in the Indian state of Uttarakhand. Two types of 
decentralization policies are examined: Panchayati Raj (village governance) and Van 
Panchayat (forest governance). Both policies are essential to understand how social justice 
plays at many levels on the grassroots reality: livelihood, self-governance, participation and 
market pressures. The final discussion establishes the link between empirical evidence and 
the central argument along with a possible alternative approach for implementing 
decentralization, namely the Ghandian model of Village Swaraj. 
Date: 22nd April, 2010 
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Rich or poor, we become estranged from the connectedness of things. Moreover we lose 




The focus of this study is on die reduced space for social justice in decentralization 
practices within the good governance approach. My topic is relevant to development since 
many international organizations have increasingly encouraged the adoption of this policy -
within the SAP framework starting in the late 1980s- but not without resistance from 
governments, local communities or academics. In this thesis, I argue social justice is not an 
outcome of good governance in India. In order to assess the validity of my argument, I 
initially provide a detailed discussion of various debates found in the literature. 
Furthermore, I go more in depth with my analysis by exploring four different hypothesis in 
relation to: access to resources, market pressures and the engagement of marginalized 
groups into forest and village governance. I show through my empirical evidence how 
managerial institutions are not necessarily inclusive and do not challenge oppression. The 
objective of this thesis is to provide extensive discussion about the interaction between 
social justice and decentralization for my case study in Uttarakhand, India. The outcome of 
my analysis demonstrates how the theoretical and ideological framework of good 
governance is more focused upon enabling market efficiency than "bringing power to the 
people". As the empirical data shows, the dimensions of inequalities, along with livelihood 
deterioration, are maintained under the current framework for decentralization. The 
policy consensus on good governance disregards, self-governance practices, the moral 
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economy of a community and does not enable social transformation. In the end, I argue 
there should be a radical revision of decentralization practices in order to enable local 
bodies to have effective scope to bring development and social justice. 
In addtion to this brief introduction, this thesis consists of four additional chapters. 
Chapter Two explores the theoretical debates around the good governance approach to 
decentralization from multiple perspectives. It aims at defining the implications of the good 
governance approach for social justice and decentralization. In first instance, good 
governance has been endorsed from influential international organization as a critical 
policy for the ultimate goal of market integration. Its role in favoring a particular notion of 
economic efficiency (namely that of neo-classical economics) and formalized institutional 
processes has significant consequences for decentralization and social justice. Some of 
some of the criticisms condemn a retreat of responsibility from the state to prioritize 
democratization with consequent state managerialization in order to accommodate a 
specific neoliberal national agenda. Some left wing scholars also argue good governance 
might perpetuate power structures in an attempt of cultural imperialism. The various 
critiques underline the implications for social justice as a crucial aspect to assess what 
interests good governance is serving. In this frame, a definition of social justice within a 
normative tradition linked to the moral economy, essentialism, Gandhi and Ambedkhar is 
developed. Its conceptualization is then translated into the context of decentralization 
intended as inclusive practices to ensure the common good and the upliftment of 
oppression. The exploration of how the political ideology redirects decentralization to 
interact with social justice issues is also presented. Decentralization is then analyzed 
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according to its mainstream definitions, implementation and historical trajectory. The 
failures in implementing decentralization, according to its good governance approach, 
poses fundamental normative questions mat are explored through the analysis of its 
inherent paradox and how other uieoretical frameworks conceptualize its practice. In 
particular the debates witfiin Insititutional Political Economy, Sustainable Livelihood 
Approach and Neo-Marxist ideology are presented to frame, more precisely, a broader 
range of critiques of mainstream decentralization and to offer an overview of its alternative 
uses. The concluding section introduces decentralization in India and its implications for 
social justice. 
Chapter Three introduces the discussion through an analysis of social justice according to 
the Constitution of India, which enables a more context-specific conceptualization of its 
definition. In this frame, a detailed analysis of decentralization for village governance 
decentralization, namely Panchayati Raj, is India is developed. Panchayati Raj is presented 
according to its origins, organizations and funding. The latter factor is analyzed to present 
the centralized logic of the government to use resources without much inclusion of the 
voices from local communities. In this frame, the tensions of Panchayati Raj to be used as 
instrument to push neoliberal policies are clashing to the potential for social transformation 
through the use of grassrooted politicization and power to the marginalized groups. 
Furthermore, forest management is introduced as second example of decentralization in 
India. Its legal framework is presented to underline the government emphasis on 
productivity of forest resources above livelihood and traditional rights. The role of 
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government agencies to implement a scientific regime in forestry delegitimizes local 
knowledge and community autonomy in managing resources. After a broad presentation of 
die decentralization policies under study, Uttarakhand is introduced according to its social 
structure, history and current pressures. In this context, Panchayati Raj is illustrated in its 
implementation and potential trajectories since a state-specific legal framework is yet to be 
finalized. In the case of Forest governance, Uttarakhand has a very state-specific legal 
framework namely Van Panchayat. Its forest policy is presented in a historical perspective, 
from the British Empire to today's pressure to convert common property resources into 
private property along the good governance logic of forest managerialization. The 
concluding section introduces the specific area from where the data analyzed in the 
empirical Chapter was gathered. 
In Chapter Four the central problematic is introduced and four causal variables are 
established in order to expand the discussion and the empirical analysis in line with the 
main argument. The central problematic is based on the extensive literature offered in the 
previous chapters and explores how the good governance approach to decentralization 
does not lead to social justice. Good governance favors a model of development that 
enables political decentralization to facilitate economic liberalism; in this frame social 
justice receives limited scope. The emphasis on wage labor, resources commercialization 
and managerial institutions needs to be assessed in contrast to issues of social exclusion, 
pressures on livelihood and the capacity of local body to enable democratic dissent. 
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The critiques of good governance mainly underline its inability to bring genuine 
democratization as well as its disregard to address die issue of power structures and class 
relations. The attempt of the empirical analysis of this diesis is to ground die implications 
of good governance to field reality through the investigation of four main issues. They are 
summarized as access to forest resources, access and engagement in institutional process 
and marketization pressures in village and forest governance. Each issue is linked to one 
hypothesis in order to give a systematic analysis of various implications for social justice in 
die process of decentralization. To analyze my empirical evidence I use regressions, tables 
and graphs. In addition to case surveys, I also present a few narratives and in-depdi case 
studies of die villages under analysis. The various methodologies and techniques are 
combined to strengthen the arguments presented in each hypothesis. 
In die first hypothesis I argue that current decentralization practices perpetuate uneven 
access to forest resources. In order to assess its validity I examine access to resources per 
village and on die basis of forest allocation. Van Panchayat is also assessed in its capacity to 
provide forest resources according to villagers' opinions. In the second hypothesis, I argue 
institutional processes are still exclusionary and maintain great divides on the basis of 
gender, class and education level. In die diird hypodiesis, I argue tiiat market pressures, in 
the context of decentralized forest governance, are negatively affecting people's livelihood. 
In diis case, market pressures are defined as external for public-private partnerships and as 
internal for government initiatives to commercialize the forest or to integrate local 
institutions into the mainstream economy. In the fourth hypodiesis, I finally argue diere is a 
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fundamental imbalance between economic development and social justice in decentralized 
village governance even though the constitutional mandate gives equal priority to both. My 
analysis illustrates the uneven distribution of benefits and locals' opinion that there limited 
change in their communities. The four hypothesis are linked to central problematic and 
the various evidence gives evidence to the low scope of social justice in good governance 
practices. 
The concluding chapter summarizes all findings and links my findings with the broader 
discussion of decentralization and social justice. The analysis of my empirical data 
demostrates there is limited scope for social justice in the good governance approach. For 
example, the evidence about participation from both decentralized forest and village 
governance indicates a significant divide, in engaging into village politics, along the lines of 
class, gender and education levels. In the case of forest governance, my regression analysis 
shows that the scarcity of resources along with village forest allotments by the gov's Forest 
Dept are negatively correlated with access to resources for households. In addition, the 
third hypothesis explores how market pressures are compromising the fragile equilibrium 
between the environment and communities' livelihood. In the case of village governance, 
the empirical evidence underlines a substantial imbalance between economic development 
and social justice. Furthermore, decentralized village governance shows some degree of 
elite capturing in the distribution of benefits and it seems to bring limited positive change, 
with some degree of increasing conflicts in the community. Overall, local bodies are 
pressured to become agents of a neoliberal project instead of space for democratic 
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discussion and dissent building. The Neo-Marxist critique of good governance as policy 
device to maintain a depoliticized class structure is grounded in the extensive analysis of 
field data. Although some positive signs are found in regards to participation and 
infrastructure development, local institutions remain exclusionary with limited capacity for 
social justice and social transformation. 
Concluding the introduction with two fundamental questions: Why India? Why 
decentralization and social justice? Decentralization as a policy model originally came from 
the Ghandian philosophy but the actual mandate driven by neoliberal principle is 
deteriorating the community harmony and reducing the scope for social justice. The 
constitution of India is a progressive written piece and the principles of equality are 
inspired by Gandhi's fight for independence. The inability of the current government to 
implement die funding principle of social justice from the Constitution clearly represents 
the struggle of India's republic caught between the hazy dream of becoming a modern, 
individualistic and market-oriented society and its communitarian, Ghandian and socialistic 
foundations. Decentralization policy within this context fascinates me and its analysis gives 
interesting insights of die struggle India has to face along with many other societies thrown 
off in shaky waters where only policies favoring ultracompetitive, rational and selfish 
behaviors wins over all, not matter what context they are in. The argument of this thesis 
opens up the necessity to reconceptualize decentralization within other approaches as 
much as possible far away from the neoliberal logic. 
20 
CHAPTER n 
This Chapter, namely literature review, explores various theoretical frameworks in relation 
to decentralization. The central focus for my analysis is the good governance approach to 
decentralization and its implications for social justice. I initially explore how good 
governance is theorized and how is critiqued by various scholars and political ideologies. 
Furthermore, a conceptualization about social justice is provided in order to orient my 
central argument The inverse relationship between good governance and social justice is 
linked to decentralization practices. The implementation of decentralization, as shaped by 
good governance, becomes the focus of the last sections of this chapter. Decentralization 
historical origins, definitions and inherent theoretical tensions are finally explored. The 
Chapter concludes to an analysis of decentralization dirough different approaches in order 
to provide a more multidimensional understanding of its inherent paradoxes and 
alternative definitions. 
2.1 Decentralization, the state and social justice: outcome for development 
This initial section aims at to exploring the link between decentralization, the state and 
social justice within past debates previous to the current good governance agenda. The 
difficult task to link these three dimensions is extensive in the literature and has different 
implications for development; my attempt is to give an initial perspective of this very 
discussed and researched relationship. This analysis will be conducive to establish a 
connection to today's mainstream debates and to my central argument exploring the lack of 
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social justice in the good governance approach to decentralization. 
On the rise of early industrialization, the role of the state was widely debated. Initially, the 
development discourse identified the government as the realm of experts and technocrats 
thereby justifying state planning and simplification (Scott, 1998). The push to planning 
turned out to be a top down approach in order to create growdi and a strong economy. 
The creation of aggregate statistics such as GDP dominated the idea of development 
Poverty and inequalities were its inevitable consequences, as long as the average wealth 
increased, and were considered second to growth, investments and savings. Nationalists, 
moralists and even economists eventually rejected this idea of development through various 
critiques, and started invoking the role of national self-reliance to achieve development 
(Griffin, 1981). 
Arising social dissent pushed for a new approach that gives more recognition to 
development of human resources, poverty alleviation programs and technical skills 
improvements in order to make the process of capital accumulation more inclusive. The 
role of the state was seen differendy because of a growing consensus to delegate, 
decentralize and make local bodies more responsible in the process of development. The 
new logic has not necessarily challenged the capitalist mindset but it has favored transfer of 
power from groups who dominate at the centre to diose with control at the local/state level. 
Griffin (1981) recognizes power at the local level to be more concentrated and applied 
more strongly against the poor than at the centre. Greater decentralization has not 
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necessarily lead to "power to the people", especially if implemented under high modernist 
ideologies and without addressing power structures (Griffin, 1981). Even though many 
international organizations advocated for greater decentralization the distribution of 
political power did not change. Because of giving priority to policies meant to strengthen 
capitalism, the condition of many poor did not improve. In order to reverse the current 
model of development the poor should have the opportunity to organize themselves in 
institutions of their choice by weakening institutional control and by creating a fairer 
equilibrium in power distribution across various levels of governance (Keith, 1999). 
A change in existing forms of decentralization requires radically different concepts of 
current ideas about the state and development altogemer. In Kerala (India), for example, 
the concept of democratic decentralization has involved politicization, social mobilization, 
the inclusion of all citizens in the process of decision-making and sharing of benefits and 
responsibilities. The Kerala model is an example of radical transformation of state 
development policies to favor direct participation of all communities in governance (Isaac, 
2001). India's special case of decentralization was also inspired by great political 
disagreement toward the idea of a state linked to exploitation and systems of domination. 
The necessity to conceptualize development outside of its centrally-decided capitalist 
notion pushed to create different interpretations of its link with decentralization, the state 
and social justice. In this attempt, it is interesting to discuss the debates between Jose Carlos 
Mariategui versus Haya de la Torre and Gandhi versus Ambedkhar that took place in the 
23 
early decades of the 20th century. They offer insightful and contrasting visions of what 
development should look like. The first debate is a Marxist versus populist struggle in 
development theory whereas the second offers different views of decentralization and 
oppression. 
Mariategui claimed mat feudal and capitalist relations introduced during the Spanish 
colonial period were the elements of holistic exploitation in Peru.1 His political and 
intellectual project prioritizes the integration of indigenous groups into national society to 
unify the nation by overcoming social, ethnic and economic divisions and exploitation 
(Radcliffe and Westwood, 1996). De La Torre starting point was similar to Mariategui and 
recognized the exploitation and suffering of his people. Haya argued that the revolution 
against feudal and imperialist oppression needed a full development of capitalism within a 
national framework. He believed the peasants were too weak and the proletariat too small 
to undertake significant revolution. The experience of hardship could be resolved only witfi 
a populist alliance between the working class and the national bourgeoisie in order to push 
progressive military action. This debate is an example of ideological struggle between 
favoring peasants and the most marginalized groups and a more modernist middle class 
based approach to development (Edelman, 2002; Gonzales, 2007). 
In order to end the system of oppression he contributed to the ideological struggle against the 
cultural and intellectual dominant pro-imperialist liberalism. He argued that capitalist stage needed 
to be skipped in order to form a new socialist state from the beginning. In this transition he gave 
central importance to class struggle, the indigenous question and to the role of human 
consciousness as reflection of history and as a crucial force in shaping it 
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Mariategui's advocacy in favour of marginalized groups also influenced his 
conceptualization of decentralization. He opposed to decentralization if driven by a 
centralized ideology and if meant to establish a superficial administrative set-up in order to 
increase control over capital. In his view, the decentralization process requires 
development of the oppressed regions as governmental entity in its own right before 
achieving municipal autonomy. The implementation of decentralization within existing 
regional imbalances and with the current nature of land tenure perpetuates forms of 
oppressions (gamonalismo, feudalism and bossism) (Farazmand, 2001). The continuous 
marginalization of local communities is especially linked to the problem of the indigenous 
population (Indian) and of land. Decentralization is ineffective to solve the basic problems 
at the local level of Gamonalismo if subdued to a capitalist state (Mariategui, 1971). 
Mariategui's key to decentralization rests on the liberation of the rural population from 
poverty and discrimination through a powerful system of revolutionary authority that can 
initiate programs supporting radical agrarian reforms and national unity (Angotti, 1986). 
The second debate -expanded later in the Chapter- is between two crucial historical figures 
for India: Gandhi and Ambedkar. Both agreed on the necessity to pursue new visions for 
development with a stronger recognition of social justice and equality yet they disagreed on 
what priority should be adopted for this end. According to Gandhi's view2, a village 
Gandhi's search of truth takes him to the conclusion that plurality is the core of reality. His 
pluralist vision of society does not classify a single distinct unit as the ultimate expression of a 
community since all identities are its true expression. Gandhi, in this perspective of diversity, 
envisioned India as the constellation of village republics with complete self-reliance and delinked 
from mechanisms of external exploitation (Palshikar, 1997) 
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republic is political in nature and it represents the essence of India in opposition to the 
creation of modern cities as symbols of western domination and colonial rule. Gandhi 
argues the emphasis on village reality can be a possible alternative for development 
opposed to me urban and technology-driven capitalist model. While he invoked the revival 
of the spirit of traditional village life through empowerment of local bodies (Panchayat), he 
also found many flaws widi the actual system such as the practice of untouchability and lack 
of cleanliness. Nonetheless, Gandhi romanticized a decentralized rural India in dialectic 
contrast with die modern industrial west Qodhka, 2002). 
In contrast to the celebration of village life, Ambedkar experienced in his own life the 
oppression of rural India. For diis reason he universalized the experiences of exclusion, 
exploitation and untouchability to all village realities and critiqued Gandhi's relative 
softness about the issue of caste and representation (Jodhka, 2002). Ambedkar rejected the 
role of tradition which legitimizes caste inequality and he actively contributed to reverse die 
balance of oppression by introducing reservation clauses and special provisions for lower 
castes in die draft of the Indian Constitution. He struggled to broaden die social base of 
Indian nationalism dirough die inclusion of lower castes in order to secure their freedom 
from external and internal oppression and enslavement His engagement in die formation 
of die emerging secular Indian nation was driven by a strong dissent with Gandhi's view of 
village republic. Ambedkar invoked a process to purge society from discrimination by 
establishing rights and protection for lower castes (Gaikwad, 1998). 
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Both debates (Gandhi vs Ambedkar and Mariategui vs La Torre) show the struggle to 
identify the right strategy to bring social justice as freedom from any form of exploitation 
within different conceptions of development and of the state. The mulufaceted relationship 
between decentralization and development can be traced in Gandhi's argument of village 
republic. In opposition to his view, the current capitalist rationale favours an approach for 
decentralization enabling capital accumulation and power concentration. The dichotomy of 
these conflicting views, partly originates from the role of the state which can be exploitative 
or completely decentralized and favouring self-sufficiency of each community. Social justice 
is a crucial dimension in defining the dynamic link between decentralization and 
development because it entails the necessary upliftment from forms of internal and external 
oppressions. Social justice can be achieved by channelling class struggle and engaging 
indigenous population against bourgeoisie exploitation invoked by Mariategui. Their 
opposition to the current development trajectory needs to be complemented with an 
approach to overcome any form of inequality and cruelty existing within the village reality, 
like the ones identified in Ambedkar's arguments. 
In this thesis the notion of social justice is linked to both debates; it recognizes all possible 
dimensions of oppression, ensures community autonomy from external pressures -for 
example to conform to a neoliberal project of development- along with individual release 
from social stigma.3 The state and its inherent power structure, instead of shaping policies 
3 For example, in the case of India, the dimension of oppression linked to caste and gender must be 
addressed and mat requires social justice to be a process for social change. 
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favouring inequalities and exploitation, could rather support self-reliance and traditional 
social patterns of community through the celebration of local adaptive knowledge while 
tackling forms of internal oppression from die elites (whedier village-based, national or 
transnational). A stronger recognition of local autonomy in shaping development can 
provide stronger cohesion and enable the creation of self-understanding for social action. 
Such action will provide space to channel the struggle for rights to livelihood that have a 
basis in custom and tradition and involve the most vital interests of community members 
(Scott, 2002 and 1976). 
Yet, it is important to recognize local autonomy and its potential synergy with a state that 
prioritizes social justice in pursuing political and economic interests for die common good. 
As Ambedkar recognized, the village reality can also have oppressive internal structures 
and measures to address the causes and solutions to overcome inherent social problems 
need to be developed. The expression of diversity, inspired by Gandhi's vision, might be 
Utopian but also raises important points. It requires delinking from global economic 
dependency and favours a more dialectic relationship among various level of governance in 
setting development priorities by recognizing each community's history, ethnicity, 
spirituality, forms of oppression and self governance practices. Diversity cannot be grasped 
only by a centralized power structure deciding the trajectory for development but it 
requires a form of decentralization that can facilitate political and democratic awareness in 
order to free die exploited from internal and external mechanisms of oppression. 
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The analysis of both debates opens new theoretical spaces to conceptualize the relationship 
between decentralization, state and social justice for development Unsurprisingly, the 
current framework is light years away alternative vision since it aims at universalizing a 
western project of development questionable at many levels. This thesis will attempt to link 
social justice and decentralization within the current tensions and debates linked to the 
good governance approach. The next section will start the analysis by defining the good 
governance approach. The overview of the approach will facilitate to contextualize the 
analysis of today's decentralization practices and its link with the neoliberal logic of efficient 
market and of a minimal state. 
2.2 Good Governance: the Neoliberal Perspective 
Governance is defined as a system of national administration. The term originates from the 
business literature about the micro behavior of the firm. The commission on Global 
Governance defined it as the various ways individuals and public and private institution 
manage their common affairs. In the early 1980s governance and good governance started 
to appear in the development discourse, particularly in the research agendas and activities 
of bilateral donors in collaboration with public and private banks. The idea of good 
governance became central because of growing consensus among economists and scholars 
in international relations about the necessity to emphasize more the role of institutions in 
development A great increase in numbers and influence of non-state actors and technology 
in an age of globalization and liberalism renaissance also contributed to its emergence 
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(Weiss, 2000). 
Good governance was quickly embraced as a supportive concept for the spread of 
neoliberal policies. Its hegemonic interpretation aligned to the neo-liberal ideology, as 
defined and discussed in this section, will be the basis for reference throughout the whole 
thesis if not mentioned otherwise. Good governance took on a very particular meaning that 
referred to public sector management, accountability, legal framework for development, 
information and transparency and the rule of law. Adherents to neoliberal ideology 
maintain that if all of these conditions are necessary for markets to function efficiently and 
expand within a country. The World Bank also pointed out that bad governance leads to 
lack of human rights, widespread corruption, unaccountable governments and 
personalization of power. According to its view, good governance must be the natural 
opposite (Weiss, 2000; Boas 1998). Mainstream decentralization is widely implemented 
within this approach to achieve good governance goals. 
The international organizations that promote the good governance agenda actively shape its 
definition. The definition of good governance from the World Bank is captured in the 
following quotation: 
Good Governance is an essential complement to sound economic policies. 
Efficient and accountable management by the public sector and a predictable and 
transparent policy framework are critical to the efficiency of markets and 
governments, and hence to economic development The World Bank's increasing 
30 
attention to issues of governance is an important of our efforts to promote equitable 
and sustainable development. (Preston, 1992: pg V) 
The World Bank argument draws from empirical evidence that good governance 
measured as corruption; rule of law enforcement, accountability and transparency is 
positively correlated with per capita income. The Bank's studies emphasize die economic 
consequences of good governance measured as institutional quality. Good governance 
should favor development by preventing state capture and by following neo-liberal 
economic principles in order to build an efficient market (ESCAP, 2009). 
Some United Nations agencies also support good governance; in the Human Development 
Report of 2002 Kofi Annan has been quoted: 
Good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty 
and promoting development (Annan, 2002:51). 
It is reasonable to assume the United Nations position is mainly supportive of the good 
governance approach even though internal dissent exists as will be later illustrated. The 
United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) defines it as "the exercise of political, 
economic and administrative authority in the management of country's affairs" (UNDP, 
1997:11). The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(ESCAP) identifies Good Governance as a managerial process of decision-making only 
possible dirough formal processes because informal structures lead to corruption. ESCAP 
also focuses on the participatory side of good governance only possible through legitimate 
institutions. Participation must be informed and organized and human rights should be 
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enforced by enhancing the legal framework and institutional processes. ESCAP requires 
institution that can allow the most marginalized communities to be integrated in the 
mainstream economy in a participatory way in order to achieve the goals of accountability 
and transparency as invoked by the good governance approach. What is out of institutional 
structures, established by policies aligned to good governance, should not be legal and 
leads to deterioration of society (ESCAP, 2009). 
ESCAP's arguments about managerialization of the state to enable efficiency and market-
integration are supported also from research-oriented organization like the Research 
Triangle Institute (RTI). RTI collaborates with the United States government agency for 
development (USAID). The Institute celebrates the successes of market economies, against 
the inefficiencies of state enterprises, and promotes more accountable good governance as 
the right strategy for open markets. In this direction, RTI identifies the most crucial 
dimensions of good governance in: legitimacy, accountability, management effectiveness 
and availability of information. The ultimate goal is to achieve the public good efficiently, 
as retraceable in many neoliberal economic policies of the Wes t RTI, similarly to ESCAP, 
views the good governance approach as key to management effectiveness in responding to 
citizens' needs. According to RTI, decentralization enables the government to provide 
services and infrastructure while economic liberalization leads people to increase demand 
for sendees, willingness to pay taxes and make investments (Jonhnson and Henry, 2003). 
The process to establish a mutual reinforcing relationship between political 
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decentralization and economic liberalization could allow marginalized groups to receive the 
right information about the public good and to establish the perfect link between 
participation and the outcome of building a market economy. T^he next section will 
explain, more in details, the idea that with sufficient information and proper institutions, 
citizens can voice their preferences and shape government policies and services. The 
economic arguments of good governance enthusiasts' disregard dissent and forms of 
resistance are considered as a tfireat preventing governments from implementing market 
oriented policies (Jonhnson and Henry, 2003). Because of the good governance emphasis 
on formalized decentralization processes with low space for dissent and the notion of 
economic efficiency, a more detailed analysis of its neoliberal logic will be now introduced. 
2.3 The good governance approach to decentralization: theory of public good and 
efficiency. 
This section explains how the good governance approach translates into decentralization 
according to the assumptions invoked by many mainstream institutions and their agendas. 
This analysis will lead to some central questions of normative and ideological nature against 
the way neoliberal economics defines the world. Neo liberal economists have been worked 
4 In order to establish this linkage good governance supports a policy model implemented along the 
line of functional responsibilities (provision of physical and social services), access to revenues (tax 
revenues and control over the resource available at the community level) and political 
autonomy/accountability (the central mandate is enforced according to local political processes 
ensuring self-regulation). This requires political processes to be transparent and citizens to be 
enabled to influence decision through open meetings and citizens advisory committees. Good 
Governance should favor programs to build technical awareness within marginalized groups by 
establishing mutual trust and confidence with the local governments and bureaucracy. 
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their brain hard to show that the ultimate objective of development is to build efficient 
markets and dismande state regulation even if this leads to higher inequality and internal 
conflicts (Harvey, 2007). The strongest supporters of decentralization as a policy tool in 
good governance are several international organizations. The United Nations Economic 
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank usually converge to support the neoliberal logic of decentralization as the right mean 
to achieve development. 
Their wide consensus is grounded on die firm conviction about the role of die state as the 
source of all problems in the Third World. According to the neoliberal point of view the 
bureaucratic apparatus has became too large, centralized and insufficiently coordinated. 
The amount of state regulation led to less administrative flexibility and limited state 
capacity to respond to the appropriate changes a market economy requires. The budgetary 
crisis, faced by many states in the last decades, is seen as a direct consequence of irrational 
distributive policies and inefficient allocation of resources driven by a politicization of the 
economy. Hence, decentralization becomes part of a program to create a modern, 
managerial, depoliticized and efficient state that can base its policies on the goodwill of 
political and bureaucratic elites. This project conceptualizes individuals as purely rational 
cost-benefit calculators demanding for policy proposal based on economic and 
administrative efficiency without state interferences (Haldenwang, 1991). 
A model of development along neoliberal lines can be traced in die multitude of papers 
34 
published by various international organizations. The good governance approach to 
decentralization is especially supported by their economic arguments of: accountability, 
responsiveness and optimal equilibrium of supply and demand of public goods. These 
terms are central especially for fiscal decentralization, which is under most careful analysis 
by economists. Accountability is defined as the right and duty of individuals grouped in 
local communities to self-regulation in compliance to formalized procedures. 
Decentralized accountability implies a shift in responsibility from the central level to the 
local level5. The trade-off between centralization and accountability is central for 
economists in their claim for decentralization as a valuable policy because of its 
sensitiveness to differences in the needs and preferences of different localities (Seabright, 
1996). Responsiveness also enables local governments to be more efficient in the provision 
of what people demand6 (Smith, 1985). What emerges from this brief overview of 
economic concepts invoked by various international organizations is particularly important 
in the relationship between supply and demand for the public good. 
' This process is seen as the optimal policy because it incentives governments to act in the interest 
of their citizens. The difference between centralized and decentralized government is indeed a 
matter of distributing control over the central policy implementation variables established at die 
national level to sub-regional units. Centralization allows government to save resources of 
coordinating policies between jurisdictions but it also has the potential cost to diminish 
accountability to die wishes of a particular region or locality. 
6 Responsiveness is strongly tied with accountability and it is anotfier important argument of 
neoliberal economists in support of decentralized governments with higher responsibility and easier 
access to local knowledge. The latter factor is crucial in defining local preferences and priorities, 
which are essential to truly enhance the efficiency of managing local affairs and services. The 
challenge economists identify to enhance responsiveness is to determine community demand in 
absence of competitive pricing and to ensure die public good is internalized locally in order to 
equate taxation with consumption. 
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Equilibrium between supply and demand of public goods is the theoretical optimal 
achievement of decentralization -more specifically fiscal federalism- according to 
economics (Smith, 1985). The conflicts between economic efficiency and equity in 
provision of local services trigger equilibrium. The demand side of service provision is 
expressed through voting and other political activities and decentralization becomes 
effective by increasing the number of governmental units and the opportunity to express an 
individual preference. On the contrary centralization faces more constraints in facilitating 
individual expression for alternative ways to obtain the desired kind of service. According 
to this economic equilibrium smaller jurisdictions are better equipped to create larger 
benefits to individuals in return for their participation than larger units of government. 
The supply side plays a central role in the optimal equilibrium since it deals with allocative 
efficiency of the collective goods and the determination of whether the cost of production 
exceeds the value of services to the community. The argument for a decentralized supply 
of public good is that the larger the political structure, the greater the tendency to aggravate 
the weaknesses of public organization and to reduce scope for innovation. Fragmented 
jurisdictions are expected to maximize consumer's satisfaction whereas; consolidation 
decreases it by creating state's huge monopolies that will tend to consume a lot of resources 
and to produce inefficient and unwanted services. Fiscal federalism, within the various 
forms of decentralization, offers most scope to ensure redistribution (for example, in the 
form of progressive taxation) and a minimum level of public service to everyone in order to 
correct externalities and market failures. Good governance decentralization should allow 
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for the optimal equilibrium to be reached because of effective citizens' engagement in 
expressing their preferences and local governments' efficiency in meeting public demand 
(Oates, 1997). 
The supply and demand reasoning behind decentralization justifies the neoliberal 
economic arguments' and their vision of development. The ultimate goal is to build the 
perfect environment for investments to expand the free market and to establish a 
capitalistic mindset All levels of governance involved in a depoliticized and managerial 
process to create rational economic units out of people freed from state inefficiencies. 
Unsurprisingly, the various arguments illustrated so far receive various critiques from many 
scholars and different political ideologies. 
2.4 Critiques of Good Governance: implications for devolution and democracy 
The first level of critique about the good governance approach to decentralization shows 
the inconsistencies of its mainstream assumptions in current practices. This section 
explores how some good governance's economic claims result invalid and the negative 
implications in the process of democratization. This level of critique does not debunk the 
approach at its roots but underlines a series of inherent weaknesses. 
Part of this critique looks at technical issues and does not reject the good governance vision 
of development. In particular, it questions the common assumption that devolving 
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governance to the local level will necessarily generate more efficient outcomes. In first 
instance, devolution implies the principle of fully informed citizens but evidence shows it 
usually fails in poor countries because of differential in entidements between outsiders and 
insiders. Information and accounting system are also weak in low-income countries and 
accountability cannot be ensured because of major elite groups capturing. The argument 
about efficiency in public provision cannot be accomplished so easily since most often 
oppressed groups look for the central state for protection and relief. Moreover, fiscal 
federalism faces die constraints of interregional tax competition and different levels of 
capacity to raise revenues; its enforcement can lead to differential across municipalities in 
the level of expenditure and inflow of money. The level of technical and administrative 
capacities also cannot be considered homogeneous and information asymmetries for the 
central government are combined with the low quality of staff in local bureaucracy 
(Bardhan, 2002). This first set of arguments about good governance original economic 
claims does not question its ideological rationale but it is directed to improve current 
practices in die implementation process.7 
Whereas die first (institutional) critique focuses upon die assumptions underpinning die 
7 Policy suggestions comprise ideas to improve the allocation of control rights, yardstick competition 
and coordination in contracting witfi local representatives. Secondly me financial aspect of it is 
explored dirough strategies to improve local taxes, user fees and central grants programs to raise 
service delivery. Thirdly more inclusive practices in good governance are recommended dirough 
consolidation of electoral advantage and village level market incentives to ensure local people to 
have full access over local assets. Lasdy external support to facilitate policy implementation is 
envisioned dirough die supply professional and technical services to local communities and 
development of finance projects. This is a partial description of strategies to improve good 
governance practices more specifically in decentralization. 
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agenda of good governance, more radical critiques question the mainstream objectives, 
arguing that it is reductionist and undermines democratic principles. Along these lines, 
Gopal and Vandana Desai (1998) describe mainstream good governance policies as an 
attempt to managerialise government and to push a shift from supply side to demand side 
development strategies. UNESCO (Parthasarathy, 2005) also embraces a critical stand over 
good governance and it identifies an ideological risk of new strategic top-down and 
hegemonic policies linked to market reform and not actual democratic consensus or social 
change. The principal criticism is that good governance is exclusively advocated as a means 
for advancing economic objectives at the expense of other development priorities. Gopal 
and Vandana Desai (1998) also recognize an inherent risk to implement institutional 
processes that exclude political pluralism in setting development priorities and may lead to 
soft authoritarianism. Good governance support for the rolling back of the state from its 
redistributive commitments can ultimately reduce democratization and subordinates the 
principles of democracy to the functioning of a market economy. Decentralization framed 
along the good governance approach universalizes a specific vision of society whereas the 
policy should be shaped in a culture-specific way with greater emphasis to the democratic 
dimension of the state (Jayal, 1997). 
From this critique, the good governance approach provides a framework of democracy 
without a substantial process for democratization and excessive priority to market-enabler 
reforms within inconsistent economic assumptions. Its rhetoric about participation is more 
oriented to project implementation and not democratic discussion. The views so far 
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illustrated also suggest more space for disagreement and dissent because development 
should be a political process of contestation and negotiation within a society. Hence, the 
government needs to implement corrective measures to the distorting consequences of a 
democracy instead of reducing its role to manager with low involvement in the 
development process. Jayal (2007) argues that the role of democracy is crucial especially in 
dealing with unequal social structures (for example the case of caste system in India) in 
order to achieve effective participation in politics that good governance alone cannot 
accomplish. Although some failures of good governance have been identified in this set of 
arguments, a more radical analysis of its rationale is explored in the next section. 
2.5 Good Governance and social justice: An oppressive "civilizing" mission? 
Another set of more radical critiques direcdy questions the good governance agenda and 
how it is imposed to enable a free play of market forces originated from the urban 
industrialized North. The following arguments focus on good governance and its 
implication for social structures/justice/divisions, issues of power structures and traditional 
practices of self-governance. In this context, the issue of social justice emerges out to be a 
strong factor in the critique of the good governance approach to decentralization. 
The critques at this level, coming from left wing politics, identified the central objective of 
good governance decentralization to develop a regulatory and organizational structure so 
that social regulation helps to stabilize capitalism and its inherent contradictions in the 
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sphere of capital accumulation. Good governance principles are not based on collective 
decision-making in which people can exercise their rights but upon the potential to 
generate profits by efficiently managing resources. In this frame, mechanisms of 
governance are meant to secure social relations and conditions of production as 
instrumental for capitalism reproduction (Parthasarathy, 2005). The role of a decentralized 
state is subordinated to institutionalize the processes of collective bargaining and to provide 
the right infrastructures required by capital hence, decentralization becomes the best 
regulatory fix in the transition to Post-Fordism. The pressure upon developing countries to 
shift to Post-Fordism in order to embrace the logic of accumulation implies a non-welfarist 
state, a highly fragmented labor market, polarization of exports, reduction in wages, social 
divisions that can paradoxically lead to obstacles to capital accumulation. Furthermore, the 
pressures to facilitate international capital also interfere with the fragmented dimension of 
decentralization in regards to social regulation, local economies and local governments 
(Schurman 1997). 
The capitalist rationale identified at this level of critique about the good governance 
approach to decentralization address the central issue of power and its distribution. When 
liberal political theory is applied at the local level the inherent conflicts within society are 
overlooked. Formal mechanisms of electoral accountability are not enough to change the 
dynamics of power entrenched in vested interests and structural conflicts between groups. 
The sources of power usually reside outside the legal framework of representative 
institutions and holders of economic power are more likely to perpetuate privilege, 
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hierarchy and oppression. A Gramscian perspective of power ,offered by Taylor (2004), 
underlines that "trasformismo" through good governance policies serves to absorb possible 
counter-hegemonic elements into the dominant elites (transnational elites) through a 
process of compromise and incorporation of individual politicians into the conservative-
moderate "political class". Power cannot be conceived within the narrow terms of a legal 
framework and the good governance approach to decentralization risks to become part of 
processes by which dominant classes at all levels force their interest through state rule -
based on global policy consensus- and formalized institutions (Smith, 1985; Taylor, 2004). 
Power concentration implies that most oppressed minorities face further struggles and 
injustices and experience misrepresentation of their interests. 
Another part the critique argues the issue of power is not fully grasped by scholars 
critiquing good governance only by defending democracy. According to Parthasarathy, 
(2005) their argument lacks to understand the implications for depredation of traditional 
practices as a substantial part of the picture. The central argument of this claim identifies 
good governance as a clear attempt of cultural imperialism. The presumption to civilize 
other societies disregards the history of community structures and the interactions between 
formalized processes of governance and common customary practices/traditional 
institutions. The rhetoric of participation and inclusive institutions is an attempt to make 
people beneficiaries and legitimisers of programs and processes that do not belong to 
them. According to Kothari (2001), participatory processes become technical solutions to 
political economy issues and are driven by a centralized political co-option that requires 
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participants' engagement into forms of labor and mechanisms of cash transfers for project 
implementation 
The alienating processes of a decentralized managerial state, inspired by good governance 
policies, leads to depoliticized development Furthermore, such practices avoid any 
substantial challenge against the micro and macro power structures in order to 
accommodate market-oriented policy objectives. Formalized decentralization practices 
have led to neglect the invisible aspect of effective participation, traditional self-governance, 
and to reinforce social structures entailing power, assets and status. Actions through formal 
institutions prevent oppressed groups -which lack power and/or are unaware of the rules-to 
increase their political participation and, to oppose institutional processes that are likely to 
perpetuate marginalization (Bandyopadhyay, 2002 and Parthasarathy, 2005). The 
formalization and managerialization of the state through decentralization does not solve the 
issue of power and have serious implications for democratization. 
Power accumulation, market-imposed mechanisms and disregard of local communities 
pattern of self-governance are leaving little space for social justice and dissent, in regards to 
neoliberal policies, through current institutional means. An example in support to this 
argument can be drawn by brutal experiences of groups resisting against injustices created 
by externally imposed development projects (for example, forced displacements in dam 
construction as reported to the Uttarakhand Solidarity Network8). Some suggestions to 
8 http://www.euttaranchal.com/news/general/rnounting-public-pressure-against-dams-in-
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revise current pressures underline the need to engage and work widi traditional institutions 
and to enable marginalized communities in fulfilling their priorities without external 
pressures to "westernize". Cultural specificity demands different ways to conceptualize 
development mat goes beyond externally imposed policies such as good governance. 
According to Parthasarathy, (2002) the current approach divorces political democracy from 
economic democracy since any semi autonomous or autonomous self-governing 
communities with their institutional structures are out of the picture. The basis for critique 
explored in mis diesis argues good governance to be a "civilizing" mission shrinking space 
for social justice and dissent by excluding the powerless to fit into formalized processes of 
decentralization. 
The central argument against the good governance approach to decentralization as 
"civilizing" mission requires a more detailed section about social justice. As briefly 
introduced in me first section of diis chapter, it is intended as inclusive all forms of 
oppressions. Imposed policies only meant to expand a global market deprive local 
communities to maintain meir right to self-governance and exemplify a form of oppression. 
At the same time, various forms of power structures and inequalities are maintained and 
perpetuated at all levels beyond the deceiving rhetoric of participation and liberal 
democracy proposed by the good governance agenda. The next section will present a 




2.6 Social justice according to different theoretical frameworks 
In order to explain the link between social justice and decentralization, it is necessary to 
briefly overview assumptions and analytic frames about social justice through different 
theoretical frameworks. Contemporary mainstream economists, for example, see the 
Western development normative course as conducive to social justice equated with 
economic freedom and a more enriched society. Justice, in this frame, embeds various 
forms of right protection and low state involvement in order to create a bourgeois-
democratic capitalist order. Postmodernists, in contrast, do not see a unilinear path for 
development or standards of justice transcending time and space. Their conception of 
justice follow bundles of beliefs, norms and cultural patterns varying across societies hence 
its notion can be only situationally understood. Neo-Marxists focus on class dynamics at all 
levels and sees social change as driven by class interest. They highlight the source of 
injustice in the unequal relations of production but also in market forces. In the case of 
neoliberal pressures, inequalities in distribution of benefits are a direct consequence of 
social class differentiation (Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley, 2003). All these definitions 
about social justice do not entirely apply to the notion used in this thesis but offer various 
insights aligned with different ideologies. 
For the central argument explaining the relationship between decentralization and social 
justice, moral economics seem to be most aligned with the original intent of this thesis in 
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explaining how policies shaped along the neo-liberal logic can be oppressive. Moral 
economics argue that social views of just and unjust are likely to vary not only witfi their 
economic or social hierarchies but also cultural understanding. James Scott (1976) offers a 
very valid and interesting conceptualization of justice. Exploitation is created in die 
relationship between individuals, groups or institutions but its notion needs to include both 
socialist and non socialist dimensions. The Marxist tradition identifies the form of 
exploitation in the labor theory and surplus appropriation by the owners of means of 
production. Scott argues that the degrees of exploitative relationship vary greatly and an 
objective theory is not enough to define its complexities. He introduces a conception of 
justice that embraces a normative tradition and provides a conceptual link between a priori 
notion of exploitation and the subjective feeling of the exploited. The Marxist notion of 
false consciousness to explain the incongruity between these two dimensions overlooks the 
validity of individuals' perception of injustice constructed around existential needs and 
cultural values. 
Scott (1976) developed a framework of analysis in order to explain die more subjective 
dimension of injustice according to peasants by looking at two moral principles: the norm 
of reciprocity and right to subsistence. The former implies that a service received creates a 
reciprocal obligation to return it at comparable value at some future date. Various 
andiropologists (Malinowski, Mauss) have found reciprocity, mutual assistance to be die 
basis for friendship and alliance in traditional societies. The right to subsistence is also a 
crucial dimension to consider as an active moral principle in the village tradition. It embeds 
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the assumption that all members of a community have the presumptive right to life 
according to local resources and the common notion of hierarchy of human needs. It is 
reasonable to expect lower disparities if die right to subsistence is prioritized within a 
society because people will view as morally unacceptable any economic situation 
threatening their livelihood (Scott, 1976). In me case that right is deteriorated, the 
oppressed will embrace everyday forms of resistance (such as passive non-compliance, 
deceit, slander, sabotage etc.) instead of overtly challenging strong systems of exploitation 
widi great risk. This form of disobedience challenges the authority by undermining die 
dominant logic of productivity and legitimacy and can eventually provide the opportunity to 
lift mechanisms of oppression (Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley, 2003). 
According to Scott's argument injustices of policies aimed at serving the interest of die 
West have negative consequences also on a subjective level for individuals in die 
community. It direatens dieir livelihood and traditional system of economic provisioning; 
resistance will occur if interferences direat community's moral principles and survival. The 
subjectivity of oppression can be further conceptualized according to the principles of the 
basic human functional capabilities framework developed by Nussbaum (1992). In her 
conception of capabilities, she attempts to link die western moral tradition of essentialism 
reflections with the need for compassion as belief in a common humanity. The universal 
bond of humanity to survive on this planet has deep implication for social justice and 
recognizes die necessity to transcend the economic-utilitarian views of today's society. 
Economic utilitarianism is pervasive and increasingly modeling die world in a way that push 
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individuals to identify themselves with monetary value. According to Nussbaum's view: 
to treat deep parts of our identity as alienable commodities is to do violence to the 
conception of the self that we actually have and to the texture of the world of 
human practice and interaction" (Nussbaum, 1992:231). 
Beyond the imposition of policies shaped along the neoliberal ideology, oppression also 
exist from within the community. The principle of connectedness needs to embrace a 
deeper understanding of die human dimension of oppression and the way it unfolds in 
every society. The necessity to overcome internal, as much as external, exploitation is 
found in the Gandhian philosophy of social justice grounded in the principles of: truth, 
nonviolence and personal suffering. He equates power with the capacity to do violence and 
he invokes nonviolence as the force for social change to reach the common good (Christie, 
2001; Weber,). According to his view an action is just when not harm either parties but the 
process of self-consciousness about justice is more experiential than theoretical. Although 
the words of Gandhi might appear Utopian, his recognition of the inherent goodness in all 
humans has profound implications in shaping societies. 
Along similar lines, Ambedkar also believed in liberation of the individual and shares 
common ground with Gandhi in recognizing a communitarian vision of liberty, equality 
and fraternity (Palshikar, 1996). Furthermore, they both recognize the necessity of social 
action and valued popular, yet peaceful, struggle as essential to remove injustices. Their 
belief in moral values as eternal and crucial in coordinating material social life is a common 
48 
starting point for social transformation. While Gandhi romanticized village republic and its 
inherent ability to overcome internal forms of oppressions, Ambedkhar recognized more 
strongly the necessity to institutionalize liberation from oppression in die modern world. 
He endorsed the emergence of a political consciousness as agent for fundamental change 
in Indian society and believed in the necessity to shape a state that countered the 
discriminatory tendencies of traditional caste loyalties. His ideal for social justice envisions 
a society where social activism towards the exercise of political power for the purpose of 
peaceful social revolution can create fundamental principles of equality and justice as 
opposed to hegemonic domination and internal forms of oppression (Fitzgerald, 1999). 
The systematic pressures upon peasants to adopt a utilitarian mindset inspired by 
neoliberal economics are central in my analysis and can be linked to social justice in its 
essentialist, Gandhian and moral economics notions. Furthermore, exploitation can be 
identified in the Marxist theory of labor and in how community's survival is impacted by 
hegemonic power structures. Secondly, social justice cannot disregard the struggle of the 
oppressed and marginalized groups within their own community. As Ambedkar and 
Gandhi recognized, oppression requires social transformation. In a world dominated by 
complex state structures a pure Gandhian model sounds unattainable, although very 
fascinating, and orienting existing political institutions in prioritizing social justice -inspired 
by the Gandhian philosophy of truth and nonviolence- might be more feasible. In 
synthesis, the way social justice is defined in this thesis entails both human and cultural 
dimensions as much as all mechanisms of exploitation deriving from hegemonic power 
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structures. In other words, the subjective dimensions of injustice -derived from exposing 
local communities to the neoliberal hegemony- along with community-based power 
structures should be central when policies are designed and implemented. Bom aspects 
relate to decentralization practices and the perpetuation of injustices can be found in the 
model of development imposed through formalized institutions embracing the good 
governance agenda. The next section will utilize the various frameworks to conceptualize 
the relationship between social justice and decentralization. 
2.7 Decentralization and Social Justice 
The theoretical preference embraces the Gandhian notion of social justice including 
Amdekhar argument. Furthermore, the way social justice is interpreted also draws from its 
moral economy normative dimension within an essentialist framework and to the Marxist 
theory of labor. In first instance, the conceptualization of the relationship between social 
justice and decentralization is inspired by moral economics' arguments about community 
and traditional patterns of self-governance and self-provisioning. Yet, it recognizes inherent 
limitations of some traditional structures if perpetuating oppression (like in the case of the 
caste system for India). 
In my analysis the link between social justice and decentralization is intended as die 
genuine and real inclusion of the most marginalized groups into die democratic process. It 
requires forms of oppression to be removed and effective representation of all people at 
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the local level. In this framework, institutional processes need to reflect patterns of self-
governance without the presumption that a Western notion of the state and development 
are the only possible frameworks. Oppressive hegemonic power structures should be 
challenged through decentralization practices in order for inclusive and participatory 
democracy to reach all levels through dialectic interaction across tiers of governance. 
External pressures to adopt practices aimed at perpetuating power concentration, along the 
good governance rationale, will disempower marginalized groups and reduce the scope for 
social justice. More precisely, the neoliberal project to create an international efficient 
market disregards the real inclusion of marginal groups and other models of development. 
The conflict between genuine democratization and market-oriented policies is at the core 
of this struggle. Social justice, as illustrated so far, might require a kind of decentralization 
that allows the creation of a democracy in a collectivist sense where the common good in 
die process of development is agreed at the local level. A collective democratic structure is 
based on the belief mat social order can be achieved without recourse to power relations. 
The lack of imposed formalized authority presupposes individuals to follow internal morals 
and have cooperative behaviors (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979). To reach this end, a radical 
social transformation aimed at abolishing hierarchy at all levels is also needed. If internal 
structures in the community prevent inclusion of marginalized groups, mechanisms to 
support their voices are needed. Inclusive decisions making relies on some degree of 
restriction of individual ends, if against the common good, and on institutional processes 
meant to overcome oppression at all levels instead of accommodating central policy 
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objectives. 
A collective democratic structure requires a new vision of a decentralized state that does 
not perpetuate power and capital accumulation but prioritize the right to subsistence and 
cooperation. Democratic relations, within a decentralized perspective, should not be 
defined as a pre-packaged notion of western philosophy disconnected from different 
cultural understanding and communal structures. The state can play a central role because 
of its great resources and capacity to redirect policies. It can embrace the capitalistic 
orientation and perpetuate oppressive mechanisms directed to satisfy the thirst of 
accumulation or it can radically change its overall orientation favoring inclusive 
decentralization practices. A possible example of synergetic relationship across tiers of 
governance can be drawn from the experience of Kerala (India) where the principle of 
subsidiarity was implemented. It allowed for a restructuring of authority so that there is a 
system of participatory co-responsibility between institutions of governance at the central, 
regional and local levels. Based on this principle, functions are transferred to the lowest 
institutional or social level that is capable of performing them (John and Chathukulam, 
2003). Although a few exception, (i.e. Kerala) decentralization practices, along the good 
governance approach, tend to pursue another pattern by pushing local communities to 
resist a centralized logic of the market that deprives them from their autonomy, livelihood, 
resources and communal structures. As long as the neoliberal project dominates policy 
implementation, there are fewer chances to have social justice as central part of state 
objectives. 
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The good governance approach for decentralization along the neoliberal logic does not 
substantially address complex issues of power, livelihood, self-governance, political 
participation and social status as central components of social justice. The next section will 
contribute to define the relationship between decentralization and social justice with a more 
in-depth analysis of the role of the state. A deeper understanding of its role is necessary to 
have a grasp over policy implications for decentralization. 
2.8 The political ideology of the state: implications for decentralization 
Decentralization and the state dimension can be seen as a complex relationship and an 
emerging debate is taking place suggesting new forms of governments to reduce inequalities 
and to achieve social justice. This new consensus represents a pressing need of a new 
political project that redirects state policy from a narrow-minded pursuit of economic 
liberalization to a renewed commitment in social justice. The development discourse of 
decentralization, minimal state and liberalization has converged into the common idea of 
state retreat In truth, the state is still behind the curtain very active in providing the 
condition for faster capital mobility and directing material resources away from social 
justice. The real change can be achieved with a radical shift in the political ideology behind 
decentralization and development; the government in this perspective can be a great 
catalyser of struggles in the achievement for social change through policy implementation 
(Lake, 2002). 
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In the current good governance ideology decentralized institutions are very constrained in 
action to redirect state policies. Local bodies' struggle is more channeled to attract social 
welfare limited funds through competition between localities in fear that more monetary 
generous benefits will reach less well-off places. Private-sector decentralized institutions will 
have even less interest to pursue social justice because driven by the pure logic of profit 
Community-based organizations also face difficult times to build enough capacity to attain 
social justice goals because of inadequate funding, political influence, administrative 
complexities etc. Private foundations providing financial resources to decentralized 
institutions usually operate within extremely short-term horizons. They ramer follow 
current policy trends and quick-fix solutions according to the latest academic trend wimout 
radical social change in their agenda (Bandyopadhyay, 2002). Because of conditionalities, 
lack of funding or low interest, decentralized institutions have limited action for social 
justice. 
The neoliberal agenda is at the basis of local institutions' struggle to endorse social justice 
issues in dieir action. According to Lake (2002) ultimate objective remains to depoliticize 
development without addressing the broader issues of power in order to achieve market-
oriented policy goals. Decentralization is implemented to accommodate formal structures 
or private agents instead of crucial issues of social injustices and segregation derived from 
social hierarchies of power, resources and status. The institutional set-up invoked by good 
governance is direcdy or indirecdy preventing the most vulnerable sections to be 
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substantially engaged in the process of political participation and of social change. Their 
lack of power and knowledge of the institutional processes is at the root of their exclusion. 
The lack of space for social justice linked to exclusionary decentralization practices is 
strongly linked to the shift to a form of state that is increasingly managerial in nature. 
Systematic policies of privatization, deregulation and decentralization are implemented at 
the same time in order to create cultivated consumers. The apparent process and rhetoric 
of democratization is instead an imposed system of accountability deriving from a "linear" 
simplified world in which local bodies become routine service providers instead of agents 
of development. This is a very clear political choice that the good governance agenda 
supports through the transformation of participation into a multi-articulated processes and 
mechanisms of service delivery. The fixation of procedural and technical processes with a 
neoliberal logic of consumerism and market integration is increasingly reducing space for 
social justice, depoliticizing local bodies and constraining dissent (Desai and Imrie, 1998). 
The reduction of scope for social justice in decentralization practices has been happening 
through various forces: destatization, internationalization, managerialization and 
denationalization or more precisely the transfer of functions to private agents, global-scale 
institutions and more local scale levels of the state. The power structure has not been 
altered substantially by a mere redistribution of the functions to local level of governance. 
The national state role has not been reduced but directed to accommodate an overall 
ideological choice that gives more space to a corporate-led focus on development instead of 
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social justice and welfare. As Harvey claims, a free market requires a deepening of die state 
to reach social processes mat guarantees the preservation of its crucial power structure in 
the functioning of neoliberal policies (Harvey, 2005:117). An overall ideology change could 
enable the goal social justice to be pushed from above and be transferred to decentralized 
institutions as a policy objective instead of a second-order function. Central governments 
shift away from the neo-liberal arguments of personal responsibility, privatization and 
efficiency can adopt a new direction toward communal responsibility, social equality, 
livelihood protection and social inclusion. The crucial issue for decentralization, in diis 
framework, is not a quantitative redistribution of state power but a qualitative redirection of 
the policies the government is taking and to which power is actually applied (Lake, 2002). 
The role of state power can be crucial in changing the current rationale of decentralization 
but it can hardly happen as long as international organizations pressures many governments 
to adopt a neoliberal trajectory of development State managerialization, free market policy 
goals along with the various constraints of decentralized institutions are limiting social 
justice to be promoted in the process of development. The past sections explained, in 
depth, how the good governance agenda brings limited scope to address oppression and 
social change as much as engagement of local communities in shaping development 
according to their own needs. The introduction of various critiques helped to have a more 
comprehensive picture of internal tension in defining decentralization priorities. The next 
part of this chapter will offer a detailed analysis of how decentralization practice, definitions 
and its historical trajectories in order to contribute to the empirical discussion and critique 
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of the good governance approach. The ultimate goal is to link debates and broader 
conceptual definitions provided so far with the evidence emerging out of its current 
implementation. 
2.9 Good governance decentralization forms and definitions 
Decentralization is a difficult concept to delineate and methodological issues in its 
conceptual analysis gives different and sometimes contrasting shades of meaning to its 
definition. The definition of good governance decentralization follows the break up into: 
political, fiscal and administrative (Cohen, 1996). The overall objective of these various 
forms of decentralization is to create mechanisms in order to transfer of functions to lower 
tier of governance in various ways (Fulton, 2008). 
Decentralization as defined here is a "process of adaptation which contains several phases 
and it is characterized by contradictions, retreats and juxtaposition" (Curbelo 1986:75). 
Decentralization, in its mainstream definition, is defined by International Organizations 
like the World Bank according to the Rondinelli framework. According to his framework 
there are three main types of decentralization around which vast literature and critique is 
based upon: 
y Administrative decentralization. Its objective is to increase in efficiency in relation 
to how resources within a community are distributed and managed. It is the most 
widely used and analyzed. The implementation process in this frame can take up 
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the form of deconcentration, delegation and devolution (Cohen, 1996).9 
^ Political decentralization: It focuses on political participation of local communities 
at the local and regional institutions level. This form is usually concerned with 
democratization and civil society to identify the optimal transfer of decision-making 
power to lower level governmental units. 
>> Economic/Fiscal Decentralization: It seeks to reduce the control of the state in 
areas of economic regulation and social distribution. The ultimate objective is to 
reduce state expenditures and to let the market forces free to promote economic 
development The process to achieve economic decentralization is through 
privatization and deregulation in order to transfer public functions in the hands of 
private parties or individual actors (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1989; Cheema and 
Rodinelli, 1983).10 
The latter seems to be the most ideologically binding, but also the most widely adopted 
• 9In the case of deconcentration, it is implemented through a mere transfer of competences and 
specific functions to inferior levels of state administration such as local institution or parastate 
agencies. This is the least extensive form of transfer and having the central government with 
most control over decision-making. 
• In the case of delegation specific functions are transferred to parastate institutions or local level 
governmental units in which political parties or interest groups hold corporate status granted 
under state legislation. 
• In the case of devolution a transfer of government decision making and administrative authority 
to territorial entities is legitimized by an electoral process and awarded wiui more autonomy 
from the central government in which local political parties or interest groups hold decisive 
influence. 
10 Some examples of economic and fiscal decentralization are: self-financing with user charges; co-
financing with users' contribution to service provision or maintenance; expansion of local revenues 
by improving land distribution or tax collection; intergovernmental transfer of taxes, schemes, 
grants etc.; employment generating service provisions and cost reduction measures of general 
scope. 
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form of good governance for decentralization. A crucial implication of economic/fiscal 
decentralization is linked to financial dependency, intended as devolution, from the central 
government. This implies a reduction of local communities' economical autonomy because 
of pre-fixed limits and priorities over the use of their resources (Haldenwang, 1991). This is 
fundamental because behind the good governance rhetoric there are pre-conditions to 
enforce an agenda that can be detrimental for a local community. According to the overall 
argument, decentralization implemented according to a national policy agenda supporting 
genuine institutional autonomy at the local level, as opposed to the neoliberal market-
oriented framework, can be more beneficial for traditional self-governance. 
Decentralization theorized as administrative, political and fiscal requires further analysis of 
issues arising in its implementation process. The attempt is to maintain the direction of 
this thesis in questioning the mainstream assumptions behind decentralization. The 
challenge to do research in this area becomes how to assess limitations and potentials of 
decentralized governance from its theoretical framework to issues more strongly linked to 
its practices. 
2.10 The Centre-Local dimension in implementing the good governance approach to 
decentralization 
Current practices of decentralization imply some specific terminology and characteristics. 
First of all the notion of area delimitation is connected to the spatial concern for political 
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identity. Its creation can be drawn from die region's peculiar culture, history, language, and 
traditions or following die notion of efficiency. The latter can be particularly problematic 
since diere are often incongruences between die technical delineation of an area and 
settlement patterns, dius attempts to apply die notion of efficiency in spatial division 
usually clashes widi local interests (Smitii, 1985). 
Decentralization along witii spatial division also involves utilization of appointed field 
personnel as part of die administrative organization. They are mainly posted to areas, 
districts, provinces or regions and they are expected to move around across different 
localities. The field officer is typically a full time career official, appointed, promoted, 
remunerated and retired according to die applicable bureaucratic procedures. The various 
parties involved are usually part of a hierarchy with internal methods of co-ordination and 
control. Hence, die various decentralization policies tend to be highly formalized along the 
lines of deconcentration and devolution (Smith, 1985). Process formalization, as 
mentioned before, can lead to neglect die real issues of effective participation, social justice 
and community's reality in decentralized governance. 
Decentralization implies die delegation of political authority dirough bureaucratic means 
and low involvement of die local community. Political authority is usually delegated to 
lower government tiers tiirough constitutional amendments and laws enactment but local 
institutions gain legitimacy to exert limited tasks according to local needs witii restricted 
autonomy from die imposition of national government specific policies' objectives. 
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According to Stanyer (1976) bureaucratic decentralization becomes the means to reduce 
the forces of localism and to enforce similar processes of decision-making and priorities 
across various regions and localities. A centralized system of policy-making is detrimental 
for the local communities and would still be enforced within formal bureaucratic 
mechanisms without much space for dissent and autonomy. 
Bureaucratic decentralization can imply different level of autonomy ranging from complete 
independence to complete integration. Federalism is the process that requires most transfer 
of power from the central state and it usually requires the local governments to receive 
power directly from a Constitution and not from the national government It is also the 
most delicate since it implies the recreation of new relationships across tiers of governance. 
A complete transfer is not usually performed right the way, different economic and political 
interests can create great tensions to fix government priorities (Smith, 1985). In addition to 
it, federalism is only implemented at the state level since the complete transfer of regulatory 
capacity at lower levels is not envisioned in the current approach of decentralization. 
Furthermore, possible level of greater autonomy will not affect the local community to the 
degree required by social justice because the maintenance of formal processes invoked by 
the good governance approach still implies decentralization through bureaucratic means. 
The implementation issues of spatial dimension, bureaucracy and functional 
responsibilities are peculiar to the good governance approach. They are part of formalized 
institutional processes not necessarily aimed at inclusive models of decentralization. They 
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are introductory notions of a deeper analysis of decentralization in die mainstream 
development debates in the last 20 years presented in die next section. The historical 
origins of various debates and ideas will give more ground reality to what have happened in 
good governance decentralization and possible insights for further analysis of its 
implications in the implementation process. 
2.11 Decentralization initial enthusiasm during die Structural Adjustment Programs 
Starting in the late 1980's the continued weakening of centrally planned economies, the 
rapid growth of international trade and investment, and the end of the cold war have led to 
a new conceptualization for governance and decentralization. In Latin America, East/South 
Asia and Central Europe transition from state planned to market economies became the 
focus for national policy agenda. Giving more space to the private sector, privatizing state 
enterprises, downsizing large central government bureaucracy and strengdiening local 
governments became all part of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) aimed at restoring 
markets in the context of good governance. In addition, the new public management 
movement of the 1990's shaped die way international organizations thought about what 
governments should execute in order to a build market-oriented, decentralized and high 
quality service system. Combined widi trade liberalization, advancements in information, 
spreading of financial capital across national borders, diese reforms would purportedly 
spur economic growtii (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007). 
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Even though local and regional government have been sometimes reluctant to take up this 
new model of governance, most central governments and international organizations are 
fiercely pushing forward this policy (Kent, 2007). The international financial institutions 
like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund were the most fervent supporters of 
the model. They have persistendy encouraged the process of devolving authority to the 
local level or to the private sector in order to deconcentrate responsibilities from the 
central government The state in the process of decentralization has been pushed to 
reinvent itself to become mission driven, results oriented, enterprising and customer 
minded. In this perspective, after decades of centralized governance and of state 
management, there has been a revision about the role of institutions in order to fit with the 
new approach. The shift in governance favored by international organizations led to new 
system of rules, mechanisms of interactions across institutional layers and new complex 
relationships between central government, local institutions and citizens (Grindle, 2007). 
As decentralization became prevalent in the development discourse during the 1980's 
neoliberal economists argued that decentralization -specifically federalism- would increase 
allocative efficiency by managing public expenditures according to local needs". Their 
assumptions were based on the principle that as long as capital and labour are mobile, 
market-enabling decentralization gives incentive to lower units to perform well in their 
economical and political tasks otherwise resources will move to odier jurisdictions 
11 According to their view local institutions are also in the best position to respond to local demand 
since information about local preferences is readily available. Moreover the system should be an 
incentive for high quality service delivery because of higher direct competition between federal units 
and for an increase in accountability because of better local institutions' responsiveness. 
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(Weingast, 2005). According to Grindle's perspective (2007), public management 
exponents also developed similar arguments in support of decentralization. Citizens would 
be more motivated to complain and demand for improvements in the case the service 
delivered is not satisfactory. Corruption and taxation mechanisms were also expected to 
improve through local institutions. Decentralization was expected to improve government 
by providing public officials with better capacity to take on new responsibilities through 
mechanisms of improved performance and accountability. 
Along the idea of efficiency and administration improvement, mainstream political 
scientists in line with Cheema and Rondinelli also became advocates of decentralization. 
Their argument in its favour underlines the creation of a stronger participatory local 
democracy and a reduction of centrally national planning by delegating greater authority to 
local institutions that have better understanding of the problems.12 Participation would also 
enable higher representation of minority groups and higher equity in the allocation of 
government resources and investments. Decentralization would provide alternative 
channels of decision-making and reduce local elites' influence in development activities. In 
their view, decentralization is an opportunity for local citizens to learn skills of deliberation 
and to understand the mechanisms of accountability, hence strengthening democracy 
(Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983). 
12 Closer contact between government officials and local communities should increase officials' 
knowledge about local issues and enhance citizens' participation into politics leading to more 
effective mechanisms of reward and punishment of local officials' behaviors. 
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The vision of a more efficient economy, better public service and participation legitimized 
the pressures on developing countries to adopt the good governance approach for 
decentralization. The SAP was the right mix of policies to allow institutional reforms along 
the good governance rationale to accommodate the needs of the market and to link 
political participation wiuh economic liberalization. In the next section, the drawbacks of 
mainstream ideas, developed in the 1980's, about decentralization are explained in order 
to give further critical assessment of the limitation of the current approach. 
2.12 What did not work in good governance decentralization? 
Evidence in support of decentralization in the late 1990s became very mixed and 
inconsistent and many expectations were widely unmet. Economists started fearing an 
increase in public deficit because of decentralization. National fiscal health experts 
responded by placing mechanisms to tight up central supervision of local revenues and 
expenditures to avoid debts. The World Bank itself recognized potential risks and 
weaknesses of good governance decentralization. It warned of widening of regional 
disparities in the provision of public services, increasing public deficit, the inability for the 
central government to use fiscal policy to adjust to economic shocks and possible conflict 
of interests between the national and local interests. The World Bank also suggested to 
discourage political fragmentation and to replace proportional representation with stronger 
coalition at the national and state level in order to reduce conflict over policy agenda. 
According to die Bank, decentralization needed to become more aligned with formalized 
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structures inspired by organization theory and public finance in order to strengtfien central 
control over sub-national government (Burki, Perry and Dillinger, 1999). Because of the 
problems illustrated so far, die good governance approach to decentralization was already 
under scrutiny after a few years from its origin. 
Empirical studies performed by Treisman (2007) to assess the various claims of neoliberal 
economics applied to decentralization showed that most arguments about its benefits and 
macroeconomic dangers ended up being invalid. A few can hold only given certain 
conditions that are very difficult to observe anyways. The expected outcomes of 
decentralization about administrative efficiency, availability of local preferences, 
accountability and policy experimentations were proven empirically insignificant 
(Treisman, 2007). From a public management point of view even the quality of service uhat 
was to improve under decentralization was negligible at best. The incentive structures and 
motivation of local institutions were not necessarily aligned with pressures to improve 
performance. Corruption, performance measurement inconsistencies and over complex 
fiscal mechanisms were also identified as persistent problems at the local and central level. 
13 For example, administrative efficiency does not require political decentralization since local 
competition among units of governance leads to inequalities and is hard to achieve in the real 
world. Fiscal incentives deriving from higher tax collection does not seem to improve economic 
performance. Furthermore check and balances of local governments to keep higher-tier of 
governance accountable does not happen since "divide and conquer" strategies are still adopted 
locally hence reducing decentralized units' capacity to block central interventions. Units of 
governance are also assumed to be better in garnering local information and increase policy 
experimentations but evidence shows only central government facing electoral pressures will 
introduce local policy testing since it has less to lose electorally. Many mainstream assumptions of 
local institutions capacity to improve economic performance and accountability were exposed to 
inherent limitations 
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The various negative feedbacks created a debate about the legitimacy of decentralization 
practices mat in most countries have usually been a top down process rauier than the result 
of grassroots pressure from below (Kent, 2007). 
In political participation, decentralization also showed mixed results. Evidence of elite 
power capturing along with authoritarian enclaves in local settings has exacerbated 
inequalities and local conflicts over economic, social and political issues. Decentralization 
claims to bring more people in the process showed wide variability in the case of 
participation across local governments and not significant social change. Furthermore, 
decentralization had to face some other major challenges, including weak state capacities at 
all levels, difficulties in determining the optimal size of local governments and problems of 
ethnic conflicts and state unity. These problems clash with the vision of decentralization's 
goal to deepen and consolidate democracy by harnessing democratic values and increasing 
responsiveness to local interests especially for marginalized groups (Hutchcroft, 2004). The 
expectations about decentralization to foster democratization did not hold on the ground 
and social injustices have perpetuated. 
After the end of the initial wave of optimism from various scholars, empirical studies 
showed how the reality of good governance decentralization was much grimier. Economists 
did not consider decentralization as a set of service delivery mechanisms in contrast to local 
communities' practices of self-governance. Other realities in developing countries have 
strikingly dissimilar understanding of what economists, aligned with the World Bank, 
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define as priorities for governance and local economy. Along similar lines, public 
management theories aimed at improving public good delivery through formalized 
institutional processes resulted ineffective in developing countries. Furthermore, initial 
enthusiasm about participation did not consider the inescapable consequences of 
neoliberal policies like greater inequalities and oppression. 
The evidence about failures of many claims advanced from the good governance approach 
to decentralization brings back the centrality of social justice in the picture. The way 
decentralization was implemented did not fulfill the original expectations hence it's 
reasonable to argue that the good governance rationale is easily exposed to questioning 
about its legitimacy. The priorities of development flagged by international organization in 
decentralization policies are not inclusive of social justice and of the grassroots reality of the 
oppressed. The managerial state is based on simplified assumptions about society on a very 
clear neoliberal logic and does not seem to grasp the complexities of local struggles and 
dissimilar understandings of reality. The evidence of its inefficacy leads to a necessary 
conceptual re-visitation of decentralization and its critiques through different ideological 
lenses that will be later illustrated. The next section will introduce the inherent paradox of 
decentralization caught between the neoliberal project of creating an efficient and growing 
economy and the process of democratization. This is a point of reflection to assess the 
tension between two clashing forces in decentralization; each with different origins, 
objectives, priorities and implications for development and social justice. 
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2.13 Decentralization and its current inherent central paradox of democratization versus 
nation-driven neoliberal policies 
The ineffectiveness of current decentralization practices leads to the underlining paradox of 
greater sub national democratization versus die level of autonomy accorded from the 
central government. Decentralization's indeterminacy results in key decision still made at 
the central level and policies that follow a pattern highly disconnected from the local reality. 
At the same time upward pressures are arising from communities attempting to speed the 
process of democratization and access to decision making (Oxhorn, Tulchin and Salee, 
2004). The initial push to implement decentralization within the good governance 
approach came from the elites and this is a fundamental ambiguity that merits discussion. 
The same elites established that decentralization is a set of institutional processes meant to 
enable a policy framework embracing economic and political liberalization. According to 
Manor (1999) transitioning to a market economy contrasts with the principle of 
democratization since it enhances economic insecurity and contributes to socio economical 
inequalities and injustices. Support for decentralization as a set of mechanisms to reduce 
rent-seeking behavior from the state apparatus entails the expectation of increased 
economic efficiency in order to promote national economic development As shown, this is 
not necessarily empirically assessed but it entails assumptions about implementation 
practices that can have profound implication for society. 
For example, the theoretical assumption of efficiency implies local leadership in 
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decentralized institutions to be better than national control. The truth is that local 
leadership does not have access to resources or experience to effectively implement 
institutional processes. Political elites have the real control of decentralization as a way to 
hold on more power by further penetrating society imposing social control like in the case 
of the Pinochet military regime in Chile. In the trajectory of economic liberalism 
decentralization is required to establish a depoliticized market-oriented framework. This is 
needed to promote national development without opening substantial institutional space 
for social justice and effective local control over the process of democratization (Oxhorn, 
Tulchin and Salee, 2004). 
The contradictions about who has the real control over decentralization practices have led 
to great doubts about what is the best way to evaluate its successes. The inherent ambiguity 
leads to open spaces for debate about what critical perspective of analysis should be taken. 
The relationship between democratization and decentralization does not seem to hold any 
longer. On the other hand sub national government can be a source of new political 
alternatives and innovative ideas to create a more democratic and inclusive political system. 
Current practices have pushed several movements in Latin America (i.e.: FREPASO in 
Argentina, PT in Brazil, Frente Amplio in Uruguay etc.) at the local and regional level to 
emerge and oppose to mainstream national policies agendas. State decentralization guided 
by narrow political criteria and purely economic driven can create unintended 
consequences of opposition movements proposing for more democratic decentralization 
and social justice (Oxhorn, Tulchin and Salee, 2004). The issue of control over 
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decentralization practices is creating resistance; this is additional evidence of lack of social 
justice triggered by external interference on patterns of self-governance and local 
autonomy. 
The source of dissent can be also explained in the ambiguity of decentralization and the 
way democracy is defined. The good governance approach is more likely to favor 
principles of a liberal democracy based on educating citizens to follow a democratic 
process in order to fulfill their own individual interests in contrast to a more 
communitarian alternative. The latter alternative implies community interests to be above 
those of individual voters hence, a very different conception of democracy. The current 
process of economic liberalization is entangled with decentralization that favors the 
individual voter above the common good leading to reduced space to build inclusive 
democratization and social justice especially for the marginalized groups. The levels of 
inequality and economic dislocations associated to the overall process of transformation 
into a market economy can lead to conflicts and forms of resistance like in the case of 
conceited citizen mobilization (Oxhorn, Tulchin and Salee, 2004). 
The kind of democratization process becomes a crucial dimension because it can support 
the good governance ideology within a logic based on consumerism or can embed an 
inclusive vision diat enable social justice. There are various ways to strengthen local 
democracy and policies favoring a representative kind will rely upon formalized measures 
to strengthen accountability and service delivery. On the other hand, more direct and 
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flexible types of democracy can enhance the inclusion of other groups in society and of 
repressed interests. The real question needs to address whose interests are being served. 
The spectrum of decentralization practices ranges from managerial to political and the 
former are preferred within the good governance approach. The implications for social 
justice in the process of democratization are far more complex dian what mainstream 
rhetoric hopes to convey since it is strongly linked to what interest is ultimately serving 
(Hambleton, 1988). 
Social justice in the process of democratization is part of the fundamental paradox between 
the neoliberal rationale and the communitarian notion of democracy. The final part of this 
chapter will explore how the tension between these two forces in decentralization unfolds 
within different theoretical perspectives. The arguments, exposed so far, has shown current 
practices of decentralization have not delivered democratization favoring the common 
good; the reasons are partly linked to ideological tensions and to internal inconsistencies. 
Deeper understandings of the various debates emerging out of the neoliberal framework 
will be explored in the next section; more specifically: sustainable livelihoods approach, 
institutional political economy and Neo-Marxism. The various issues organized in sections 
delineate what are the tensions and synergies in understanding decentralization through 
different lenses of analysis. The point of views of different school of thoughts can give 
interesting insights about critiques and alternative models to interpret decentralization. 
Their interpretation about current practices is tightly linked to legitimize or delegitimize the 
good governance rationale and its implications for social justice in the process of 
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democratization. 
2.14 Institutional Political Economy (IPE): from neoliberal techno-manegerialism to 
political economic populism in decentralization 
Institutional political economy perspective has a different grasp of decentralization 
compared to the good governance approach. IPE critiques the neo-liberal understanding of 
the market that is limited to property rights and legal infrastructures. IPE instead sees the 
market as a political construct and the focus should be more on political institutions and 
processes. IPE, in this regard, provides an analysis of how economic actions by state actors 
are strongly influenced by their institutions. According to IPE, good governance should be 
defined differently than what various International organizations have conceptualized 
according to the neoliberal rationale. In its view good governance is the result of the 
interface and aspirations of various institutions in the political sphere instead of an outcome 
of market forces or state intervention. 
Roy (2005) argues that institutional structures should be prioritized for the goals of good 
governance. In order to strengthen institutions, the IPE approach emphasizes the 
importance of mechanisms to avoid corrupt practices and rent-seeking behaviors while 
implementing decentralization. Economic elite should be targeted at the local level 
especially to reduce their political power. In very stratified society, authoritarian regimes 
might be more suitable to execute pro-poor and decentralization policies. The conditions 
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to have successful decentralized institutions according to the IPE approach are: a plan for 
making resources available to local bodies, agreeing on functions that need to be 
decentralized and the presence of strong egalitarian community-based institutions. 
Decentralization in this direction is claimed to be crucial to advance democracy and to 
ensure effective institutions for service delivery, accountability of procedures and political 
action that is more inclusive of marginalized groups (Roy, 2005). 
Particularly for oppressed groups, decentralization should embed anti-poverty programmes 
along with human resources schemes in such a way to strengthen the impact on local 
communities. The volume of money spent on education, health and rural development is a 
crucial indicator for human resource development. More funds in this direction should go 
along with more specific programs for the most marginalized groups in order to bring 
development in the countryside where the majority of the population in developing 
countries continues to live. Local institutions should have more power not only to meet 
education and health requirements but also for activities such as employment-creation, 
housing, micro-irrigation and water resource management. These tasks become crucial to 
consolidate stabilization, efficiency and growth at the local level. Furthermore social 
policies in this direction should favor distribution and incentive different patterns of growth 
that are locally rooted. To enhance a stronger local economy institutions should be more 
able to determine the extent and nature of the way funds are utilized without the 
interference of the state. IPE arguments for decentralization converge to the rationale of 
"political economic populism" instead of the "political economic techno-managerialism" 
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invoked by neoliberals (Mkhandwire and Rodriguez, 2000). 
IPE understanding of decentralization only partly relies on the same economic rationale of 
development based upon the notion of growth and market integration invoked by 
International organization supporting the good governance approach. It also supports the 
existence of a decentralization policy enabling local communities to manage, control and 
have access to resources for development in stark contrast with the neoliberal arguments 
for fiscal discipline. IPE underlines the fundamental inability of the current good 
governance approach to revise its practices since its rationale would rather favor the decline 
in social sector expenditure leading to lower self-reliance ratios. The mainstream model 
privileges the reduction of fiscal deficit thus impeding effective and efficient provisioning of 
social-sector goods and services crucial for development as intended by IPE. Furthermore, 
good governance invokes the rationalization of public sector expenditure in order to repay 
multilateral debts or to finance large-scale development projects. Effective decentralization 
cannot be supported by the good governance approach, which favors a minimal state and 
great shifts of resources away from welfare-oriented programs (Roy, 2005). 
The current trend is showing many governments to be aligned with an attempt to transform 
their very nature into a minimalist "techno-managerialism". The tendency to reduce the 
role of the state leads to absence of decision-making, resource-raising powers and funds for 
local institutions. Uneven distribution of resources and aumority can lead marginalized 
groups to have less access to socio-economic assets and to exploitation by the informal 
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local power structures (Roy, 2005). Even though IPE arguments are directed to a strong 
revision of die current good governance approach toward stronger support to the social 
sector instead of excessive fiscal cuts; it does not reject the role of economics in 
decentralization at its roots. IPE instead suggests substantial improvement in the fiscal and 
institutional arrangements conducive to effective decentralization in order to improve 
inclusive growth. 
IPE is a school of thought that shows theoretically the first contradictions within current 
practices of decentralization, its emphasis on social welfare already shows a different 
normative approach in regards to the good governance rationale. The internal 
contradictions of a minimal state and fiscal deficit bring back the issues of marginalized 
groups and the lack of support in their regard. The additional insights offered in the next 
section about the Sustainable Livelihood Approach can deepen the discussion in regards to 
other ways of conceiving decentralization and its uses. 
2.15 Sustainable livelihoods approach and decentralization as political capital 
SLA analysis of decentralization tends to focus to local level realities so the shift of 
decision-making closer to the community is seen as the right strategy to deliver a more 
responsive and poverty-focused public service. Some pre-conditions are necessary to deal 
wiuS local power structure in order to achieve successful decentralization such as: elected 
bodies having enough funds and powers, reliable mechanisms to ensure accountability of 
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elected representatives to citizens and the accountability of bureaucrats to elected 
representatives. Decentralization should be a device to enhance transparency and 
participation in order for SLA projects and programs to meet local conditions and 
preferences (Manor, 1999). 
Decentralization is intended as a process that can provide the institutional framework to 
take forward the goals of projects established from SLA. The ideal one should assume a 
concern for local realities and needs on the part of local institutions to facilitate the creation 
of a livelihood strategy. Successful decentralization integrates a right-based approach and 
great emphasis on the issues of human rights. Policy suggestions in this direction are: to 
strengthen the organisation of the poor, to allow people's priorities to be integrated, to 
provide securing rights of tenure to land and to have civil society more engaged in 
monitoring the performance of local institutions. SLA gives importance to die relationship 
between rights, entidements and the nature of state obligations and how the notion of 
individual agency -as developed by Amartya Sen- should be best integrated in a collectivist 
vision (Norton and Mick, 2001). 
Even though SLA does give more emphasis on the issues of human rights and poor's 
agency it does not provide a structural critique of the good governance approach to 
decentralization. On the contrary, the livelihood approach attempts to internalize part of 
the same terminology for its development practice. In more details, five assets (capital, 
social, financial, natural and political) should be managed in such a way to improve 
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community wellbeing through the processes of decentralization, participation and market 
liberalization (Allison and Benoit, 2006). SL framework basically internalizes the issues of 
decentralization such as power structure in its notion of political capital. SL explicidy does 
not have a theory of social change or political transformation because politics and power 
relation are seen as exogenous variables in relation to all the other capital assets within a 
community. For this reason SLA stresses to look at power only in a dynamic relationship 
without making it a critical factor (Baumann, 2000). SLA is critiqued for its neutrality 
because it looks at decentralization giving low emphasis on the various issues of social 
justice and facilitates current practices without a critical review of the dominant political 
agenda. 
Yet, the most recent debate is more complex and there is an emerging awareness of the 
importance of including politics and power in the livelihood framework. The recognition of 
the limitations of politics as another capital requires to fill the divide in livelihood analyses 
between micro-level perspectives and macro-level structural issues. The micro-economic 
reformulations of livelihoods have tended to disregard how social relations impact 
livelihoods. A new perspective of SLA is pushing the question of class politics and power to 
gain more centrality in the debate. Hence, the necessity of more explicit theorization about 
political processes within the livelihoods' perspective opens up new opportunities to 
conceptualize and define the priorities of this approach that could turn out to oppose to the 
good governance agenda (Scoones, 2009). 
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Even though recent debates have the potential to change SLA political ideas, current 
practices have not challenged the status quo of the current good governance approach, 
which is inspired upon neo-liberal principles. At the same time SLA has emphasized into 
its analysis of decentralization the necessity to allow people's priority to be integrated, to 
give more emphasis on poverty alleviation and more recendy to provide more centrality to 
the issues of power and politics. These two apparently contradicting directions can be seen 
as part of the central dilemma of democratization versus marketization. The last theoretical 
view offered about decentralization is perhaps the most significant because it develops an 
extensive critique on the logic behind decentralization invoked by the good governance 
approach. 
2.16 Neo-Marxists and decentralization as policy device to reproduce forces of capitalism 
In recent years Neo-Marxist writers have offered a more comprehensive explanation of the 
state at the subnational level especially in the contemporary context of neo-liberal 
capitalism and decentralization. The main arguments concern the political aspect of 
decentralization and its impact in the process of capitalism reproduction. The current 
emphasis Neo-Marxists give is to local and regional governments as crucially important in 
the reproduction of the forces and relations of production. 
In times of economic restructuring at a global level starting from the 80's caused by 
increased internal and external debt, dependent countries that in the past have created 
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greater state capacity became more exposed to new pressures for adjustment 
Decentralization, in mis framework, can be interpreted as an effective mean to face 
economic crisis. The relation between state and society remain crucial because with the 
diminishing distributive capacity of the state the ruling elites need to find the best solution 
in the process of modernization. Current practices of decentralization imply a new way to 
articulate functionally and spatially the various political arenas and participation and it 
seems to offer the best solution for modernization (Haldenwang, 1991). 
Neo-Marxist arguments look at the current decentralization model as a crucial aspect for 
capitalism linked to an exploitative state and as an essential element for the renewal of 
capitalism's productive forces such as capital, manufactured goods and labor power. 
Decentralization is better associated with labor; a capitalist economy requires a healthy and 
productive workforce and decentralized local authorities play a very essential role in 
educating the economy of human capital. The new requirements for the economy lead the 
state to provide financial support to local governments in the form of housing, education 
and social welfare. The provision of means of consumption is essential to reproduce the 
right kind of labor in the logic of capital accumulation. While bureaucracy and corporatist 
institutions sponsor social investments for economic infrastructures; decentralized units of 
governance are delegated to manage social consumption in order to adapt labour to the 
requirements of capitalism's productive forces (Smith, 1985). 
Local governments have indeed become an arena of major contradiction according to the 
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Neo-Marxist analysis between the allocation of resources to profitable production and 
unprofitable consumption under the form of welfare. The state is responsible for non-
competitive activities necessary for the functioning of the overall economic system and 
appeasement of social conflict. The consequences of this approach for local governments 
are the production of new inequalities in service delivery and, the establishment of an 
emerging concept of individual's position in collective consumption. The Neo-Marxist 
interpretation of decentralization claims that local communities can become strongly 
influenced by a new conception of ownership and consumption in the logic of profit. 
The economic rationale of ownership and the political/social consequences are kept 
separate in order to achieve the ideological objectives and to sustain the mystification of 
bourgeois society. The participative dimension of decentralization is seen as an instrument 
to fragment political practices. The creation of social consensus on an anti-democratic 
modernization project aims at achieving complete integration of the social forces into the 
capitalist production process. The objective remains to de-politicize and de-radicalize issues 
in order to prevent social conflicts and to strengthen neoliberal practices. (Saunders, 1989) 
Even though local institutions are formally expected to be representative, the lack of 
effective participation leads to societal hostility in regards to the dominant interests at the 
centre. 
To avoid resistances local authorities are controlled in indirect ways, for example 
independence of local governments can be reduced by fiscal controls and the allocation of 
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local functions is sometimes transferred to regional agencies. The concern to maintain the 
conditions for private production and to control local expenditure only for productive 
purposes constrains the ability of decentralized units of governance to raise revenues meant 
to meet social needs. The capitalist state, at the same time, will provide the necessary 
support for infrastructures such as roads, water supplies, energy and communications. This 
is achieved through the cooperation between private parties and various layers of 
governance, under central sponsored schemes, in order to emphasize employment The 
central control over local institutions and emphasis on infrastructures ultimately leads to a 
reduction in the institutional scope for social justice or for class struggle (Smith, 1985). 
Decentralized units of governance are serving the purpose of a centralized ideology; this 
also gready reduces institutional autonomy. The local government faces various constraints 
in action, especially by class interest outside the territory of the local community. It only 
becomes part of the structure and its long-term objectives remain within the interest of the 
bourgeoisie dominating the working class. For example, the elected representatives 
increasingly depend on bureaucrats and professional; mis represents a clear shift from local 
political autonomy to managerial practices. Even the attempts to reduce the inequalities 
always clash with the rationale of a market system whose imperatives are the perpetuation 
of inequality and the maintenance of scarcity. This conflict can also be understood within 
die urban bias. The limitation of local democracy in redistributive terms is based upon 
market driven diversion of funds away from areas of greatest social need (rural areas) into 
areas of greatest economic returns (urban centres). Less priority to die most oppressed 
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areas is an additional argument of reduced space for social justice, in decentralization 
practices, also intended as institutional autonomy (Saunders, 1989). 
Even though the ultimate goal is capital accumulation; the good governance rationale of 
decentralization practices uses the rhetoric of social justice intended as empowerment and 
participation. The idea of social justice, in this case, is based upon the principles of 
efficiency in order to initiate a process of inclusion of the powerless in the existing social 
order without any significant reduction of power from the elite classes. Neo-Marxism has a 
different and more radical notion of empowerment and invokes a bottom up social 
mobilization of society to challenge the hegemonic interest within the state and the market. 
Local institutions, in the Neo-Marxist framework, are identified as agents of 
conscientisation and collective identity formation around the struggle. Substantial 
empowerment requires structural transformation of economic and political relations toward 
a radically democratized society (Mohan and Stokke, 2000). The powerless are instead 
constrained by practices that follow the capitalist model of development and its notion of 
social justice. 
Behind its rhetoric, the capitalist state is seen as the facilitator of decentralization linked to 
practices controlled by the bourgeoisie and elite aiming at creating a model of development 
mainly infrastructure-based with no space for alternatives. Geiser and Stephan (2009) argue 
that a modernizing state is an alienating external institution that has superimposed western 
values deriving from colonialism in developing countries. Chatterjee (2009) argues that in 
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the case of India, along with the alienating state, there has been the "vernacular India" with 
its own politics of people and traditional roots. Even with the intrusion of colonialism, the 
traditional structure of society was far from being destroyed as much as elite politics. The 
coercive apparatus of the colonial state penetrated in the Indian society as well as in many 
others but it failed to reach below the higher levels of the elite. Social movements and a 
subaltern political society exist, along with formalized decentralized practices, especially in 
South Asia and Latin America. Political society or social movements are the source of 
resistance against the current process of decentralization. They create a trichotomy 
composed by the state, citizens as defined by western values and indigenous nations or 
communities. The struggle to create a pluralistic state able to integrate different views about 
local politics and local institutions is ongoing (Geiser and Stephan, 2009). 
The centrality of social justice is especially central in the Neo-Marxist critique to the policy 
rationale of the good governance approach to decentralization. The link between 
decentralization and social justice gains greater significance within this debate than the ones 
explored from IPE and SLA. In this frame, along with the necessity to reestablish policy 
objectives by changing the rationale behind decentralization, the central question remains 
how these perspectives can be translated in a complex context like India. India is the 
country I am going to analyze for my case studies so the linkage between its realities, good 
governance approach decentralization and social justice is very multifaceted. This 
multidimensional relationship will be explored briefly in the next section in order to 
introduce the more analytical section of this dissertation. 
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2.17 Decentralization and social justice in India 
I embrace the idea that various degrees of informal communal decentralized governance in 
India have been existed way before the good governance agenda was formed. Yet under 
the good governance global consensus, die release of funds and decision-making power 
follows a centralized vision for development. Traditional institutions (named Panchayat) 
widi functions of resolving disputes are now transformed into units to implement policies 
decided at die central government. As next Chapter will show, few states have managed to 
transform local bodies into politicized arena of dissent against die neoliberal policies the 
government is adopting. In Kerala, for example, participatory decentralization has managed 
to counter-act the pressures to favor economic growdi and has prioritized social welfare 
and social justice. In other areas of India, local bodies are still exclusionary and powerless 
in front of state policies. In diese cases, diey risk to be transformed into units to spread 
economic liberalization with the perpetuation of inequalities and creation of conflicts 
(Malik, 2004). The most important legislation for Indian decentralization, namely 
Panchayati Raj Act, has attracted much attention for its potential to transfer real power to 
local institutions and for its constraints in doing so. 
The 73rd constitutional amendment meant to constitutionally recognize the Panchayati Raj 
institutions, the Constitution put down in words their duty to prepare plans for economic 
development and social justice. The legal framework implies diat Panchayat cannot 
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prepare any plan for economic development if it does not ensure social justice. Even 
though social justice had received constitutional recognition in the Panchayati Raj Act, die 
central government ignores it by pursuing economic policies that increase rural poverty, 
polarize wealth and create new power structures based on die control over resources or 
benefits distribution. The government does not seem willing to grant untied funds and 
autonomy to lower tier of governance, ultimately centralizing power in its hands for the 
development process and policies' objectives. 
Even though India embraces neoliberal policies, it also has an active parliament and state 
legislatures, free print media, constitutionally guaranteed system of decentralization and 
devolution of power along with a growing and vigilant civil society. The values at the 
foundation of India's democracy and unity are under assault through the process of 
liberalization but die struggle to defend them is also taking place. Ultimately the 
government needs to reorient its economic and social policies for decentralization on the 
basis of the principles enshrined in the Constitution in order to really achieve a balanced 
and locally decided development (Bandyopadhyay, 2002). 
2.18 Where is this research standing? 
The good governance approach to decentralization attracts many critiques. The small space 
for dissent, self-governance and social justice (as defined in this Chapter) are issues tiiat 
need to be addressed while assessing current practices. The mainstream idea of what local 
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governments should achieve follows the good governance approach, which has attracted 
much support from various international organizations. Yet, the internal theoretical 
inconsistencies of the dominant approach are also emerging and translating into applied 
decentralization. This poses fundamental normative question about good governance 
legitimacy in defining how local governments should function. For die purpose of my diesis 
decentralization will be assessed empirically in the specific case of India in order to prove 
how current practices reduce space for social justice. 
In my case studies, I support the Neo-Marxist claims about decentralization in relation to 
social justice. Social justice is defined along the lines of moral economy, essentialism, 
Gandhi and Ambedkhar. I argue diat though the constitutional framework gives substantial 
support for the concept of social justice and social welfare, the implementation of 
decentralization policies do not embed any major scope for social and power change. The 
very oppressed have limited access to formalized political processes and power devolution 
is transformed into a managerial task in order for citizens (especially the most marginalized 
groups) to accommodate the good governance agenda that the government embraces. For 
die case of India, die emphasis on economic development, through decentralized 
institutions, should be at least not greater than programs aiming at achieving gender 
equality, equal access to resources, effective participation, oppressed groups representation, 
preservation of customary practices for self-regulation, space for dissent, measures to 
ensure effective ownership and control over local resources and conservation of traditional 
means of livelihoods. 
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CHAPTER EQ 
In this chapter I explore more in depth the two main central elements of my argument: 
decentralization and social justice in India. Firstly, an overview of social justice as defined in 
the Constitution is given in order to orient me reader to a more specific conceptualization 
for die context of India. Furthermore, I explain the complexities of mechanisms and 
processes defining decentralization for village and forest governance in India and discuss 
how botfi policies apply to my case studies in Uttarakhand. Panchayati Raj stands for 
decentralized village governance whereas Van Panchayat stands for decentralized forest 
governance in the specific case of Uttarakhand. The objective is to provide frame to 
understand how the issues underlined in die previous chapters are linked to the case 
studies widi related contextual specificities. 
3.1 From theory to binding legal reality: The Constitutional definition of social justice in 
India 
Social Justice in the constitution of India is an extensive section. I have selected only some 
specific articles, and judicial interpretations that best relate to my analysis of 
decentralization.. Social justice as defined by die constitution aims at ensuring equal 
opportunity and equal protection of die laws. The basis of its notion requires appropriate 
policies to promote equality with individual freedom and to promote fundamental rights 
witii social justice. 
Indian constitution aims at creating a socialist democracy with emphasis on the basic 
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human rights. In the preamble of the Constitution of India the promise for social justice is 
expressed in the following words: "We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to 
constitute India into a sovereign, social secular, democratic, republic and to secure to all its 
citizens justice (social, economic, political); liberty (of thought, expression, belief, faith and 
worship); equality (of status and of opportunity and to promote among them all); fraternity 
(assuring dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation) (Raju, 
2006:43)." The above principle already envisages that, social justice - including its 
economic and political inclusion- is the declared goal of the Supreme Law. In order to 
achieve the founding principle of the Republic of India there are some basic rights for the 
people and especially for the most oppressed sections of society that will be used as 
framework of analysis for my problematic: 
> Article 14 states that "the state shall not deny to any person equality before the law 
or equal protection of die laws within the territory of India" (Raju, 2006:45). In this 
article there is a clear rejection to all the policies that create inequalities; in my case 
study I argue there is a fundamental ideological element of decentralization that can 
potentially lead to inequalities. 
The constitution of India also developed some equality provisions to treat all 
people equally irrespective of their race, caste, religion, sex, language and place of 
birth. The conception of equality entails preferential treatment in favor for 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes relative to the privileged classes of the 
society since the former have been subjected to long time oppression. 
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o How? For example, the Constitution contains special reservation posts for 
oppressed groups in government jobs, education posts or local institution 
seats. This reservation is based upon the principle of equality of status and 
of opportunity stated in the preamble and on article 15: "not citizens, shall 
on grounds only of religion, race caste, sex, place of birth or any of them be 
subject to discrimination". (Raju, 2006:45) 
Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees the most fundamental of all rights, 
namely, the "Right to life". This is the foundation on which the other rights related 
to social justice are built and it states: "no person shall be deprived of his life or 
personal liberty except according to procedure established by law" (Raju, 2006:71). 
According to the judicial interpretation, the right to life is the basis to live with 
human dignity, free from exploitation. 
o The Supreme Court gave a wider meaning to article 21 by adding "right to 
livelihood" because no person can live without the means of living i.e. 
livelihood. In the case an individual is deprived of his/her means of 
livelihood, than his/her right to life is also offended. 
Article 39 contemplates that the "state shall direct its policy towards securing"(Raju, 
2006:85) the following: 
o That the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate 
means of livelihood 
o That the ownership and control of the material resources of the community 
are so distributed as best to sub serve the common good. 
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o That the operation of the economic system does not result in the 
concentration of wealth and means of production to the common 
detriment. 
^ Article 39 has the inherent objective to secure egalitarian society where there shall 
be no discrimination, inequality, injustice and exploitation in the state. The 
constitution assigns a very prominent role to and imposes heavy responsibility upon 
the state to assure a dignified life to all individuals irrespective of his race, caste, 
color, language, religion and status. 
This is a series of the most important constitutional that will be used to contextualize social 
justice in the case of India. They will guide me, in the following sections, to assess my 
central argument in relation to the policy and empirical analysis of my case studies. The 
constitutional definition of social justice is supreme law in a country where most policies 
promote privatization, liberalization and the increase of FDI. These economic policies are 
leading to an increasingly deepening of the rural-urban divide and to an increase in 
inequalities and conflicts (Patnaik, 2007). The middle-class dream bursts in front of the 
hundreds of millions of oppressed Indians on the edge of survival to accommodate the 
needs of a liberal market economy with uneven social landscape. Decentralization in India 
has recendy gained constitutional recognition but its intrinsic rationale of democracy and 
social justice, as envisioned during the struggle for Independence, are in conflict with the 
pressures to facilitate a free market invoked by the good governance agenda (Karat, 2004). 
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Social justice is increasingly becoming central in the debate as integral part of the struggle 
against external forces reducing its space. In order to assess the lack of social justice in the 
good governance approach I will be relying on the definition provided in the previous 
chapter along with its notion in the Constitution in order to link my empirical analysis to 
contextual specificities and theoretical debates. In this regard, an important notion 
retraceable both in the Constitution and theoretical frameworks is "common good". Good 
governance incentive to liberalization leads local institutions to be more exposed to 
increasing market pressures that widen inequalities, fragment community and foster 
unequal access to resources and political processes. The negative consequences of these 
pressures lead to a deterioration of the common good which is tightly linked to social 
justice. 
Secondly, "livelihood" is also central for social justice, in particular for decentralized forest 
management. The right to livelihood is disregarded when disruption of the environment 
puts many local communities under hardship and when external forces deprive them from 
the right of ownership of natural resources. External forces can be linked to corporate-led 
development activities that breach the constitutional article about adequate means of 
production and favor the blind logic of accumulation pressuring local communities in 
various ways; for example people displacement because of dam construction etc. 
Decentralized bodies, in this dynamic, remain powerless to policies slowly attempting to 
introduce the market through emphasis on infrastructure, marketization and government 
sponsored schemes in devolution. These pressures clash against the tasks of devolving 
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substantial power to the oppressed and ultimately go against Article 39 of the Constitution 
which aims to establish an egalitarian society. The later sections will show how the various 
pressures unfold in the context of India and more specifically in the case studies of 
Uttarakhand. 
3.2 Village decentralization under the Panchayati Raj Act 
The pressures of neo-liberal policies have arisen only recently whereas attempts to 
decentralize power through Panchayat started as early as 1947, right after independence. 
Panchayats originally meant assembly of five in the form of a self-governing council, have 
existed as local bodies with judicial and police powers since pre-colonial times. Only in 
1989 the National Parliament, at the time ruled by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, 
introduced the 73 rd and 74th constitutional amendments; collectively referred as the 
Panchayati Raj Act. When the amendments were ratified in 1992, their objective was to 
revitalize local governments in rural India by mandating regular elections to locally elected 
bodies. Individual states were required to enact legislation through conformity acts to 
devolve power and resources to local bodies, enabling them to function as institutions of 
self-government. The governance structure created through the Act is inspired by the 
traditional structure of Panchayats in order to transfer power to an institution that is 
generally known. 
The constitutional amendments provide for some broad mandatory and discretionary 
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provisions to form local governments, but the implementation of the Panchayati Raj Act 
remains highly state specific. The mandatory provisions in the Act are to strengthen 
representative democracy and political representation: establishment in every state of rural 
local bodies, direct elections to all seats in the Panchayats at all levels and mandatory 
reservations for untouchables, tribes and women. Discretionary provisions are meant to 
endow the electorate at the village level with functions and authority to enable Panchayats 
to function as institutions of democratic self-government (Chaudhuri, 2003). More 
specifically the main objectives of devolution of powers and responsibilities as stated in the 
74th amendment are: 
"a) the preparation of plans and implementation of schemes for economic 
development and social justice. 
b) the implementation of schemes for economic development and social justice as 
may be entrusted to them including those in relation to matters listed in 11th 
Schedule." (Indian Constitution, 73rd amendment: 243-G). 
All the mandatory and discretionary provisions are meant to fulfill both the needs for 
economic development and social justice as central objectives for village governance in 
India. 
The necessity to establish provisions to implement Panchayat Raj also came from the 
widespread political consensus regarding the failures of the bureaucratic and over-
centralized apparatus of the Indian state and also from the suggestions of the international 
community to apply the good governance approach. Yet, the Act aims at revitalizing local 
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government by promoting greater community participation and fairer representation in the 
development effort. This policy framework still leads to the central dilemma of what kind 
of development does the national agenda really envision (Johnson, 2003). The 
Amendments recognize the importance of social justice in particular as it relates to 
gendered and caste dimensions of Indian society. For example, there is a specific 
reservation proclaiming that 30% of all seats should be reserved for women and for 
scheduled castes. Moreover, scheduled tribes reservation should be proportional to their 
presence in the territory. Some states just reformed the percentage of reservation for 
women up to 50% (Raghabendra and Ester 2004). However, the following evidence also 
shows how empowerment, social justice and real inclusion of the oppressed in the 
development process are minor concerns in a national agenda that prioritizes 
infrastructure, employment and market integration. Given the opposing interests of the 
government; the next section explains more in details how the institutional set-up fulfills its 
functions to deliver economic development and social justice at the ground level. 
3.3 The organization of Panchayat Raj 
Panchayati Raj is a system of governance divided in three levels: village, block and district 
The lowest level is "Gram Panchayat" which is a deliberative body at the village level and 
meets at least twice a year. Everyone in the village older than 18 constitutes the "Gram 
Sabha" which is responsible for electing a council, and choose a Pradhan (chief) and Upa-
Pradhan (vice-chief). Elections are held every five years and occasionally political parties 
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nominate candidates though this is a rare occurrence outside of Kerala. Once elected, the 
Gram Panchayat Sadasya (Gram Panchayat elected representatives) has some degree of 
decision-making power. The council decides by majority voting, whereas the Pradhan 
oversees and supervises the whole political process. The major responsibility of Gram 
Panchayat is to implement some local infrastructures (public buildings, water, roads) 
projects according to the type of funding received from the state. Secondly, the Gram 
Panchayat needs to identify targeted welfare recipients of government schemes, to keep 
record of births and deaths, to improve public healdi by providing facilities for sanitation 
and drinking water, to review the annual statement of accounts and to examine reports of 
the preceding financial year. As the subsequent case studies demonstrate, these functions 
are laid down and implemented with a clear bias towards developing infrastructures. 
At the second level of Panchayat there is an important tier called the "Block Panchayat" 
represented by Panchayat Samiti that is the local government body at the block level. More 
villages together form a Development Block and the Panchayat Samiti is the link between 
the Gram Panchayat and the District Administration. It usually covers five to ten villages 
and it does not have jurisdiction over urban areas but only over rural communities. Each 
elected Samiti represents 5,000 on average (Palanithurai, 2006). Its functions related to 
infrastructure and employment are: to construct roads, to improve irrigation tanks, to 
promote cottage industries, to supervise drinking water supply and rural electricity and to 
enhance agriculture. Its functions related to welfare are: to administer activities in the 
domain of primary education, to support youth organizations, to deliver welfare schemes 
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and to implement preventive health measures. Most funding are grants and loans from the 
State Government (Palanimurai, 2002). 
Panchayat's broadest level is "Zilla Panchayat"; it presides over the district level. In other 
words, there is a "Zilla Panchayat" (ZP) for each 35,000 people on average. It usually gets 
me funding directly from the state and refers back direcdy to the District Magistrate in 
order to underline the development needs of the whole district ZP members are elected 
members; associate members, nominated members and their representation are based on 
die proportion of population in the territory. Its main functions are related to agriculture 
like: to supply seeds to farmers, to protect crop and to increase agricultural production. It 
also plays an important role with regard to the infrastructures needed in the district and it is 
engaged in building communication across villages, setting up and run schools and starting 
primary health centres in communities in need. ZP is also in charge to develop statistics, 
survey and evaluation and most importandy to supervise, coordinate and implement the 
overall development projects. In order to carry all its functions, in some states, ZP forms a 
district planning committee witii powers to examine and propose changes in the draft for 
development projects prepared by the Panchayats and municipalities. The Government 
would tfien consider proposals and priorities in the draft prepared by the District 
Panchayat Committee when the State Plan is prepared. The District Planning Committee 
has the power to monitor and evaluate die implementation of die Plan (Rajagopal, 1992). 
Panchayats have different functions according to its degree of representation but the 
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eleventh schedule of the 73rd amendment identifies 29 areas where Panchayats at all levels 
can legitimately have jurisdictions. Many of these are related to agriculture, implementation 
of land reforms, housing, transportation, rural infrastructures, and to some extent health 
and education. The legal framework covers a very extensive number of matters yet; it's 
questionable whether various levels of Panchayat have the actual capacity to carry all of 
them, as later exposed in the case studies. In fact, as shown in the next section, there is a 
coherent link across tiers to deliver a kind of development that prioritizes the necessity to 
build the right environment to expand production through infrastructures, in compliance to 
a market-oriented framework, radier man ensuring social justice. 
The recognition of priorities in one direction does not dismiss the efforts to expand 
education and effective participation however; there are relevant differences in 
achievements regarding social justice across states and areas. For example Kerala and West 
Bengal are renowned for their left-wing political legacy which fully decentralized political 
and financial power in a participatory manner and accomplished a more inclusive 
decentralization. In other cases, like in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, power is still retained at 
higher level of Panchayat and did not significandy brought democracy and power to the 
people. Panchayatj Raj is highly context-specific and gready depends on how much capacity 
is transferred at the local level to carry the various functions mandated by the 11th schedule 
(Narayana, 2005). The next section will explain how the funding structure is central in 
understanding how the institutional capacity to bring social justice is influenced by central 
schemes. 
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3.4 Panchayati Raj: funding limited social justice 
Funding for Panchayati Raj and most of the money is highly centralized and channeled 
from die state government to the district level. Each State government is required to 
appoint a State Finance Commission to allocate taxes and fees to local governments and 
advocate for tax devolution and grants. The State Finance Commission is appointed every 
five years and its responsibilities are to review the finances of the local bodies, to distribute 
part of the revenues of the State to the local level and to pass on the funds for 
implementation of various centrally sponsored schemes. Each state has also devolved some 
power to levy certain taxes and fees only at the village level (Rao, 2000). Evidence suggests 
that there is great corruption committed by government officials in the process of 
transferring money to the local communities. Furthermore, financial devolution meant for 
social needs does not always reach local communities because of its very multilayered and 
complex bureaucratic structure administered at the central level. 
Financial devolution usually come from central sponsored schemes like Jawhar Rozgar 
Yojana (TRY) poverty alleviation schemes, welfare programs and Gram Panchayat's (Gram 
Panchayat stands for village institution) own revenue since it is the only Panchayats that 
could collect taxes, even though it is rarely able to do so. The Gram Panchayat is required 
to organize at least two meetings per year called Gram Samsad where all villagers and 
village heads can participate. The Gram Panchayat in this occasion submits the budget and 
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allocates the funds (Raghabendra and Ester, 2004). The latest and most discussed scheme 
from the government of India is called National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(NREGA). It has guaranteed the right of employment to 60 million rural poor in 200 low-
income districts since its inception in 2005. The Act provides 100 days of employment for 
public work per year, at the minimum wage of 60 Rupees (1.50 US dollars) per day, to one 
rural household member that demands for it and who is below the poverty line. This act 
provides to Panchayats the opportunity to plan and execute works in the local communities 
aimed at generating employment and creation of assets. The logic behind it is based upon 
the capacity of rural communities to build and maintain productive assets and 
infrastructure, while simultaneously alleviating unemployment. The Act enables the 
construction of rural and institutional infrastructures like roads in rural areas, water sources 
such as tanks, canals and activities related to irrigation and land development (Sharma, 
2007). 
There is some consensus in recognizing NREGA positive impact of prividing legal 
enforcement to the right to employment NREGA promises the largest employment 
programme in India. It is seen as a necessary measure to increase agricultural productivity 
in respect to the immense social and ecological diversity of India in order to bring growth 
to the rural economy. NREGA is expected to provide relief in time of distress, poverty 
reduction and enhance private investments in order to lower the fiscal deficit (Shah, 2007). 
Furthermore, proponents underline NREGA to be an attempt to make the process 
accountable through social audits and to include the gender dimension with a 1/3 
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mandatory clause to have women as its beneficiaries (Antonopoulos, 2007). Shah (2009) 
also argues that employment created under the NREGA unleashes a multiplier effect 
whereby the income that laborers earn from large-scale public works projects enhances 
their purchasing power among workers and the production of commodities creates more 
demand for capital, raw materials and workers. Rural transformation is among the central 
objectives of NREGA and can be achieved by creating consumers and enhance 
productivity of small farmers mutually reinforcing the relationship between demand and 
income through the multiplier effect (Shah, 2009). 
In addition to generating employment, the Act also strengthens the livelihood and income 
resource base of the rural poor and ensures its social security. Yet, a vast difference still 
exists between how these communities perceive both issues. Most rural communities have 
sustained themselves on natural resources by owning or using rights to manage them 
through customary practices. Today indigenous communities depend more and more 
upon government centralized decision and have reduced choice about how to preserve 
traditional sources of livelihood through local bodies. According to Lahiri (2007) NREGA 
rather favors an individual wage labor economy among people whose cultural, political and 
social life is community centric; this can lead to internal conflicts and inequalities. 
Another critique of NREGA recognizes its lack of grievance board for workers complaints 
especially from the most marginalized groups. People representing deprived sections of 
society have demanded dismissal of officers along with fairer compensations for unpaid 
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wages. The issues of welfare rights cannot be enforced as long as the district courts are 
burdened with thousands of cases and NREGA does not provide measures to create a 
system ensuring complaints to be heard. A study from the centre for Environment and 
Food Security shows that in Madhya Pradesh and Orissa 50% of the eligible people 
demanding employment did not get any work, which means a violation of NREGA's legal 
framework. Unemployment allowance, in the case there is not work, should also be 
guaranteed but evidence in some districts of the state shows that hundreds of people did 
not receive it at all. The money ends up to officials or contractors and Gram Pradhans 
(elected chiefs) from deprived categories (women, lower castes and uneducated) are 
blamed for corruption with legal action initiated against them. Almost no one from these 
groups can approach the Supreme Court to have protection (Rai, 2007). This example 
shows how the most oppressed groups can be deprived from their right to equality and 
legal protection in relation to NREGA, which leads to furthering social injustices. 
The evidence shows that various schemes are still limited to substantially address the issues 
of social justice for the oppressed groups. Beyond voting power the most oppressed groups 
in rural areas do not have actual power through decentralized institutions to deal widi 
livelihood pressures and rights alienation within the current trend of marketization 
happening in India. They are subdy forced into reforms without protection and perhaps 
disconnected from local realities. At die same, the struggle of rural India is very real and it's 
important to underline die positive intent of NREGA to increasingly recognize the 
importance of agriculture and die unfeasibility of having massive urbanization. The 
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necessity to build basic infrastructures for basic needs cannot dismiss the inclusion of civil 
society in setting priorities and institutional autonomy in deciding alternative uses of 
resources. Even though indigenous communities are still constrained in decision-making, 
there is surely space to reform by making local institutions more participatory and engaged 
in democratic expression of dissent or distress. The next section about Panchayati Raj will 
give a more comprehensive overview of the current tensions and constraints to build 
inclusive democratic processes and to achieve social justice. 
3.5 Tensions, struggles and challenges for Panchayati Raj in India 
Panchayati Raj in India is under an intense debate. Defenders' arguments are grounded in 
a genuine belief in the good governance claims that current practices are good for 
development Although there is an emerging recognition that some reforms are needed, 
proponents of the current model of decentralization for village governance identify the 
main causes of some failures in a limited commitment to implement formalized and 
transparent institutional processes. A more critical analysis of decentralization reforms 
implemented from 1993, in India, points out they have been largely "superficial". 
Substantial distribution of power and resources in rural areas requires political will to 
prioritizes effective actions to change patterns of social inequalities created by caste, 
religion, class, gender through effective social justice-inspired programs. Decentralization 
cannot achieve effective power transfer if implemented within a neoliberal logic, because it 
perpetuates the constraints for weaker sections of society to engage in social change 
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(Johnson, 2003). 
The benefits of decentralization for village governance to bring real power to the people, as 
envisioned from Gandhi, seem difficult to accomplish as long as a centralized policy 
agenda dominates and influence the processes of self-governance. The approach is still top-
down in nature and follows a market-oriented policy agenda, which is centrally adopted in 
most states, while decentralization also aims at revitalizing traditional institutions. The 
inherent conflict starts at the macro-level; multilateral agencies still favors market federalism 
in a deregulated economy and Indian states are expected to compete to attract capital and 
FDI according to the neoliberal logic of accumulation. The States Finance Commissions 
are conceived as instruments to push neo-liberal policies in order to attract investment and 
capital finances (Gomez, 2001), instead of favoring institutional autonomy in managing 
financial transfers. 
The consequence of current good governance practices have emerged since the 90s when 
inter and intra states disparities have started to increase. Intra-national inequalities have 
lead to internal conflicts and community fragmentation. This has increasingly led to 
demand for the formation of separate states in order to leave out the poorest areas in the 
process of transition to a market-economy and to attract more capital. The Indian national 
government, to cope with these pressures, is adopting limited but flexible federalism 
through the creation of new states, setting autonomous council and according special status 
to some areas based on ethnic, regional and linguistic differences. Internal fragmentation is 
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favored by market-driven liberalization which threatens the functioning of the Indian 
federal system in the spirit of democratic decentralization. Struggles to arrest the splitting of 
states are stronger where linguistic nationality consciousness and democratic structures are 
deeper rooted like in West Bengal, Kerala and other few areas (Karat, 2004). The 
challenge ahead for Panchayati Raj is to modify institutional structures to promote national 
unity through ethnic/religious harmony and a democratic system based on social justice 
prior to neoliberal policies. The approach for decentralization in India needs to be 
modified in order to bring power to the oppressed by ensuring national harmony and 
social justice. 
Despite the necessity to revise current practices to bring more power to the marginalized 
groups, there are some positive signals for women arising out of Panchayati Raj and 
decentralization in general in India. According to Narayana (2005) the reservation rule for 
women and lower castes is a massive experiment in social engineering that has not 
precedent in today's world democracies. In some districts of the poorest states, such as 
Uttar Pradesh, women Pradhan (elected chief representative) are over 50%. This is a clear 
quantitative advance in the silent revolution of Panchayati Raj and its potential outcome for 
social change should not be disregarded (Narayana, 2005). A step forward to ensure more 
inclusion of marginalized groups also comes from the engagement of a few progressive 
non-governmental organizations. For example, Aagaz Foundation is providing training 
courses to help elected women to overcome the struggles associated to their political roles. 
Aagaz approach aims at creating a vibrant political space where the gender gap is filled 
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through a learning process facilitating communication, speech and action. They are taught 
in a manner conducive to critical reflection, shared knowledge, strategic/experiential 
learning, and the overcome of women's self-perception of incapacity. Aagaz foundation is 
achieving tangible results despite great patriarchal resistances and it is redefining 
governance from the side of women leaders (Virdi, 2009). 
The inclusion of marginalized groups (i.e. women) also requires a radical qualitative jump 
and that's where civil society and left wing politics are playing a crucial role. Various 
sources of political resistance are directly and indirectly pushing to convert the 73rd 
amendment into a tool for radical social transformation. In States like Kerala, elections are 
fought on political lines and a process of deeper politicization in the village Panchayat is 
leading to more democratic vigilance over development processes H .The radicalization of 
Panchayat leadership, in some Indian states, has been necessary to enable peasant 
movements, land reforms and the breeding of democratic consciousness favored by 
grassrooted politicization, civil society building and class struggle. Panchayati Raj does offer 
14 Kerala is a special case for decentralization. The people's campaign for decentralization initiated 
in 1996 led Panchayati to be implemented in a very politicized manner. Party affiliation is really 
strong and it influences decentralized bodies more man in other states. Furthermore after the Left 
Democratic Front launched the People's campaign for decentralised planning, devolution was set at 
35 to 40% of expenditures to local bodies. This led to unprecedented planning and coordination 
among Panchayats and it also led to greater political mobilisation to hold the ruling government 
accountable of its redistributive agenda. Devolution was maintained and increased and its 
effectiveness is recognized nationwide. The commitment of the state government to substantial 
transfer seems to be the premise for success even though Kerala has a very educated population. 
Findings from OECD studies indicate that Kerala's poor are also more involved in Panchayat than 
in the other states. In most states the poor are poorly educated, less exposed to the print media, less 
engaged in political parties and consequently less engaged in Panchayat. Kerala, on the contrary, 
has a high-educated population forming an active and vibrant civil society. Kerala local governance 
is intensively politicized and power capture is much lower than other places in India. (Narayana, 
2005) 
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scope for an engaged and vibrant civil society from grassrooted democratic institutions. The 
same potential is retraceable during the freedom struggle, before Independence, when the 
Gandhian perspective of village mobilization merged with peasant movements under the 
Marxist and radical leadership (Narayana, 2005). 
Panchayat has great potential, yet it also has the serious challenge to enable village India to 
become agent for a second battle of liberation in the so-called globalised world of 
neoliberal economics and good governance objectives. According to Malik (2004) 
resistance can be possible if leadership is radicalized through training, capacity building and 
radical consciousness to build a new alternative at the institutional level. A non- radicalized 
Panchayat regime, as the current status in many states, will hardly be more than a 
representative institution subordinated to higher authority and easily manipulated to 
accommodate oppressive policy objectives decided at the central level (Malik, 2004). The 
potential and challenges of village governance for India are at the roots of conflicting 
visions for development one based on the principles of neo-liberal economics and the 
second invoking radicalized self-governance supported by a transformed state that 
prioritizes the common good. 
The two visions of Panchayati Raj are linked to the struggle of adopting the good 
governance agenda versus the necessity of creating real spaces for dissent and inclusion of 
the marginalized groups. The second policy under study is decentralized forest governance 
and it faces similar pressures as decentralized village governance, although in different 
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ways. Forest management is central to my specific case studies in the state of Uttarakhand. 
Even diough Uttarakhand's policy is different in nature and origins dian all other Indian 
states; it is necessary to understand die rationale of national policy for forest management 
Its analysis can help to have a broader understanding of die existing pressures on 
livelihoods and of die terminology used to favor a market-integration approach along die 
lines of good governance. The same pressures will also be tracked in die most recent 
guidelines for the specific case of Uttarakhand Van Panchayat policy. 
3.6 An introduction to Forest Management in India 
Forest policy is not new in India; die British rule set die first legal guidelines called die 
Indian Forest Act in 1865. It established die state as die largest owner of forests and 
divided responsibilities of conservation among its agencies in order to finance its 
infrastructures projects for India and United Kingdom. Rights and concessions of 
extraction of fuel wood, fodder and timber from die forests for household consumptions 
were accorded to villages in exchange for labor contributions in order to maintain die forest 
stock at me same level of conservation. Before tiiis act passed mere was not forest proven 
to be private and it was commonly managed at die village level (Rangan, 2002). 
The current policy framework to manage forest resources in India is called Joint Forest 
Management alias "JFM". It addresses die problems related widi deforestation by 
promoting a new partnership between local forest dependent people and die state in order 
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to manage forests in a more sustainable manner and sharing joint benefits from it JFM is 
based on decentralization; its objectives and regulations are decided at the local level in a 
participatory way widiout actually implement any form of ownership distribution between 
me local communities and the state. About 22 out of 28 states are implementing JFM in 
different forms and each one developed specific guidelines based on their own contextual 
specificities. About 17 million ha forest are covered by JFM and there currently are around 
84000 village forest councils (VFC) also named Forest Protection Committees (FPC) 
engaged in implementing it Many VFC came to existence also in response to the 
requirements of local projects by external agencies operating in India (Kaushal and Kala, 
2004). Many Indian states have received substantial loans from the World Bank and other 
external donor agencies to operationalize JFM according to the good governance agenda 
(Ranganathan, 2003). 
3.7 Legal framework and guidelines of Joint Forest Management 
The current legal framework derives from loose guidelines contained in the National 
Forest Policy that was approved in 1988 and the implementation remains state specific. 
The act recognizes the forests in the country to have suffered serious depletion. According 
to the government, the main reasons associated to forest reduction are attributable to 
increasing pressures from excess demand for fuel-wood, fodder and timber. Secondly, the 
identified factors for resource exhaustion are also linked to lack of preventive measures for 
forest protection; alteration of forest lands to non-forest purposes -without making sure 
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appropriate afforestation is undertook- and the use of forests as a source of revenue. On 
these grounds, the government of India in 1988 deemed necessary to change direction in 
terms of forest management by planning, a new strategy of forest conservation. The 
national forest policy to achieve its objectives embraced the notions of preservation, 
sustainable utilization and enhancement of the natural environment (Government of India, 
1988). 
Drawn from the basic objectives governing the National Forest Policy the following 
citations are relevant for its analysis: 
o "Maintenance of environmental stability through preservation and, where 
necessary, restoration of the ecological balance that has been adversely disturbed by 
serious depletion of the forests of the country." (Government of India, 1988:1) 
o "Increasing substantially the forest/tree cover in the country through massive 
afforestation and social forestry programmes, especially on all denuded, degraded 
and unproductive lands." (Government of India, 1988:1) 
o "Increasing the productivity of forests to meet essential national needs." 
o "Encouraging efficient utilization of forest produce and maximizing 
substitution of wood." (Government of India, 1988:2) 
The first and second objectives are in line with the environmental concern addressed in the 
preamble and invoke to management practices more sensitive to the preservation of forest 
resources. The last two, on the other hand, embrace a terminology common to the 
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neoliberal notion of "productivity" and "efficiency" linked to the long-term goal of market 
integration. The same terminology is reiterated in further articles of the Forest Policy acts, 
for example: "3.1 Existing forests and forest lands should be fully protected and -their 
productivity improved". (Government of India, 1988:3) The policy act also encourages 
local population to improve the productivity of minor forest produce and to retain die 
revenues coming from them: "3.5 Minor forest produce provides sustenance to tribal 
population and to other communities residing in and around the forests. Such produce 
should be protected, improved and their production enhanced with due regard to 
generation of employment and income." (Government of India, 1988:5) The process of 
improving production is assumed to be the priority for indigenous population. This shows 
diat the policy framework emphasizes the issue of production above livelihood along with 
the rhetoric of environmental conservation. 
The policy suggests only some limited degree of ownership of the forest to marginalized 
groups. It does not address the issue in a more comprehensive way, the forest resources are 
still assumed to be under the control of the government for its own purposes: "The vesting, 
in individuals, particularly from the weaker sections (such as landless labor, small and 
marginal farmers, scheduled castes, tribal and women) of certain ownership rights over 
trees, could be considered, subject to appropriate regulations; beneficiaries would be 
entitled to usufruct and would in turn be responsible for their security and maintenance. 
(Government of India, 1988:6) The neoliberal rationale strongly emerges in government 
regulations since local communities are assumed to manage the forest as beneficiaries 
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instead of owners or direct agents in decision maker of how to use it. 
In 1999 the National Forestry Action Programme (NFAP) complemented the Forest 
Policy. The NFAP is a far-reaching long-term strategic plan to be implemented in a time 
span of 20 years. It identifies a strategy to achieve sustainable forestry development in India 
by harmonizing the activities of different stakeholders. The NFAP derives from a 
coordinated effort from the state to manage different inputs from various national and 
external experts in forest related issues. NFAP fixes five programs to be followed: to 
protect existing forest resources, to improve forest productivity, to reduce total demand, to 
strengthen the policy and institutional framework and to expand the forest area. In NFAP 
the government also recognized the limitation of its financial resources to execute the 
mentioned agenda. T o address its constraints it included an additional clause to increase its 
effort to mobilize resources from external and internal agencies -for example FAO and 
UNDP- in order to achieve the proposed objectives (Singh, Sinha and Kumar, 2004). 
The government of India decided at The National Conference of the Ministers of 
Environment and Forests held at Coimbatore in January 2001 to reiterate its commitment 
to enhance the condition of India's forest In order to do so, it outlined a new set of 
strategies to realize the goals of the National Forest Policy. The objectives are: investing in 
afforestation, control Fires, special measures for drought-prone areas and infrastructures 
improvement (FAO, 2004). It seems, once again, the main concern for the government is to 
protect the environment through a top-down approach without engaging local communities 
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in the decision making process of how to manage and preserve forest resources. The 
government effort to preserve the environment does not provide a clear set of guidelines 
dealing with the issues of livelihoods and access to resources as central to social justice for 
local communities living in the forest 
The latest significant government commitment in terms of decentralized forest 
management and its preservation is set in 2002 and does not show greater space for social 
justice intended as livelihood protection and access to resources. The National Wildlife 
Action Plan is structured in six major programs to be achieved in a time span of 15 years. 
The first is to strengthen and expand the protected area network; the second is to effective 
manage protected areas, the third is to preserve species under the threat of extinction and 
their habitats; the fourth is to replenish degraded habitats outside protected areas; the fifth 
is to control illegal actions against wild animals and plant species; and lasdy to keep 
monitoring and researching for the best measure to be undertaken in environment 
conservation (FAO, 2004:120). Even though the national action plan reiterates the 
commitment to preserve the environment, it still does not address any issue related to 
people living in forest areas and their livelihood. Although mixed results have been 
achieved in terms of forest preservation, increasing pressure on the Indian population who 
relies on forest resources is becoming a major concern. It's reasonable to assume, in the 
longer run, increasing constrains to sustain forest-based livelihoods and to ensure fair 
access to resources if the need for market integration and productivity maximization are 
maintained as fundamental goals for forest management at the national policy level. 
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Substantial deterioration of the right to livelihood, as defined by the Constitution, for 
marginalized communities clearly indicates the government low priority for social justice in 
decentralized forest governance. 
3.8 Tensions and livelihoods implications for National Forest Management 
The pressures imposed by decentralized forest management policy to efficiendy manage 
the forests and to improve their productivity lead to serious restrictions for traditional forest 
rights. Their reduction leads to conflict over demarcation of forest boundaries, forest 
ownership and tenurial rights. The nature of inter and intra-village conflicts also is linked to 
political interference in the usage of the forest and pressures from government agencies 
(Forest Department) to commercialize the forest For example, Manipur forest department 
decided to constitute JFM with active participation of local villagers in pursue of "usufruct". 
The logic of sharing profit without people consent is contained in "usufruct" as the 
appropriate legal term for deriving profit from property belonging to a third party as long as 
it is not damaged. This is an example of social injustice emerging out of the rationale of 
market integration for productive land and forest through JFM. Furthermore, external 
pressures arise out of big development projects at the expenses of people's livelihoods 
without recognition of traditional rights. Joint Forest Management is facilitating the 
engagement of private parties by using policy guidelines as a tool to encroach upon land of 
the people living in the forest or hilly areas and shift ownership of resources away from 
local communities. The rhetoric of environmental conservation, emerging from policy 
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documents, hides the serious socio-cultural implications of market integration for 
traditional society; especially for livelihood of communities highly dependent upon forest 
resources (Shimray, 2009). 
A refocus on the question of livelihood is central in redirecting policy priorities to 
strengthen the rural areas and to address the implications for communities' livelihood 
based on forest resources. The flawed assumption of market-led strategies are seriously 
undermining the significance of the biomass economy and neglecting the importance of 
forest reliance for livelihood. Biomass or biomass-related resources dependence cannot be 
disregarded and an approach solely based on market-integration can only lead to a 
decrease in the biomass availability since growth favors intensive extraction at the expense 
of natural resources. Furthermore, the most deprived sections in forest areas that have a 
higher reliance on common property resources for their subsistence requirements are the 
most exposed to hardship. The emphasis on growth is also reflected in the rationale of 
today's forestry policy of India since some historical structures put in place by die British in 
order to facilitate the extraction of raw materials have also continued after independence. 
The most fundamental issue is economic bias of a scientific regime, which excludes and 
delegitimizes local knowledge and traditional rights. The more recent knowledge system 
decontextualizes previous approaches in the name of "national interest" resulting in a 
centralized understanding of conservation, livelihood and forest (Hill, 2000). 
In some states like West Bengal significant dissent and resistances against the national 
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interest from local communities have led to policy shift for decentralized forest 
management. The left Fronts party initial resistances and dissents achieved some degree of 
success especially in collaboration with Panchayati Raj institutions and government 
agencies. For example, the Forest Department in West Bengal, since the mid 1980s, has 
begun to encourage informal agreements with villagers and explicit recognition of the 
importance of livelihood as opposed to other states. Its approach also favored a more 
inclusive planning and monitoring witJi t_he local communities. Once again, local resistances 
to external pressures on livelihoods along with political pressures have resulted in a more 
positive outcome for food security and planning. In India, except for a few states, most 
areas witli limited political dissent have experienced Joint Forest Management as a top-
down policy prioritizing the logic of productivity above livelihood pressures and really 
constraining the action of local institutions namely Forest Protection Committees (Hill, 
2000). 
In the next section, the complex dynamics between local institutions, livelihood, social 
justice and external pressures will be analyzed for the case study of Uttarakhand. Its 
policies for village and forest governance will be further contexrualized in order to better 
situate the case studies in Chapter rV. The narrowing down is crucial to underline sources 
of similarities and differences witii tiie current trends at tiie national level. A brief state 
introduction will be followed by how Panchayati Raj and Forest policy (Van Panchayat) 
applies in Uttarakhand and its implications for decentralization and me various issues of 
social justice. 
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3.9 Introducing Uttarakhand: from self-reliance to oppression 
Before delving into the policies implementation in Uttarakhand I deem important to 
underline some statistics for the sake of general knowledge: 










53,483 Km square 







1.62% of total India area 
4.5% of India's forest 
0.7% ca of total India population 
75.78% of total Uttarakhand population 
933 in India 
75.85% in India 
54.16% in India 
Source: Census of India (2001) 
Uttarakhand separated from Uttar Pradesh on November 2000 and came to existence as 
die 27"' state of Indian Union on the 9th November 2000. Uttarakhand is a well-demarcated 
geographical and socio-cultural unit forming a part of the central Himalaya. It is a primarily 
mountainous region consisting of two divisions: Garhwal and Kumaon. Each division has 
similar ecological, socio-economic and edino cultural factors. There is a tendency to view 
rural Indian in die Himalaya as a model of equality and unity. The near absence of caste 
and class hierarchies in Uttarakhand is captured by the following quotation: 
The (attenuated) presence of caste notwithstanding, hill society exhibits an absence 
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of sharp class divisions. Viewed along widi die presence of strong communal 
traditions, mis makes Uttarakhand a fascinating exception which on is unable to fit 
into existing conceptualizations of social hierarchy in India. (Guha, 1989:14) 
The social organization of Uttarakhand can be considered more egalitarian than other parts 
of India and the forms of intra caste oppression is perhaps less pronounced. This is a 
significant factor since agrarian relations and communal traditions did not create the same 
structures of inequalities and marginalization traceable in most of India. 
As illustrated, Uttarakhand has a peculiar social structure. Furthermore, it also has cultural 
and historical significance for India. It represents a very important place for spirituality 
since various religious influences spread across the state starting from the 6th century BC 
furthermore; the sacred Ganges' river originates from its mountain range. Various centuries 
alternating king rules, hegemonies, invasions and brief peaceful co-existence led to die 
most recent history of British colonialism. The British Empire governed the region from 
1814 to independence and while keeping Kumaon under direct rule; the Garhwal region 
was restored under the local Raja (King) control under an agreement After independence 
the two sections were merged and administered by two commissionaires belonging to die 
state of Uttar Pradesh. 
The history of Uttarakhand is marked by great oppression. Before colonial rule peasants 
were self-reliant in agriculture and exported food grains to the plains during famines. 
Relative autonomy (aldiough in various degrees) was granted from various rulers to local 
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people for their internal affairs. A condition of mutual trust and loyalty between the 
population and local kings has persisted for a long time. More recendy, die British Empire 
introduced die money economy in the area and performed, according to scientific forestry 
criteria, intensive extraction of natural resources slowly deteriorating the reliance of local 
people on their forests. The colonial rule also imposed practices typical of the feudal 
system including an oppressive forced labour system and it enforced new land regulations 
favoring private property. After independence, the trend of excessive felling and extraction 
of resources continued under the Uttar Pradesh administration. Commercial forestry led to 
biomass deterioration in the mountains and to serious multidimensional implications for 
the local economy as well as for livelihoods. Villagers have experienced a dramatic 
reduction of their rights and control over common resources and self-reliance is not 
guaranteed anymore (Phatak, 2007). 
Today's fragile equilibrium between livelihood and forest resources is still compromised. 
People from the new state of Uttarakhand face great challenges ahead of them; new 
external pressures can have disastrous consequences for local reliance on the forest In 
more details, both die Indian and state governments in partnership widi multinational 
corporations are engaged in large scale development projects that will have dramatic impact 
for the local population. Hydropower projects are indeed die ones that are currendy 
disrupting a substantial amount of forest, water, flora, fauna and die natural resource base 
which forms die basis of local livelihoods (Doval, Juyal, Sundriyal, Rana and Sati; 2007). In 
Uttarakhand, resources and livelihood will be crucial factors in assessing market pressures 
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and the magnitude of social injustices that local institutions are facing, especially for die 
case of forest governance. Village governance policy in Uttarakhand, introduced in the next 
section, also has limited space to oppose the good governance agenda for decentralization. 
The reasons illustrated link to lack of regulations, resources and political support to 
guarantee institutional autonomy, social justice and resistance against neo-liberal policy 
objectives. 
3.10 Panchayati Raj in Uttarakhand: Functions, Funding and Structure 
The present Uttarakhand was formed in 2000 and the first independent elections for 
Panchayati Raj were held in 2003. The state is divided in two divisions namely Garhwal 
and Kumaon with 13 districts Zilla Panchayat, 95 Blocks Panchayat and 7335 Gram 
Panchayats. The layered structure still does not have a distinct legal framework and it is still 
partly regulated along the rules governing Panchayat Raj in Uttar Pradesh (U.P). More 
specifically the documents in force regulating local village institutions are U.P Panchayat 
Raj Act 1946 and section 63 of U.P Kshetra (Block) Panchayat and Zilla Panchayat Act 
1961 which provides the devolution of functions to die Panchayats in conformity with 
Article 243-G of Constitution of India (Param and Pratna, 2008). 
The budget for Panchayat Raj is not a separate section of state expenditures like in other 
parts of India since its legal framework has not been yet finalized. There are many centrally 
Sponsored Scheme (CSS) endowing usually very low amount to Panchayats. The taxation 
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at district level comes from rent from issues, license fees, share from resin, miscellaneous 
interest on deposits, income from animals, fairs and exhibitions, journey arrangement, 
regulation of bazaars etc. The sources of revenue for local bodies are, instead, nil and 
usually come from taxes on fishponds, shops and festivals. Gram Panchayat can also levy 
tax to villagers but the law cap is very low: around 5 rupees per year (1 Canadian Dollar= 
45 Rupees). The recommendations of the first state finance commission is to distribute 
only 11% (40% in Kerala) of the state net tax revenue to Village Panchayats and 
Municipalities (42.23 and 57.7 per cent respectively). Uttarakhand faces similar constraints 
as many other States to manage autonomously its own projects given the limited funding 
mainly coming from the State. The funding structure once again shows to be strongly tied 
to centrally sponsored schemes which objectives are established from higher tiers and 
meant to follow the central policy objectives (Param and Pratna, 2008). 
Without substantial funding, village governance in Uttarakhand has limited action but 
formal regulations still transfer many functions at the local level and ensure the functioning 
of institutions according to Constitutional guidelines. At the village level die Gram Pradhan 
(elected chief) chairs the Gram Sabha (elected council) of the village and the Secretary of 
Gram Panchayat maintains the minutes of meetings. The issues raised at the village level 
are sent to block and district Panchayat within 15 days. Gram Sabha is required to identify 
the beneficiaries of development schemes, determine economic and social development 
according to the central guidelines, right to select plans in open meetings, monitoring and 
review of plans. Gram Sabhas have also been rendered accountable to consider and pass 
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the budget prepared by the village council. Gram Sabhas meetings are held at least once 
every 6 months and the minimum quorum is 20%. The subjects covered under die village 
Panchayat in the state are drawn from the 11* schedule: agriculture, primary education, 
health and family welfare, minor irrigation, social welfare, woman and child development, 
drinking water, public distribution, horticulture, sanitation, poverty alleviation schemes, 
rural housing, animal husbandry and rural development. As later illustrated in the case 
studies, it's unlikely mat Uttarakhand's local bodies have the actual capacity to carry all 
functions to the extent mandated by state regulations or local preferences. 
Part of the reason is die recent formation of the state and the lack of a distinct legal 
framework. In this frame, Uttarakhand does not have district planning committees and a 
system for preparing a consolidated Draft District Development Plan. In its place mere are 
six standing committees in each Panchayat but dieir work and influence remains nominal. 
In each tier there are: Planning and Development committee, Education Committee, 
Construction Work Committee, Health and Welfare committee, Administrative 
Committee and Water Management Committee (Param and Pratna, 2008). Each 
committee has at least one woman, one scheduled caste member, one scheduled tribes 
member and one person from Other Backward Caste (OBC). In 2008 die parliament has 
also passed a bill to ensure 50% reservation to women marking a strong commitment to 
women's participation and as a possible step forward to ensure social justice. 
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3.11 Early Panchayati Raj in Uttarakhand: potential and struggles 
The absence of a State-specific legal framework opens up challenges and potentials for 
decentralized village governance in Uttarakhand. According to die Constitution, Gram 
Panchayats should work as institutions of self-government with clearly defined functions, 
adequate funds and responsibilities. In various State Panchayats Acts mere is an emphasis 
to establish local bodies for better administration and participation of rural areas within a 
centralized development programme instead of devolving real autonomy at die local level 
(Param and Pratna, 2008). Even diough most states have incorporated some provisions like 
reservation for women and scheduled castes/tribes, five-year term, constitution of State 
Finance Commission etc., diere has not been substantial devolution of powers and 
functions to Panchayats except for Kerala and a few odier states. This is also die case for 
die recent state of Uttarakhand, which have not yet allowed for substantial power transfer to 
women, scheduled castes/scheduled tribes and odier marginalized groups. Possible reasons 
for some states not to have successfully transferred power to die oppressed groups are: elite 
capturing, resistant bureaucracy and formalization of institutional processes diat do not 
necessarily reflect local needs (Johnson, 2003). The representatives from the more 
oppressed sections of society still have limited space for action at die institutional level. 
There are different debates about how die state should implement village governance in 
Uttarakkhand: for example, according to Pal (2007), die Panchayati Raj State Act should 
reverse the trend and make the Gram Sabha a strong body empowering people to define 
dieir own priorities and guarantee traditional rights over resources. Firstiy the preservation 
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of traditions, customs, cultural identity, community resources of people should be 
established in view of the largely homogenous culture and traditions of community effort 
typical of hilly areas, which transcend in nature the existence of other internal divisions. 
Secondly, Gram Sabha should cover only a small population considering the geography of 
die territory, in order to do so; a creation of sub-Gram Sabha can guarantee as much 
representation as possible. Three-layered Panchayati Raj in Uttarakhand should also not 
lose the opportunity to select and manage district and sub-district government officials in 
order to avoid conflict between a rigid centralized bureaucracy and the need at the local 
level. Furthermore, in order to achieve holistic autonomy, the judicial system needs to be 
strengthened at the local level in order to enable deprived sections of societies to claim 
their Constitutional rights and invoke for social justice (Pal, 2007). These are some possible 
visions for the future Panchayati Raj Uttarakhand Act to prioritize social justice. 
Bhatt (2007) gives different policy suggestions that are drawn from the necessity of using 
the market mechanisms to ensure distributive justice in a democratic way. This 
argumentation links more strongly to the good governance trajectories of market exposure. 
The starting point for this strategy is the tremendous potential of natural resources to be 
transformed into wealth through an increasingly educated and disciplined labour force. In 
order to pursue this objective, village governance in Uttarakhand needs to work on two 
levels. Firstly, devolution of power to people should be carried out to protect die flight of 
capital from the state and to create an economy according to local demand. Full 
participation from the whole community is also needed to ensure a substantial increase in 
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production, asset creation and value addition. Secondly, decentralization needs to support 
basic infrastructure development along with the objective to provide people with access to 
healthy markets where can charge better prices for their goods. Secondly Uttarakhand 
needs to initiate massive campaign to educate institutions and people to development 
planning. The range of actions in this direction are: comprehensive technical exercise of 
making sectorial plans, assessing local needs, financial oudays and implementation, 
monitoring and evaluating development projects. This possible scenario is driven by the 
good governance assumption that a healthy exposure to markets should be the focus for 
decentralized governance along with social justice intended as equity, productivity and 
efficiency (Bhatt, 2007). The various debates shown so far have proven how this approach 
disregards the nature of social justice as defined by the constitution and lead to inequalities 
at many levels. 
However, the reality of Gram Panchayat in Uttarakhand today is still linked to its limited 
capacity and autihority. It remains an agent of the government rather than a local 
autonomous institution working for the people. Hilly areas are facing the hardest time to 
define and implement activities for development on their own terms because of 
institutional processes imposed from external forces. In Uttarakhand the magnitude of 
social and spatial inequalities will not change without adopting a multi-level participatory 
planning and dialogue with unconditional financial support from the State. Current 
decisions are still strongly controlled at higher tier of governance where the power structure 
dominates (Sinha, 2007). 
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Despite central control, the situation is still very undefined since a future legal document 
might ease the current constraints and the conformity acts might not dismiss social justice 
as it appears in 243-G of the Constitution. In Uttarakhand like everywhere in India there is 
the need to create spaces for social justices through effective inclusion of oppressed groups 
in democratic processes of decision-making. Moreover in line with the central argument of 
this thesis, the transfer of real autonomy to local bodies should happen outside centralized 
schemes. It should entail a policy agenda that avoids form of development distant from 
local needs and that embraces a vision for radical social change. 
The illustrated debates about village governance in Uttarakhand have conflicting visions for 
decentralization. The debate will evolve further once the State Cabinet approves the final 
draft for the Panchayati Raj act currendy under discussion at the state level. The next 
section presents a second policy analysis for decentralization in regards to the forest policy 
for Uttarakhand which has a much longer history than the policy for village governance. 
Since most communities live in rural area, it would be highly inconclusive to limit this 
research on issues not direcdy regarding social justice linked to livelihood and forest 
resources. For this purpose, the forest policy for Uttarakhand will be further assessed, 
along with village governance, in order to establish a convincing argument on social justice 
and decentralization for the case studies further illustrated. 
3.12 Genesis of forest policy in Uttarakhand: from struggles against the British rule to 
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rhetoric of environmental conservation 
Van Panchayats is the name of the institutional arrangement for forest management in 
Uttarakhand and is a unique case of forest management in India. It has a different set up 
and history than JFM but it still is a very powerful example of how current practices of 
decentralized governance entail great pressures upon forest institutions. In mis framework 
the following section will start off widi a brief introduction of what are the main 
characteristics of Van PanchayaL Subsequendy an extensive description of its current 
origins, legal changes and today's tensions/debates will follow. 
Today's Van Panchayat formation must come from one fifth of citizens in a village and it 
must have a minimum number of seats reserved for women and unprivileged sections of 
Indian society. According to the legal framework its legal audiority can cover up to five or 
six villages. A Sarpanch (chief) elected every five years by the villagers is in charge of die 
Van Panchayat. She/he has the responsibilities to distribute the rights to use die forest for 
production purposes, to regulate forest-related activities and ultimately to manage financial 
expenditure. Furdiermore, the Sarpanch has the power to call meetings and to act in order 
to fulfill die collective interest in managing die forest. Anodier important figure widiin die 
Van Panchayat is die Deputy Forest Ranger who is die secretary and is associated with die 
Forest Department. The Forest Department is die government agency diat reviews die 
working of Van Panchayat institutions and enforces specific programs decided at die 
central level (Jayal, Prakash and Sharma, 2006). Van Panchayat functioning is changing 
quite dramatically and die current trajectory is leading to great losses of its special 
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autonomy gained at its origin. 
Van Panchayat (VP) is not a new institution; it was the historical result of local resistance 
against the ownership and management of forest by the British rule. Prior to British 
conquest the hill peasantry exercised direct control over the use and management of 
cultivated lands and uncultivated lands. Resident communities had full control through 
customary village boundaries defined by cultural traditions and practices. Agriculture and 
animal husbandry comprised components of the hill farming system and integration of 
cultivated and uncultivated lands. Before colonial interference, seasonal usage of alpine 
pastures and grassland along with conservation practices integrated in traditions prevented 
resource degradation (Guha, 1986). 
The Colonial rule, started from 1815, permanendy altered the landscape, resource use, 
dirough new forest divisions and management practices. In 1823, the colonial regimes set 
up the first land revenue setdement and established an official division between cultivated 
and uncultivated lands. Furthermore, the colonial state appropriated the audiority to grant 
to local institutions recognition of village boundaries for common lands. Subsequent 
boundary changes were introduced but disputes over the old division have remained till 
today. At the end of the century all uncultivated land was labeled as non-forest land and 
was declared district-protected Forests under the control of the District Commissioners 
formed during the British rule. All village common lands were then classified as "forest", 
irrespective they had tree cover or not, and converted into state property. The division, 
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along with impeding some land use, has never been reviewed since die British colonial rule 
despite the great historical changes in Uttarakhand (Guha, 1989). 
Since the beginning of the century till independence the colonial government attempted to 
tighten its control over forest resources by classifying an extended area of common lands as 
Reserve forests severely restricting people use rights. Strong resistances from local 
communities pushed the British government to transfer some commercially less valuable 
reserves, classified as "Class I Reserve forest", to the civil administration and to restore 
people's rights. An open access regime was created for that purpose with both peasantry 
and the state engaged in extraction. In the Panchayat forest rules of 1931, provisions were 
made for Van Panchayat to exercise complete community control over legally demarcated 
and recognized village forest from Class I reserves and to receive rights to claim and 
manage civil forest controlled by the District Commissioner. Uncultivated commons were 
instead classified into categories: commercially valuable Class II forest under the Forest 
Department, residual forest from Class I reserves and civil/"soyam" protected forest under 
the civil administration (Revenue Department) (Sarin, Singh, Sundar and Bhogal, 2003). 
After Indian independence the state continued commercial forest exploitation with even 
greater strength than under the colonial rule. The Forest Department and its contractors 
spread to the remotest areas with expansion of the road network. Local livelihoods were 
completely disregarded and state policy favored extraction of raw timber and resin for 
processing by industries in the plains. In the 70s, the Chipko movement had started to 
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claim that more emphasis must be given to local employment and local use of extracted 
forest resources. At the same time, landslide and environment damage of intensive forest 
exploitation declined biomass availability for subsistence needs in some part of the state 
and the Chipko protests expanded its popular base by including women as central actors 
for the struggle. In the 80's the issue of forest rights became part of the mainstream 
environmentalist rhetoric but instead of prioritizing social justice, by recognizing local 
forest-based livelihood and access to resources, the grassrooted struggle was 
instrumentalized to push for centralized environmental policies and regulations (Sarin, 
Singh, Sundar and Bhogal, 2003). 
Rapid expansion of protected area network, large-scale resource displacement and 
restricted permitted timber fellings seriously compromised livelihood of hundreds of 
thousands of people leading to an increase in inequalities in access to resources. 
Furthermore, the forest department - largest custodian of state property- has not 
maintained the forest properly to meet people's forest-based needs. The right to livelihood, 
as defined by the constitution, is being breached in the name of "environment 
conservation". In addition to it, recent legal changes -explored in the following section- are 
also contributing to the deterioration of Van Panchayat autonomy. Its capacity to deal with 
current pressures forcing forest institutions to accommodate market-oriented changes 
inspired upon the neo-liberal logic of forest commercialization is under great constraint 
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3.13 From owners to managers: Van Panchayat legal changes and market pressures 
Van Panchayat was created in 1931 through the notification of the Kumaon Panchayat 
Forest Rules and has undertaken several changes in the last 80 years. The 1931 rules were 
designed considering traditional communal property resource management practices in the 
area. They were not included in the Indian Forest Act of 1927 but were specifically 
arranged for the unique cultural and geographical characteristics of the state. Van 
Panchayat in the Forest Rules of 1931 received full control over use of its income from the 
forest resources. However, the bureaucratic complexities to create a Van Panchayat and 
suspicious attitude toward the administration inhibited their formation in large scale. In 
spite of administrative problems, the forest condition has improved dramatically under the 
exclusive control of villagers without external interference especially from the Forest 
Department. Van Panchayat regulation has enabled local institutions to maintain the 
ecological balance of soil fertility, water source protection and to support local livelihoods. 
Van Panchayats rules were revised again in 1976 and it became the first step to reduce 
Panchayat autonomy, aumority and entitlements. The new regulations restricted the eligible 
area for formation of new Van Panchayat according to new village boundaries defined in 
the early 60s instead of the original division established in 1823. The regulation also 
mandated the allocation of 20% of Van Panchayats income to die district level government 
and 40% to die Forest Department in order to increase the engagement of state agencies 
into forest management, since then under village control. Other policies, like the Forest 
Conservation Act in 1989 and the felling ban, also limited Van Panchayat capacity to utilize 
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the forest and to deal with disputes over an increasingly confusing spatial division of village 
forest 
More recendy, the World Bank had endorsed a forestry project named VJFM (village joint 
forest management) of 65$ million dollars loan over the period 1998-2002. The purpose of 
World Bank's interferences was to transfer the standard policy model of Joint Forest 
Management of other Indian states to Uttarakhand, instead of supporting existing Van 
Panchayat. The Forest Department was enabled to gain control over the only example of 
legally protected community forest management in India. It prompdy initiated commercial 
extraction by transforming people status from right holders to beneficiaries of the forest, in 
other words people lost their decision power over extractive use of forest resources. Many 
Van Panchayats were able to opt out of the World Bank project because of unreasonable 
transfer of authority to the state at the expense of forest dependent communities and their 
decision making space (Sarin, Singh, Sundar and Bhogal, 2003). 
Even though local communities resisted to the W B pressures, the new Uttaranchal 
Panchayati Forest Rules in 2005 legally ended the protection of Van Panchayat from 
programme and practically endorsed the World Bank ideal trajectory to convert common 
property resources into private property at the mercy of market forces. The latest rules are 
forcing local institutions to conform to the working in project mode and to the rationale of 
forest managerialization. The new rules now officially identify villagers as "wage labor" and 
managers at best, instead of right holders, and greatest authority in decision-making is given 
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to the Forest Department. Van Panchayat is now forced to make microplan15, to have joint 
bank account with the government agencies and to comply with market oriented 
management plan designed by the Forest Department (Virdi, 2005). This move clearly 
disregards the central role of local communities in the process of decision-making and 
autonomy of local institutions. 
Continuous attempts to depredate local autonomy and to centralize forest management 
practices kept pushing strong resistances and fuelled separatist movement that led to the 
formation of the new state of Uttarakhand (initially part of Uttar Pradesh) in 2000. The 
initial hopes of a new state to be able to restore informal community forest management 
based upon traditional practices and right to livelihood were unmet (Sarin, Singh, Sundar 
and Bhogal, 2003). Even though communal Van Panchayat has proven to be more 
effective in conservation and in social justice in the context of livelihood preservation; no 
substantial step forward has been made to expand its capacity. Van Panchayat is actually 
being constrained more and more from external pressures to enable forest 
commercialization. This is reflected in a clear shift away from the initial hopes of 
institutional autonomy to a managerial approach complying with centralized control of the 
Microplan: It shall be obligatory on the part of the Management Committee to prepare a 
microplan on the basis of guiding principles given in the Composite Management Plan for the 
management and protection of village forest/Panchayati forest for a period of five years with the 
assistance of the concerned Deputy Ranger/Forester of Forest Guard as may be convenient from 
administrative point of view, giving due consideration to the requirement of the righmolders and 
ensuring die ecological balance of die region. The micro plan will be place before die General 
Body of all the right holders/Self-Help Groups by die concerned Forest Range Officer for its for its 
approval before it is finally sanctioned by die concerned Sub-Divisional Forest Officer. It shall be 
me duty of die Committee to strictly follow the prescriptions of the finally micro plan. (The 
Uttarakhand Panchayati Forest Rules, 2005: Art. 12) 
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forest from government agencies. The initial special status of autonomous forest 
management in this area of India -where most people rely on forest livelihoods- risks to be 
drastically reduced. The central/state governments are attempting to have further control 
over the forest for their own market-oriented policy interests, hidden behind the rhetoric of 
good governance, devolution, environmental conservation and empowerment 
3.14 Today's neoliberal discourse in conceptualizing Van Panchayat 
As shown current policy changes are slow attempts to achieve forest management more in 
line with neoliberal principles of private ownership and market integration invoked by the 
good governance agenda. In this framework, it becomes important to briefly mention some 
arguments, in compliance to the good governance approach for decentralization, that are 
increasingly presented in the literature of Van Panchayat. Some market-enthusiast scholars 
(Balooni Ballabh and Inque) mainly base their studies of forest management of 
Uttarakhand upon the analysis of: rights to access, rights to management and rights to 
distributions. 
Firsdy, Van Panchayat has specific requirement to appoint forest guards to control the 
forest and to fine any offender depending on the value of product being stolen by people 
residing outside village forest in order to guarantee the right to access to local communities. 
Balooni, Ballabh and Inque (2007) argue that lack of mechanisms to ensure fines are paid 
leads village forest to be treated like an "open access resource" for cattle grazing and 
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harvesting grass even though specific regulation impose the communities to make sure the 
forest is preserved. Their argument implicitly blame local people no to comply with the 
guidelines provided by the state of "formalized" access. I argue state regulations are against 
the interest of local population. For example, the forest guards are required to be 
appointed by some other ad hoc body whereas traditional forest management relied on 
people from the community to oversee and protect the forest is the current attempt to 
replace what has been considered general practice with some other external procedure, 
inevitably creates resistances. 
Secondly, the right to management seems central in conceptualizing Van Panchayat 
communities. Balooni, Ballabh and Inque (2007) identify communities' exposure to 
incursions, encroachments, pilferage and corruption as their inability to develop a plan to 
properly manage the forest The argument of right to management is based upon the 
assumption of how important is to have long-enduring and robust institutions that can 
monitor, control and decide how the resources should be used. Strong Van Panchayat 
institutions are expected to provide transparent information, to counteract opportunism 
and to enable communities to overcome the constraints of co-operation through 
institutional arrangements.) The illustrated argument shows the implicit suggestion to 
strengthen formalized procedures and to ease institutional processes based upon the 
assumption traditional structures in local communities are not cooperative and able to deal 
with forest resources, even though their entire livelihoods is based upon them. In my view, 
the government should instead favor a policy to ensure complete access to resources to 
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communities and complete autonomy to manage them. 
Thirdly, snother central feature of Balooni, Ballabh and Inque (2002) perspective is the 
asymmetric right distributions. Again, the scholars reiterate that VP is theoretically a good 
idea but the conflicts over the right distributions need to be solved. I argue it is reasonable 
to suppose that rights generation if not carefully distributed -especially in a highly divided 
society like India- might contribute to create inequalities ultimately leading the oppressed to 
have less forest resources available. Yet, the problem with Balooni, Ballabh and Inque 
argument is that they blame corruption or inefficiencies whereas, the enforcement of 
institutional processes that are not internalized by local communities are increasingly 
pushing Van Panchayat to make compromises over the most essential resources for 
villagers' livelihood. 
The arguments of neoliberal scholars, illustrated in the conceptualization of rights to 
access, management and their distribution, shows support to legal changes centered on 
managerialization of forest use. As illustrated so far, the analysis of both policies for village 
and forest governance, in the context of Uttarakhand, underlines issues linked to the 
reduction of social justice and to the good governance approach at various levels They can 
be traced in livelihood, self-governance, institutional autonomy, market pressures, 
formalized regulations, forest commercialization and access to resources. These issues 
should be linked to decentralization practices as crucial elements to assess social justice in 
the case of Uttarakhand. In the next section, the central argument of this thesis will ground 
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its analysis of case studies according to die applicability of the various debates and 
perspectives offered so far to field reality. The empirical section will link the issues 
explored in the policies of forest management and village governance in a specific area of 
Uttarakhand: Munsiari. Before delving into the more analytical chapter of my thesis, a brief 
introduction about this specific area under study is important to introduce its contextual 
specificities. 
3.15 Where in Uttarakhand? Munsiari area: a brief introduction 
Munsiari block lies within the central Himalayas of India. It is part of Pithoragarh district 
and it borders with Tibet Autonomous Region of China. The main rivers named Namik, 
Gori and Ralam flow in three valleys and drew water from the high mountain ranges tfiat 
surround the area. The Johar valley in which the Gori River flows is die central one and 
contains various glacial head waters. It has wide grassland areas and terraces in die upper 
section and steeper forested slopes in the lower section. Major mountains encircle the 
whole area; the northern and western sections include 7,000 meters peaks: Nanda Devi, 
Panchachuli and several others. High mountains, deep gorges and fast flowing rivers along 
with low infrastructure development make the area less accessible than others (Pangtey, 
2006). 
The Johar Region history is long and has roots in mythology. Before the eighteenth 
century, Tibetan Buddhism was well-spread in die area. Hindu religion and culture started 
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becoming more dominant during the eighteenth century so the language, social system, 
religious beliefs and rites have closer resemblance with Hindu in Kumaun and Garhwal 
(the two main administrative regions of Uttarakhand). During colonial rule the influence 
was limited because of its remoteness but the Johar region has always been a very strategic 
area for trade with Tibet. After Indian independence and the beginning of the Chinese 
Cultural Revolution, the trade with Tibet ended in 1962. Since a substantial part of the 
local economy was based on trade with Tibet, people faced great hardship and the 
worsening of the local economy. The government of India, in the meanwhile, has started 
absorbing part of the population in its workforce and the more educated locals from 
Munsiari area are increasingly migrating in search of government jobs or employment 
opportunities (Pangtey, 2006). Munsiari block still includes many villages mat are very 
remote from road access and have experienced low degree of external influences and 
conserve deep rooted traditions and culture. 
Most villages in the Munsiari area are composed by people who mainly belong to 
Scheduled Tribes (government recognition for indigenous and tribal groups); die most 
common group is the "Shaukas". A significant portion of people belonging to the Shaukas 
who have not been migrated out of the Johar Valley is still engaged into income-generating 
activities based on traditional means of livelihoods. Their main sources of livelihood are: 
wool-based cottage industries, sheep farming, cultivation and collection of herbs. The 
reliance on agriculture is also quite high especially for beans and potatoes, which are also 
traded locally. The beauty of the location also opens up potential spaces for tourism 
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respecting the fragile ecological equilibrium in the Himalayas. The field research was 
mainly based in this area and the following chapter will attempt to create a link between 




Chapter number four will look at how the issues emerged so far can be translated and 
assessed empirically. The chapter will develop four distinct hypodiesis linked to die central 
problematic and will delve into a detailed and in-depth analysis about the claims of this 
diesis. The strongest forces identified so far, reducing die scope for social justice in 
decentralization, are mainly linked to marketization pressures and die creation of 
exclusionary and managerial institutional processes. The consequences of disregarding a 
more communitarian alternative for decentralization can have profound repercussions for 
the oppressed, livelihood and can fuel inequalities and internal conflicts. The two policies 
analyzed in this chapter are: Panchayati Raj and Van Panchayat. They are both studied in a 
specific location of Uttarakhand: Munsiari Block. The Chapter will attempt to create an 
empirical link to die discussion at die dieoretical level and field reality in order to legitimize 
die central argument 
4.1 The central problematic 
Decentralization performed within die good governance rationale is in truth a push for 
market integration in line widi a development trajectory favoring wage labor and resources 
commercialization in line widi economic liberalism. In diis framework, I argue diat 
decentralization policies for local governance in Uttarakhand prioritizing market-oriented 
and managerial institutions does not lead to social justice especially for the most oppressed 
groups. Social justice is primarily intended according to the Constitutional principles in 
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line with the theoretical exploration endorsed in Chapter Two. 
The main relationships between variables in this framework have to be related to 
decentralization and social justice. The data used to evaluate the validity of my central 
hypodiesis have to deal with the complex concept of social justice in the context of village 
governance and forest management for my case study in Uttarakhand. The reasons for me 
to analyze Panchayati Raj and Van Panchayat is because they are strongly interrelated and 
tfiey can both provide me extensive and complimentary data to the various issues I am 
going to analyze within die definition of social justice in the Indian Constitution. 
Furthermore, the communities I have been studying are strongly affected by both policies -
although in different ways- and mere is evidence of a clear convergence to a very similar 
pressure to shift livelihoods and reduce scope for social justice issues. 
4.2 Causal variables 
For my case studies I have developed clear, concrete and quantifiable causal variables that 
are linked to the principles of social justice enshrined in the Constitution. The causal 
variables are the most fundamental linkage between my conceptualization of social justice 
as inspired by the Constitution and die vast empirical data I gathered during my fieldwork 
in Uttarakhand. 
My causal variables are inspired by die various debates about decentralization and are 
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based upon the claims that decentralization within die good governance approach is 
exacerbating inequalities, neglecting die real issues of effective participation, avoiding real 
social change for die oppressed groups, deteriorating livelihoods, perpetuating social 
exclusion, creating over-formalized institutional processes and mainly pushing for a model 
of development inspired upon neo-liberal principles. All these issues are basically linked to 
my main problematic of reducing space for social justice in the context of decentralized 
practices; therefore I identified four causal/independent variables which I will analyze to 
objectively investigate my central argument. 
1. Access to forest resources in decentralized forest management 
2. Access and engagement into institutional processes and decision making 
3. Marketization pressures in decentralized forest management 
4. Pressures for market development in decentralized village governance 
All of them are central to the discussion of decentralization and its implementation and 
these four principal issues go against the Constitution claims for social justice. These four 
issues are strongly contextual to my case studies hence the various indicators and 
information needed are assessed mainly on die basis of field evidence. 
4.3 Chain of Causality 
This section establishes the main hypothesis to assess my central problematic. Each 
hypodiesis is linked to the main causal variables identified in the previous section and 
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specify, in details, the broader issues and the data needed. The combination of all evidence 
from each hypothesis is needed to evaluate the validity (or the lack of it) of my central 
argument. Each broad hypothesis is built on the issues identified in the literature and in the 
policy analysis contextualized for my case studies. Each is justified according to principles 
of social justice illustrated in the Constitution which are also aligned with the theoretical 
definition provided in the literature review. 
> Hypothesis Nol: The current policy for decentralized forest management contributes 
to and perpetuates unequal access to forest resources within and across villages. (I 
assume that the current decentralization policy is increasing inequalities in the access to 
resources on the basis of forest divisions and distribution that do not meet village and 
household needs. I am also expecting mat if the access to forest resources becomes 
unequal and not decided at the grassroots level, than the forest condition and basic 
needs are compromised. This goes against Article 21 (right to livelihood) of the 
Constitution and adequate means of livelihoods in Article 39. 
o Forest resources distribution: If forest resources are not well distributed then 
access to forest resources is unequal and difficult 
• Are people's fuel wood, water and fodder needs met? (Individual 
interview) 
• Do people go outside the Van Panchayat forest to get resources? 
(Individual interview) 
• Do people think the Van Panchayat area is sufficient to meet village 
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needs (area)? (Individual interview) 
• Are oppressed households experiencing less access to forest 
resources? (Individual interview) 
o The amount of forest and local needs: If the forest under Van Panchayat does 
not meet people and village needs because of its limited size or difficult access, 
it means decentralized forest governance is constrained in providing equal 
resource distribution and access to villagers. 
• Forest/ Inhabitants ratio within the community (General village 
information) 
• Forest distance from the village (General village information) 
o Forest condition and Van Panchayat- If the forest experience some form of 
deterioration not linked to Van Panchayat autonomous activities, then it 
becomes important to explore what other factors are deteriorating local 
resources. The reasons behind forest condition will be particularly explored in 
hypothesis number 3. 
• Do people perceive their forest is healthy enough to satisfy their 
needs? (Individual interview) 
• What are the outcomes of current Van Panchayats practices on the 
forest? (Individual interview) 
> Hypothesis No2: Decentralized forest and village governance within the current 
neoliberal framework causes and perpetuates unequal engagement in decision making 
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processes (especially for the oppressed groups) I assume that the way local institution 
function do not give enough space in village and forest council to women and 
oppressed groups and do not create enough institutional scope for effective 
representation and participation even though some of these groups (usually women) are 
the most involved in forest work. If the hypothesis is supported from empirical 
evidence, men implementation of decentralization does not reduce marginalization in 
participation hence it is limited in achieving social change through local bodies. The 
tendency to impose over formalized institutional processes without widening the scope 
for social issues is indeed perpetuating unequal access and distance between local 
institutions politics and the most oppressed groups. Even though schedule castes and 
women are granted reservation in die Constitution, this might just not be enough scope 
to widen democracy, especially if decentralization policies maintain marginalization. 
This goes against the principle of equality as stated in the preamble of the Constitution 
of India and articles 14-15. 
o Attendance rate in forest and village governance meetings: If people and 
especially oppressed groups do not attend meetings then institutional processes 
are not going to be representative of the whole community. 
• Attendance rate of oppressed groups at forest and village institutions' 
meetings. (Individual interview) 
• If not, what are the reasons (descriptive explanations) 
• Attendance rate of villagers at forest and village institutions' meetings. 
(Individual interview) 
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• If not, what are the reasons (descriptive explanations) 
o Effective participation in forest and village governance meetings: If people do 
not participate in meetings, the institutional processes for decision making are 
unequal in access -hence not democratic- and prevents from substantial 
engagement The second and most important dimension of this issue is the 
effective participation of women and oppressed groups in village governance 
(Oppressed groups are the most exposed to social exclusion and if institutional 
processes are not inducing to their engagement, the problem of inequalities is 
perpetuated). The distinction between the two cohorts must be emphasized. 
• Are villagers' effectively participating in discussions and in the 
decision making process in the forest and village councils. (Individual 
interview) 
• If not, what are the reasons (descriptive explanations) 
• Are oppressed groups effectively participating in discussions and in 
the decision making process in the forest and village councils? 
(Individual interview) 
• If not, what are the reasons (descriptive explanations) 
o Knowledge of the microplan and of what activities are carried out by the 
forest council. If people are not aware about the microplan, it shows that 
over-formalized institutional processes are far from being internalized by 
local communities. The distance between institutional processes and 
people's knowledge about them leads to argue that the current framework 
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of decentralized forest management impose devices that are not integral 
part of people's notion of Van Panchayat autonomy and forest ownership. 
• What is a microplan? (Policy analysis) 
• Do people know about the microplan (Individual Interview) 
y Hypothesis No3: Market pressures of external agents engaged in big-scale infrastructure 
projects and intensive resource extraction (companies, private traders, government 
agencies, corporations -for example National Thermal Power Corporation-, 
construction companies etc.) in the areas under decentralized forest governance leads 
to the detriment of the common good and disruption of local livelihoods: I assume that 
the national government is giving incentive to forest commercialization through 
legislative changes, its agencies and support to the private sector. The presence of 
commercial actors is interfering and pressuring local communities to shift livelihoods in 
order for the government to achieve market integration widiout consultation or 
negotiation with local units of governance hence prioritizing marketization and shifting 
livelihoods. This leads local communities to new pressures -not based on their 
consensus anyways- against people's livelihood potentially compromising their reliance 
on the forest and reducing the autonomy of local institutions. This issue is crucial 
because it clearly represents the inherent conflict between democratization and the 
principles of the constitutions versus the neoliberal agenda of the Indian government 
Within this framework, external agencies' interferences and marketization pressures go 
against article 39, article 21, the right of livelihood specifically to have adequate means 
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of livelihoods. 
o People awareness of market pressures legitimize their existence. If the majority 
of the people are aware about the existence of external companies, it implies 
people are also exposed to their potential consequences. 
• People awareness about the existence of large development project, 
private companies and construction works (dams or other major 
infrastructure projects from Himalayan Hydro Power Limited, National 
Thermal Power Corporation, Block level, others) in the area (Individual 
Interview) 
• What are external agencies doing (descriptive explanation of local 
people knowledge about private companies activities) (Individual 
Interview) 
o People's perception about the impact of big development project The opinion 
of people about external companies is important to understand the potential 
consequences of their projects for the common good and local livelihood. 
• People's opinion about external agencies (companies, private traders, 
corporations for example NTPC, construction companies e t c . ) and its 
impact on the forest (Individual Interview) 
• People's opinion about external agencies (companies, private traders, 
corporations for example NTPC, construction companies etc..) and its 
impact on the community (Individual Interview) 
o Commercial extraction of forest resources: If the microplan and the internal 
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institutional arrangement are favouring the commercialization of the forest, it 
implies a shift from the effort to secure proper livelihoods for local 
communities to achieve further market integration by transforming people 
from owners to managers of their own resources) 
• Microplan contents (Local politician testimonial) 
• What is a microplan (Legal Framework to provide a 
qualitative explanation of why is this a relevant variable 
within the context of market pressures) 
• Tree species encouraged to be planted (Local politician testimonial) 
• Commercial extraction (medicinal plant, fuelwood, lichen) planted 
(Local politician testimonial) 
o Funding origin and financial devolution: If die funding are limited, and 
bounded by commercial interests imposed by external agencies (for example 
to open a joint bank account widi the Divisional Forest Officer, to use 
institutional and forest resources for plantations to be sold outside the village 
etc.) uien forest governance institution are serving die interest of market 
integration instead of local communities' livelihoods.) 
• Funding from external sources, how it was used. (Local politician 
testimonial) 
• Forest council Joint Bank Account with the Forest Department 
(Local politician testimonial) 
• Does the Forest Department get to take die 10% on forest resources 
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sold outside die village? (Local politician testimonial) 
> Hypothesis No4: A decentralization model inspired by die good governance agenda 
prioritizes infrastructure development more than social justice. The imbalance does not 
substantially address people's needs and does not improve die condition of die most 
oppressed: I assume that village institutions within the good governance approach give 
strong emphasis to a kind of development favoring infrastructures more than social 
justice as defined in the Constitution. The legislative framework regulating Panchayati 
Raj clearly states economic development and social justice are both part of the mandate 
for local institutions in village governance but I assume there is a clear bias in emphasis 
on infrastructure and most funding are directed to that purpose. The perception of 
local people on village governance is crucial to understand what direction is the 
implementation of decentralization actually taking and I expect it to confirm the stated 
bias. Because of it, I assume people needs are not reflected substantially in local 
institutions of decision-making and that their perception sees Gram Panchayat as a 
mean to achieve infrastructure development instead of social justice showing the 
significant imbalance between the institutional scope for social justice and infrastructure 
creation along with job generation. This goes against the actual mandate for local 
institutions in village governance and the consequences lead decentralized village 
governance to go against the principle stated in the Preamble and article 39 of the 
Constitution in particular the notion of common good and adequate means of 
production. 
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o People's perception of village institutions' activities and priorities: If local 
people perceive that local institutions only invest in infrastructure projects, it is 
double evidence of a bias in the model of development perpetuated through 
decentralized institutions. If people recognize the importance of social justice 
more than what local institutions are capable to deliver, it underlines villagers' 
need might not be reflected substantially. 
• What people (and oppressed groups) think is the priority for their 
communities (social justice, infrastructure, service or employment)? 
(Individual Interview) 
• What to people (and oppressed groups) think is done at the local 
institution level? (Individual interview) 
o People's opinion about how much local institutions have achieved at the village 
and at the household level: If people deem that the condition of their village 
has not changed substantially in the last 5-10 years and that their household 
needs are not considered in local institutions, it implies that people are not 
satisfied with the current system of decentralized governance because it gives 
more emphasis on a model of development that does not necessarily serve 
local communities' needs. 
• Have the village condition changed substantially in the last years? 
(Individual interview) 
• If not, why (descriptive explanation) 
• How much benefits are people at the local level receiving from local 
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institutions? (Individual interview) 
o Amount and distribution money/resources received by local institutions and 
for what development projects it was invested. (Appendix 3 shows the 
expenditure break down of each village institution): If villages' local institutions 
only received money to be invested in infrastructure or monetary schemes, it 
implies the priorities for decentralized institutions remain within a model of 
development that does not encompass enough institutional scope for social 
justice hence perpetuate inequalities. 
• Financial devolution for each category drawn from the 11th 
schedule of local institutions' responsibilities (Local 
politicians' testimonials) 
• Where does die money come from and how is it invested 
(Local politicians' testimonials) 
• Are social justice taken up in the meetings (local politicians 
testimonials) 
4.4 Methodology 
In the next section the empirical results will be presented assessing the various hypothesis 
and sub-hypothesis correlated widi the principal causal variables tfirough econometric 
regression analysis and tables. Furthermore, the empirical evidence will be explained 
dirough more descriptive and qualitative explanations to give more voice to my numbers 
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and combine qualitative and quantitative memodologies. 
The various empirical materials will be presented without the constraints of only a single 
"fixed" theoretical framework. The most used methodology is aligned to the moral 
economy of science approach and founded in the belief that objectivity is a method of 
understanding. Even though the central argument of this thesis embraces a specific 
ideological stand, the use of quantification does not seek individual conviction but rather 
the agreement of a diverse and scattered constituency. According to Daston (1995) the 
moral economy of science is more about self-discipline than coercion, it seeks impartiality 
in quantification not as guarantee of the truth of a verdict but as pre-requisite for analysis. 
The necessary reduction of idiosyncratic evidence does not imply that the path is "really 
real"; abstraction never eliminates traces of individuality and interest and the history of 
mathematics applied to social sciences is full of examples of partial impartiality. Data 
collection often implies a degree of personal interpretation of the answer received. 
Impartiality in quantification, in this frame, is intended as genuine effort of self-imposed 
objectivity rather man as properties inherent in the numbers themselves. The outcome of a 
research along mese lines is not solely focused on interest -might that be political, social or 
economic- but also on integrity in the process. At the same time, the process of abstraction 
is influenced by questions of knowing, issues of material conditions and scientist's personal 
values. Diversity, in this sense, can lead to multiple competing moral economies within 
science. Hence, strategies for research are diverse, fluid and pragmatic. Even though some 
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principles for quantification remain constant across scientific communities, their 
application remains multidimensional and broader in scope (Grosjean and Fairley, 2009). 
My research, inspired by the moral economies approach, attempts to create a provisional 
map to interpret the messy, contingent spaces where societal and scientific values are 
negotiated. The whole process entails the combination of integrity in the process of 
quantification but also some degree of flexibility in using other methodologies and to give 
open interpretation. 
Because of the nature of this research, a moral economy approach of science is unlikely to 
be enough and other methodologies will be used. In Chapter number 2, the way I define 
social justice also links to the neo-Marxist critique of good governance. For this reason, a 
methodological approach that strictly conforms to quantification (or a single tradition) does 
not allow me to explore the complexities of other empirical evidence and claims. I argue 
the complexity of world reality is hard to grasp if research is not a creative process. Hence, 
although I mainly endorse the moral economy of science in analyzing my data through 
quantitative methodology; I also present a few narratives and case studies analysis in 
compliance to a more Neo-Marxist tradition. In combining approaches I might be 
dismissed as postmodern, but field evidence embeds so many dimensions that it becomes 
difficult to dissect their interdependence and mutual relationships with only a single 
approach. I am aware of the limitations of my data analysis but the attempt is to present a 
possible interpretation of what I experienced, and assessed, in the field. 
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My quantitative study, perhaps more predominant, entails the use of graphs, tables and 
statistical tools including regression analysis. My qualitative evidence entails the analysis of 
policy documents, some narratives and the analysis of various issues affecting the 
communities under study emerging out of aggregated and disaggregated data. Most data 
have been gathered under die form of case surveys hence a fair introduction to this 
methodology should be illustrated. Each case survey corresponds to an individual of my 
random sample through the support of translators. I chose case survey because the 
complexity of the issues under study requires an effective approach to identify and 
statistically test patterns across individuals. It is particularly suitable for this research 
because it allows nomothetically research to be complemented with idiographic richness. 
This is peculiar for an area of research with unit of analysis entailing a broad range of 
conditions of interest The procedure adopted in designing my case survey is: (Larsson, 
1993) 
^ T o select a group of conditions, variables and sample relevant to the chosen research 
questions 
^ T o design a coding scheme for systematic conversion of the qualitative case 
descriptions into quantified variables 
> T o use multiple methodologies to code empirical evidence and measure their 
reliability. 
> T o statistically analyze die coded data. 
A case survey approach is conducive to explore wider patterns and degree of generality in 
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order to understand complex processes and evidence. This enables to go beyond die 
limitations of strict adherence to a traditional quantitative methodology. A coding scheme is 
needed to enable statistical assessments and to bridge fragmented evidence to a more 
comprehensive understanding of various implications that would be otherwise dismissed in 
a stricdy number-based approach (Larsson, 1993) . Coding discrepancies should be 
embraced in order to underline the complexities of empirical evidence and to identify 
insights for further research. The possibility to explore literature and develop hypothesis 
through case surveys and additional evidence is an attempt to bridge the nomothetic-
idiographic gap in a creative, dynamic and interactive manner. 
In choosing case survey and the methodology so far illustrated, I was supported by Himal 
Prakriti, an Ngo based in Munsiari that works around issues of forest conservation. The 
small Ngo is composed by only 3 members and receives not funding. It collaborates and 
support independent research or university students' thesis projects. The scope of its action 
is broad and its objective is to raise awareness about issues affecting Van Panchayat along 
with education about the forest and its implications for livelihood, the environment and 
ecological equilibrium. Even though the Ngo is composed by only three members, they are 
engaged in various activities in their community in relation to livelihood preservation, 
tourism creation, social activism and political activities. 
With Himal Prakriti support I was able to gather extensive empirical material mainly from 
semi-structured interviews (Appendix 1) with villagers and local politicians. I chose to use 
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semi-structured interviews because it allowed me some flexibility to manage my data and to 
combine close-ended with open-ended questions. I also realized it was die proper 
technique within the case survey memodology. A general semi-structure interview was 
submitted to the whole sample whereas to receive more specific data about the village and 
forest institutions, a different type of semi-structured interview was used. I interviewed 286 
people from 8 different villages in Munsiari area in the course of four months, from May to 
August 2009. For each village I interviewed the local elected chief representative of the 
local village and forest institution and different members elected in the council. The 
villages were selected in collaboration wim a NGO I interned for, namely "Himal Prakriti", 
who supported me mrough the whole process and provided me with translators. The 
criterion for village selection was to gather information from heterogeneous areas according 
to different altitude, remoteness, exposure to external pressures, size, caste composition 
and safety. Each village had different characteristics and allowed me to gamer multiple 
perspectives from communities apparendy close in geographical terms but profoundly 
different in terms of local politics and social structures. Around half of my sample is drawn 
from people living in affected areas by dam construction. I chose them because it was 
significant for my research to assess the interaction between external interferences and 
villagers. The rest were closer to my home-base and Himal Prakriti. Because of limited 
resources and time I was not able to move too much outside Munsiari area. 
Most empirical evidence is drawn from semi-structured interviews but I also present 
analysis of the legal framework of Panchayati Raj and Van Panchayat and some brief 
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narratives throughout the chapter. The results will describe with some degree of generality 
the interaction of all people interviewed with decentralization practices. Yet, the groups my 
analysis will focus upon are: women, lower castes and poor households. Their status of 
oppression and marginalization is central to analyze social justice in relation to 
decentralization practices. The next sub-sections of diis section about methodology briefly 
explain how I performed die regression analysis and how is my sample structured. 
4.4.1 Significance levels for variables 
The quantitative analysis of my hypothesis use regressions which are always corrected for 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity and the transformation of all binary variables require 
the use of dummies through formulas recognized by the software used: SHAZAM16. 
Because of the discrete nature of all dependent variables, the regressions are run using die 
Poisson method in order to normalize the values. The dummy variables D l to D7 for the 
first set of regressions indicate the relationship between being located in a particular village 
and access to a specific resource. The dummies D8, D9 indicate whether each household 
belongs to a caste considered to be oppressed according to die Constitution. It is calculated 
by assigning die value of " 1 " if die participant belongs to a specific caste eitiier scheduled 
caste, scheduled tribes or general caste. If a binary variable is a dependent variable like in 
16 AUTO/ RSTAT ML= Formula to correct for autocorrelation 
DIAGNOS/ HET= Diagnosis for heteroscedasticity 
OLS/HETCOV= Correction for heteroscedasticity 
GENR Dl=DUM(Xl)=Generation of dummy variables 
TYPE=EPOISSON= Poisson regression 
158 
the case of Outsiden, then the LOGIT method is used to normalize the distribution. To 
keep die analysis simple and straightforward, only the variables relevant to my hypothesis 
will be discussed. 
The test to assess die significance level of each dependent variable in my regression the 
equation t = * ^ —(n — k) is used. Hence, if and only if| t\ > tan_k dien my variable is 
statistically significant in the regression. Given the sample size and critical value a at 10%; 
to. k=1.65. Only when | t\ > 1.65 then the dependent variable will be considered 
significant 
Table 1.1 Explanatory table 
Statistical Measure 
t^- f c-1.65 
|t|=# 
Explanation 
It represents the level of significance in the t-test table. 
This value is assessed against the t value obtained from 
the sample. 
It represents the significance level of die relationship 
between my independent and dependent variables. 
The t statistic assesses the probability of my independent/causal variable not to be 
significant in relation to my dependent variable. The usual values are 1%, 5% and 10% and 
to each value there is an associated numerical value 1.65 (10%); 1.965 (5%); 2.570 (1%). If 
the t value from the regression is greater than any of these values, it means die probability 




The sample used is random and is 50% men and 50% women. Because of low knowledge 
of me language and of the local communities, the translators helped me to interview people 
who showed interest and time to answer my questions. All participants were selected only if 
older than 18 years and resident in die village. Although not pre-selection was performed, 
die overall sample per village reflected a proportional gender and caste break down. The 
overall ratio of different castes for die total sample tries to represent die communities in the 
whole area under study. The majority are composed of scheduled tribes hence I put 
emphasis on this section of the population in my sample as well. General sample 
information is illustrated in the following two tables. The first table describes the average 
features of die overall sample whereas the second table breaks it down into villages, caste 
and gender. 














" 1 nali =80.66sq yards or 66.66sq metres (0.0066 ha) 
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The division according to caste, gender and households interviewed strikes 50% in most 
cases. Each category represents an even break down of population per village according to 
those categories. 
For scheduled caste I intend: This category includes in it communities who were 
untouchables. Even though the Constitution of India eliminates the existence of caste and 
established positive discrimination for lower castes, they are still a social reality in many 
areas of India. In uiis research, I included Other Backward Caste (OBC), as defined by the 
Constitution, in the category of scheduled caste. 
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For scheduled tribes I intend: The term "Scheduled Tribes" refers to specific indigenous 
peoples and tribal groups whose status is acknowledged to some formal degree by national 
legislation. The most common in Munsiari area are named "Shaukas" and a brief 
description of its characteristics is provided at the beginning of this chapter. 
For general case I intend: General Castes are the ones not included in the caste-based 
reservations guaranteed in the Constitutions and are generally all the castes not belonging 
to scheduled caste, OBC and scheduled tribes. 
As mentioned in the introductory section of Uttarakhand the area under study cannot be 
considered typical of Indian society. The sample reflects the trend. Scheduled tribes have 
recognition from the government to be an oppressed class but tribal societies tend to be 
more egalitarian than mainstream Indian caste-based structure. Uttarakhand embeds social 
hierarchies that are less strong and allow the basis for sustainable resource use. Although its 
relatively egalitarian structure, there are still forms of internal oppression especially along 
the lines of gender and landlessness. Caste conflict might not be significandy present, but 
while scheduled tribes are the dominant section, scheduled caste also exist and are more 
likely to experience oppression and marginalization. The various social implications will be 
explored more in depm while assessing whether local bodies are substantially capable of 
bringing social justice. 
In the next table various facts are presented about the villages in order to give an overview 
of general information about the communities under study. A broad understanding of 
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infrastructure access, geographical features and companies' presence will enrich the 
discussion further for the identified hypothesis. 
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In order to have a more clear assessment of my hypothesis it is important to give a brief 
overview of what operations the companies, present in the areas under study, are engaged 
in. Limited National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) is the largest power generation 
company in India. Its current capacity is of 31134 M W and it has embarked in a plan to 
National Thermal Power Corporation 
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create 75,000 M W by 2017. NTPC is engaged in various dam constructions all over the 
state of Uttarakhand. It is listed on die Bombay Stock Exchange although die government 
of India holds 84.5% of its equity. Himalayan Hydro Private Limited is also a corporation 
partially owned by the government. Its operations are directed to various size hydroelectric 
projects in Uttarakhand. The company employs the technology of power generation by 
converting the available potential energy in water flow into mechanical energy using hydro 
turbines. The areas of Tanga, Lodhi and Sirtola are direcdy exposed to its operations. Both 
companies are under study in tfieir interaction with the communities and local institutions; 
this is a central analysis in order to assess my hypodiesis of external pressures and 
livelihood deterioration. 
4.5 Household Poverty Index 
The way this research quantify the magnitude of household poverty is not through 
monetary assessment of income but a more multidimensional measure that includes 
sources of livelihood, land and whether the reliance on income streams need to be 
complemented by poverty alleviation schemes. For example a landless family with a secure 
income streams through a government job will be better off dian a landless one with not 
secure income. The measure is calculated as follows: 
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Table 2.1: Household Poverty Index 
Household Poverty Index 
Less than 3 primary sources of income or resources (excluding government 
job and shop keeping).19 
Household private landholdings below village average 
Household private landholdings 2 times village average 
Household private landholdings Vi less than village average 
Landless household only relying on manual labour 
Below the poverty line family 









Hence a number is provided to each household interviewed and the poverty level will 
range from "0" to "6". All households with "0" poverty are usually relying on the wage 
economy that implies a secure stream of income from a government job that also includes 
a pension at retirement. Households with level "6" poverty usually are landless exclusively 
relying on manual labor. Most extreme cases of poverty also receive some form of subsidy 
from the government in the form of a card that will allow the recipient family to purchase 
food at a discounted price or to avoid medical expensed. 
4.6 First Hypothesis: Access to forest resources in decentralized forest management 
In this section I evaluate the validity of my first hypothesis whether decentralized forest 
management leads and perpetuates unequal access to forest resources. In the case the most 
19 It is not a normalized measure according to the size of the household since this specific 
characteristic of each family was not disclosed to me from all participants. Yet, given the small size 
of each village; most people have some degree of relation with the members of the community so 
the complexity of assessing family size was not a task I decided to undertake. I still decided to use 
the sources of income as significant factor in assessing poverty according to my own sense of the 
field -given I interviewed all participants in uieir houses- but I am aware of its inherent limitations. 
The attempt remains to create and indicator going beyond individual income streams and to define 
die household profile also according to landholdings and government recognition of its status. 
165 
oppressed groups experience some degree of limitation in access to resources compared to 
die overall sample, dien there is evidence of inequalities. The right of livelihood in mis case 
would not be delivered equally as the Constitution prescribes. The levels mat are going to 
be analyzed are at the household and the village levels. 
4.6.1 First level of analysis 
The first dimension explores resource distribution according to village, caste, forest 
reliance and poverty level. The assumption is mat Van Panchayat has its autonomy, power 
and capabilities increasingly reduced to provide to everyone, in local communities, die 
amount of resources needed. Hence die most oppressed might experience less access to 
what they need for dieir livelihoods. 
Caste, land, poverty and forest reliance are explored in relation to household availability of 
fodder, water and fuelwood. The variables to determine the extent of household 
inequalities in access to resources are assessed in the following survey question "What do 
you tiiink about forest resources/healdi to meet your household's needs?" The answers 
received are: Very little, litde, sufficient or in excess. In addition to it, opinions about 
whedier village needs are met under the current conditions and whedier people in the 
household need to go outside to get forest resources are also explored. The following 
tables describe all variables considered for mis first level of analysis: 
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Outside the forest to get 
resources= Outsiden 
Village Needs=yiWeeds n 
Description 
Fodder is crucial for livestock and 
agriculture fertilizer in the area 
under study. 
Water is essential for life and for 
agriculture in the area under study. 
Fuelwood is the main source of fuel, 
heat and it is widely used in 
construction in the area under study. 
In order to offset internal 
fluctuations dependent on the type 
of resources and village, an aggregate 
measure can give a comprehensive 
picture of the constraints of access to 
resources. 
People get resources outside the 
borders of village forest. 
The opinion of interviewees about 
whether forest resources are enough 
for the community 
Measurement 















The summation of Fodder, 
Water and Fuelwood 
0 - N o 
l=Yes 
0=Not at all 













Impact Expected on 
dependent variables 
I expect lower caste households 
to have less access to forest 
resources. 
I expect households with limited 
resources to have less access to 
forest reserve. 
I expect households with not land 
to have lower access to forest 
resource because of their lower 
status and less assets. 
I expect forest reliance to increase 
the necessity of forest resources 
hence to influence positively to 
provision and access to resources. 
I need to understand how 
significant is to be part of a 
specific community (y) in access 
to resources and village needs 
when I compute the various 
regressions. 
Measurement 
It is measured as a dummy 
variable according to what caste 
the person belongs to: 
1= Scheduled Caste 
0= Scheduled Tribes 
According to the poverty index 
the value goes from 0 (not 
poverty) to 6 (high poverty) 
It is not a discrete value and in 
my sample the value goes from 
0 to 100 nali per household. 1 
nali is around 66 meters square. 




If a person belongs to a specific 
village a value of 1 is given in 
order to run the regression. 
For this level of analysis implies some regressions that include variables indicated in table 
1.2. All of mem will be assessed with the software "SHAZAM" and the relevant results will 
be discussed along witfi a visual presentation of all levels of significance for all variables. 
Fuelwoodn = BQ + B1D}l+B2Dl + B3D* + B4D* + B5D* + B6D* + B7Dl + B8D* + B9D* 
+ PwIn + B11Ln+Bx2Fn^r£n 
Foddern = B0 + BtD^+B2D^ + B3D* + B4D* + B5D* + B6D* + B7D
7
n + BHD* + B9D* 
+ PloIn + PllLn+Pl2Fn + £n 
Watern = B0 + BxD\+B2Dl + B3D* + B4D* + B5D* + B6D« + B7D
7
n + /?8D« + /?9D£ 
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Aggr. Resn = BQ + BxD\+B2Dl + B3D* + B4D* + B5D* + B6D* + B7D
7
n + BaD* + B9D* 
+ / W n + PllLn+Pi2Fn + ^n 
Outsiden = Po + B1Dr\+B2Dr\ + B3D* + fl4D* + B5D* + B6D* + B7Dl + faD* + B9D* 
+ P10In + B11Ln+B12Fn + Sn 
VilNeedSn = B0 + B1Dr\+B2Dr\ + B3D\ + B4D* + B^D* + B6D* + B7D
7
n + fcD* + B9D* 
+ BwIn + B11Ln+B12Fn + ^ 
4.6.2 Results first level of analysis 
The first regressions will assess the relationship between access to fuelwood and the 
independent variables (caste, poverty level and forest reliance): 
Fuelwoodn = B0 + B1D7\+B2Dl + B3Dl + B4D* + B^D* + B6D* + B7D
7
n + B8D* 
+ B9Dl + B10In + BltLn+B12Fn + an 
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D7= Suring Village 
D8= Scheduled Tribes 
D9= Scheduled Caste 
1= Poverty Index 
L= Personal Land 












































R-SQUARE =0.3243 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED =0.2944 
Min=0 Max=4 Average-1.877 Std Dev= 1.072 
'Significant at 10% * * Significant at 5% * * * Significant at 1% 
In this first regression, to be part of an oppressed caste or poverty level does not play a 
significance role in access to fuelwood. On the contrary, forest reliance has the most 
significant impact. Households declaring high forest reliance will be more likely to use 
more fuelwood than others. The low significance of all other factors can be intended that 
current Van Panchayat arrangement to meet livelihoods' needs for fuelwood is effective; 
external pressures are not deteriorating its access yet 
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The second regressions will assess the relationship between access to fodder the 
independent variables (caste, poverty level and forest reliance): 
Foddern = B0 + B1D^+B2Dl + B3D* + B4D* + B5D* + B6D* + B7D
7
n + B8D* 
+ B9D* + B10In + BltLn+B12Fn + en 








D7= Suring Village 
D8= Scheduled Tribes 
D9= Scheduled Caste 
D10= Poverty Index 
XI1= Personal Land 
XI2= Forest Reliance 
Constant 














































Min=0 Max=4 Average-1.628 Std Dev= 1.311 
'Significant at 10% * * Significant at 5% * * * Significant at 1% 
In this second regression there is a positive relationship between access to fodder and 
171 
forest reliance, personal land and poverty level. Poor households show to have more access 
to fodder, possibly because their source of livelihood is mainly based upon agriculture and 
livestock and because Van Panchayat can still guarantee its access. Households with land 
and a high reliance on the forest are more likely to have good access to fodder as well. It is 
interesting to notice that all the village dummies are significant, mat implies that access to 
fodder is also highly village dependent Some Van Panchayat is able to manage their 
resources better than others; hence contextual specificities play a significant role in this 
relationship. 
The next third regressions will assess the relationship between access to water and the 
independent variables (caste, poverty level and forest reliance): 
Watern = B0 + B^+B^l + B3Dl + B4D* + B5D% + B6D* + B7D
7
n + B8D* + B9D* 
JrPioln + P11Ln+B12Fn + £n 
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D7= Suring Village 
D8= Scheduled Tribes 
D9= Scheduled Caste 
D10= Poverty Index 
XI1= Personal Land 












































R-SQUARE =0.3086 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED =0.2781 
Min=0 Max=4 Average-1.291 Std Dev= 1.432 
* Significant at 10% * * Significant at 5% * * * Significant at 1% 
This third regression clearly indicates how access to water is very contextual specific. Even 
though forest reliance still has an impact on its access, most village dummies also seems to 
be reliable estimates in relation to the independent variable. It seems most communities 
have limited water from their village forests and this emerges from the negative correlation 
between the village dummies and access to water. The problem of water cannot be linked 
only to caste or poverty but it is common to everyone and most Van Panchayat faces 
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hardships to ensure its provision, except for a few cases (Lodhi). Most households need to 
diversify and get water from other personal sources or villages. The issue is much more 
extensive and this regression cannot grasp its complexity but just hint to some possible 
interpretations. 
The fourth regression will assess the relationship between an aggregate measure of access to all resources and 
the independent variables (caste, poverty level and forest reliance): 
Aggr. Resn = B0 + B^+B^l + B^D* + B4D% + BSD^ + B6D% + B7D
7
n + B8D* + B9D% + B10In 
+ /?n£n+/Wr„ + £„ 
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Table I. 6: Aggregate access to resources 
Variable Name 
Dl=Jainti Village 





D7= Suring Village 
D8= Scheduled Tribes 
D9= Scheduled Caste 
X10= Poverty Index 
XI1= Personal Land 













































R-SQUARE =0.3781 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED =0.3507 
Min=0 Max=12 Average=4.796 Std Dev= 2.6763 
* Significant at 10% * * Significant at 5% * * * Significant at 1% 
This regression sums up pretty well what I have been discussing so far. Forest reliance is 
crucial since it describes the livelihood profile of many communities in the Himalayas. 
Access to resources is also very community dependent and by including village dummies in 
the regression, it can be inferred mat Van Panchayat are facing struggles to provide enough 
resources to villagers. The aggregate data implies that village forest does not always meet 
the needs of households, with a few exceptions. In my second level of analysis, the reasons 
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behind these findings will be explored much more in depth. The caste and poverty 
dimension are not significant variables in explaining access to resources. Although the caste 
variables are not significant in the statistical sense, it does not mean that they are irrelevant. 
Indeed, nearly all of the estimated coefficients are negatively related wiuh access to forest 
resources. Moreover, in my field observation I noticed in two cases that scheduled caste 
had less access to resources. 
For example, Sirtola village is composed of different sections, some are 10 kilometers away 
from the frorest, others much closer. Lower castes in mis village live in a completely 
different area of the mountain. Sirtola main village is very close to the forest but scheduled 
caste households are clustered at least 5 kilometers furtherer away from the forest. In this 
village, scheduled castes are named OBC (Other Backward Caste) and live in the worst 
conditions of all other caste groups. Most houses are very small and made of mud and 
stones, they do not get water from the mountains but from the polluted river also used 
from dam construction companies. It's reasonable these households also have more 
limited access to resources. 
I found a similar situation in Lodhi village. The first households I interviewed were all 
scheduled castes; they are the definite minority in the community. Again, they are clustered 
away from the main village. In this case, they are very close to the place where the dam 
construction companies are operating. They are all small houses with very big families; they 
have to work for the National Thermal Power Corporation because they are landless. The 
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main section of the village is three hours walk and most houses are in the middle of the 
forest; scheduled castes, instead, live further from the forest and women need to spend 
long time to get fuelwood. 
Although the problem of access to resources could be more communities-related than 
status related in the regression, it does not imply the struggle for lower castes is not existent 
As described for the villages of Lodhi and Sirtola, my field observations indicated the 
existance of struggle of scheduled castes to get access to forest resources. The fifth 
regression will assess the relationship between going outside the forest to get resources and 
the independent variables (caste, poverty level and forest reliance): 
Outsiden = Po + BxDl+B2Dl + B3D* + B4D* + B5D* + B6D* + B7D
7
n + B8D* 
+ B9D* + B10In + faLn+faFn + en 
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Table I. 7: Going outside the forest 
Variable Name 
D1=Jainti Village 





D7= Suring Village 
D8= Scheduled Tribes 
D9= Scheduled Caste 
D10= Poverty Index 
XI1= Personal Land 












































R-SQUARE =0.1392 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED =0.1012 
Min=0 Max=l Average=0.382 Std Dev= 0.486 
* Significant at 10% * * Significant at 5% * * * Significant at 1% 
This regression shows that poverty is positively correlated to going outside looking for 
resources. This is interesting because it shows diat poor households, witih less access to 
personal resources, struggle to have their needs met wiuhin the village forest The model 
also has a very low R square; hence many other issues are missing to have a comprehensive 
picture of other reasons along with this explanation. 
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The sixth regression and last for this set, will assess the relationship between village needs 
and the independent variables (caste, poverty level and forest reliance): 
VilNeedsn = BQ + B^+B^l + B3D* + B4D* + B5D* + B6D« + B7D
7
n + psD* 
+ P9D* + /? 1 0 / n + p11Ln+fi12Fn + en 
Table I. 8: Village needs 
Variable Name 
Dl = Jainti Village 





D7= Suring Village 
D8= Scheduled Tribes 
D9= Scheduled Caste 
D10= Poverty Index 
XI1= Personal Land 












































R-SQUARE =0.2734 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED =0.2413 
Min=0 Max=4 Average-2.32 Std Dev= 0.816 
* Significant at 10% * * Significant at 5% * * * Significant at 1% 
This table indicates that the poverty level plays a negative role in the perception of the 
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forest. The poorest people of my sample are also most likely to have higher forest reliance 
since their livelihood depends more strongly upon agriculture. In mis regression the 
poverty level is negatively correlated to village needs, which implies that the poor sections 
of my sample have a more negative opinion about forest capacity to meet village needs 
compared to others. This is significant because it underlines a problem in distribution of 
resources at the village level. Even though previous evidence shows that the poverty level is 
not a significant factor in explaining their access, a distribution problem does exist in the 
communities under study. 
4.6.3 Second level analysis 
So far we have seen the presence of an issue related to distribution and access to resources, 
some villagers have expressed a struggle in accessing to resources and poor households are 
more likely to go outside the village forest to get resources. Furthermore, the assessment of 
village needs according to participants' opinions and the aggregate measure of access to 
forest resources show that the communities under study struggle to meet their needs. The 
assumption that status of oppression limits access to resources gives conflicting results since 
both caste and household landholdings does not seem to play a significant role in the 
relationship with access to resources. Van Panchayat can be assumed to guarantee more 
equal access to resources than expected in face of its pressures to commercialize the forest 
from private agents and government policies. In addition to it, high forest reliance is always 
positively correlated with access to resources; this implies households mat need the forest 
the most can still meet their needs. 
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Yet, a fundamental problem for local livelihood remains since most households still 
expressed a limited use and access to forest resources to meet their personal needs but also 
on a village level. A reason can be traced in the diversification of livelihood for many 
households but a more in depth investigation can shed some light to other reasons linked 
to the assumption that village institutions are constrained in ensuring more access to 
resources because of uneven forest distribution. The second level of analysis expands the 
previous one by including additional relationships between access to resources, forest area 
and its distance from the village. The inclusion of these new variables considers a possible 
constraint in forest access because of the division of the forest decided from State Agencies. 
The uneven distribution of forest across villages can potentially lead to inequalities among 
households in the amount of resources available. The central argument for this second 
level of analysis assume that the divisions do not reflect the actual needs of the population 
hence depriving local communities from the right to livelihood and common good already 
defined at the beginning of this sections. 
The variables to be used for this relationship do not consider each individual to be part of 
a specific village as previous regressions hence the village dummies are dropped. The 
attempt in this case is to give more light over the issue of forest allocation in order to 
understand how the forest division and distance negatively affects the people in the 
communities. 
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Impact Expected on 
dependent variables 
The greater the distance 
between the forest and the 
village the more likely the 
needs of the village are not 
satisfied hence access to 
resources is also 
compromised. 
The smaller the forest area, 
the less likely village needs 
are met according to the 
population sample. 
The smaller the ratios of 
forest and inhabitants per 
village, the less likely forest 
resources are enough to 
satisfy in the population. 
Measurement 
Sarmoli Village- 1 Kilometer 
Jainti Village- 2 Kilometer 
Sirtola Village= 3.5 Kilometer 
Alam Village- 2 Kilometer 
Lodhi Village- 1.5 Kilometer 
Tanga Village- 1 Kilometer 
Suring Village- 1.5 Kilometer 
Shankhadura Village=5 Kilometer 
Sarmoli -Jainti Forest=35.5 hectares 
Sirtola Forest- 25 hectares 
Alam Forest- 26 hectares 
Lodhi Forest- 27.8 hectares 
Tanga Forest- 99 hectares 
Suring Forest=41.5 hectares 
Shankhadura Forest=88 hectares 
Sarmoli-Jainti Village- 0.123 
ha/household 
Sirtola Village- 0.34 ha/household 
Alam Village- 0.833 ha/household 
Lodhi Village- 1.069 ha/household 
Tanga Village- 1.356 ha/household 
Suring Village=0.523 ha/ household 
Shankhadura Village=4.4 ha/household 
In order to explore die relationship between access to resources and forest allocation in 
addition to die previous model, die following regressions equation will be used: 
VilNeedsn = (30 + ^ D l n + p2D2n + /?3/n + P4Ln+p5Fn + pbFdn + /?7Fo„ + pBFrn 
Aggr. Resn = /?0 + ^ D l n + 02D2n + 03In + p4Ln+p5Fn + pbFdn + faFc^ + p8Frn 
Outsiden =/30+ ^Dln + p2D2n + 03In + p4Ln+/35Fn + p6Fdn + faFc^ + pBFrn 
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4.6.4 Results second level of analysis 
The first regression of this set, will assess the relationship between aggregate access to 
resources, forest allocation to each Van Panchayat and die independent variables used so 
far(caste, poverty level and forest reliance): 
Aggr. Resn = fa + & D l n + /?2D2n + #,/„ + faLn+/35Fn + p6Fdn + p7Fan + /28Frn + en 
Table I. 10: Aggregate access to resources and spatial division 
Variable Name 
Dl= Scheduled Tribes 







































R-SQUARE =0.3171 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED =0.2973 
Min=0 Max=12 Average=4.796 Std Dev= 2.6763 
'Significant at 10% * * Significant at 5% * * * Significant at 1% 
This first regression clearly indicates diat forest allocation plays a crucial role in resource 
access for villagers. The exclusion of die village dummies gives anodier picture of what type 
of constraints households are facing. Forest reliance is again a significant estimate of this 
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relationship, it is high people will have a much higher access to resources. This is positive 
because it implies that strong forest dependency for individual livelihood leads to greater 
use of what the forest under the Van Panchayat has to offer. The correlation with forest 
reliance also signals that Van Panchayat forest can still guarantee resources when 
households' livelihood strongly depends upon i t 
The estimates for forest distance, reliance and household allocation are particularly 
interesting because they show to be reliable in explaining this relationship. Oddly, the 
absolute area of forest does not necessarily imply that if greater then households have more 
access to resources. The regression shows the opposite results in that sense. The reasons 
can be traced in how the forest is managed by local institutions and the community. In 
some cases, forest area is not utilized in its entirety because of remoteness and in others die 
forest is of uneasy access because of its physical configuration. The absolute value does not 
explain its impact in proportion to the size of the community for example, die forest size of 
Sarmoli is equals to the one in Suring but die ratio is four times lower. The regression 
shows that ratios of forest area and number of households have a particularly high level of 
statistical significance; a higher ratio implies better access to resources. Furthermore, the 
status of scheduled caste shows to be negatively correlated to access to resources. In sum, 
mis regression implies that die distribution problem can be linked to Van Panchayat forest 
endowment per family and to households belonging to marginalized sections of society. 
The second regression will assess die relationship between village needs, forest allocation 
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and the independent variables used so far (caste, poverty level and forest reliance): 
VilNeedsn = /?0 + PxDln + /?2D2n + 03/n + faln+Wn + p6Fdn + j ^ F o * + p8Frn 
Table 1.11: Village needs and forest allocation 
Variable Name 
Dl= Scheduled Tribes 







































R-SQUARE =0.1853 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED =0.1648 
Min=0 Max=4 Average=2.32 Std Dev= 0.816 
'Significant at 10% * * Significant at 5% * * * Significant at 1% 
According to diis second regression, die relationship between die opinions about whedier 
die forest meets village needs and forest allocation is still significant In particular forest 
distance and the ratio of forest area over villagers explain tfiat die greater die area and 
smaller die distance, die more likely households needs can be me t It sounds logical but 
because of unfair spatial divisions and no access to forest administered under government 
agencies for commercial purposes, the forest allocation is negatively impacting village 
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livelihoods. The forest area also seems to be negatively correlated to village needs; this 
value per se is misleading because the real issue is allocation and not the absolute number 
of hectares per village. The proportional value is indeed more insightful and also more 
significant 
The third regression will assess die relationship between getting resources from outside the 
forest, forest allocation and the independent variables used so far (caste, poverty level and 
forest reliance): 
Outsiden = ft, + A D l n + p2D2n + 03In + p4Ln+/35Fn + p6Fdn + ^Fc^ + p8Frn 
+ sn 
Table I. 12: Outside village and forest allocation 
Variable Name 
Dl= Scheduled Tribes 







































R-SQUARE = 0.0541 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED =0.0267 (Logit) 
Min=0 Max=l Average=0.382 Std Dev= 0.486 
'Significant at 10% * * Significant at 5% * * * Significant at 1% 
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This third regression has a very low R square; hence it does not really provide a 
comprehensive explanation of why villagers go outside. Several variables are missing to 
render the model more effective in explaining the relationship between forest allocation 
and the need to go outside the forest to have access to resources. The various independent 
variables do not grasp what factors really determine people crossing boundaries and 
conflicting significance levels dismiss the theoretical consistency of this model. Almough 
the model is not satisfactory, it still provides reliable estimates for forest distance and 
allocation of forest per households. Village forest that are far away and a low ratio per 
household seem to be reliable estimates to explain why individuals to go outside the forest 
to look for resources. These results are in line with the previous regressions that indicated 
that forest allocation and distance are reliable factors in explaining why some households 
have more access than others to resources. 
In conclusion, die various regressions in both level of analysis give some broad insight of 
what are the pressures upon communities and their access to resources. The allocation of 
forest according to village size plays a crucial role to explain the extent each households can 
rely upon its resources. Forest reliance is a very significant factor to access to resources 
hence the more household depend upon it, the higher its consumption. Furthermore, to 
belong to a scheduled caste shows evidence to be a negative factor in the use of the Van 
Panchayat especially within the frame of uneven forest allocation between communities. 
Some additional evidence from previous regressions shows that poor households have a 
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lower opinion about the forest meeting communities' needs and are more likely to get 
resources outside its boundaries. The first level of analysis also indicates that their access to 
its extremely village dependent and the recurrent negative relationships between the village 
dummy and resources variables underline a strong issue of low and uneven distribution of 
forest resources at that level. The complex picture that emerges is probably just the tip of a 
much bigger iceberg, but I can infer mat there is some evidence showing internal and 
external problems in resource allocation based upon livelihood, forest allocation and status 
of oppression. 
4.6.5 Third level of analysis 
The impact of current practices in decentralized forest management entail that forest 
divisions -decided at the central level- along with some degree of uneven distribution of 
resources can be assumed to be significant factors in explaining a struggle to their access 
and potential threat for the right to livelihood as defined by the constitution. On a third 
level of analysis, the reasons for better or worse forest will also be explored for this 
hypothesis. In what form the forest is improving or worsening under the Van Panchayat 
can shed some more light to the actual concept of "effectiveness" of local bodies. The 
answer for this question will be explored more on a descriptive basis in order to identify 
what are the factors that can positively or negatively influence the condition of the forest 
and its resources. The empirical evidence was gathered from open answers, all codified in 
the following tables for the sake of an idiographic analysis. 
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The attempt is to interpret the pattern of aggregate evidence and to understand villagers' 
reasons to recognize a better or worse forest. This is relevant to assess the argument of 
conservation that has great scope in the current debates about forest policies and local 
institutions. The knowledge gap between the two levels of evidence needs to be taken into 
further consideration to grasp a more comprehensive picture of what form of struggle takes 
place at the local level and the interaction widi various pressures. A more in-depth third 
analysis can portray local realities in diis perspective for the sake of a more enriched 
understanding of how local institutions interact with issues of conservation. 
4.6.6 Results third level of analysis 
The question posed to participants for this analysis was "What do you uiink about the 
forest condition in the last 10 years?". The empirics derive from die open answers to 
explain why the forest has worsened or improved. Of all answers received only 27% reports 
negative reasons whereas a solid 73% indicates positive feedbacks. This is a positive signal 
because it implies that local institutions are still able to manage their resources and to cope 
with external pressures. Van Panchayat autonomy is under threat but a more detailed 
analysis of all open answers about forest condition indicate that local capacity for 
conservation is still very present The following tables explore aggregate and per village data 
in order to understand positive and negative factors identified by villagers linked to forest 
conservation. 
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Table 1.13: Positive feedbacks about forest condition 
Positive feedbacks 
Plantation of trees (bamboos, oaks etc.) 
Walling, boundaries 
Good elected-chief / Council in forest governance 
Good Patrol 






Internal work (Pass system, rules enforcement) 
Pond 
Financial condition 

































The positive feedbacks are the majority and highest in frequency. The most common 
reasons identified are: plantation of trees, walling or boundaries construction and strong 
elected leaders. Villagers find tiiat local institutions for forest management have a positive 
impact for forest conservation. Hence, the environmentalist rhetoric about degradation and 
inability of local community effort to deal with it does not hold in reality according to 
villagers. Van Panchayat is able to manage their forest and perform extensive work for its 
preservation. Community effort and empowerment also appear to be significant feedbacks. 
When die forest is a crucial aspect of livelihood for die community, local institutions are 
engaged not as manager but as communal effort to maintain and preserve tiieir source of 
subsistence. 
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Bad elected chief/council in village governance 
Uneven resource distribution 
Outsiders steal resources 
Population pressure 
Not rules 
Not external help 
Not maintenance 
Poor financial condition 
Not community effort 
Not employment 































In the table above uhe negative feedbacks do not have high frequency of all answers 
received but tbey are still crucial to analyze. The cutting of trees is identified as main factor 
for forest degradation along with absence of patrol and poor performance on the part of 
the elected Van Panchayat chief (Sarpanch). These factors are related to internal issues of 
local institutions. Ouher noteworthy feedbacks are linked wiuh issues in resources 
distribution and outsiders stealing them. It is reasonable to assume that spatial division and 
access to resources play a significant role in conflicts over distribution at the village 
dimension. Further, a village break down will identify where diese pressures are stronger. 
The following tables' offer a breakdown of all answers at the village level to understand 
where the strongest pressures are and which magnitude do tiiey take at the local level. 
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Average opinion on forest condition 










The table above describes villagers' average opinion about forest condition and on average 
the consensus seems to be positive. In the previous section, some regressions show that 
some problems of resource access still exist but die overall positive feedbacks about Van 
Panchayat poses the necessity to identify the negative factors in access to resources outside 
me action of local institutions. Van Panchayat arrangements and longtime autonomy has 
preserved die forest, if not improved i t The problems could be die current pressures from 
recent government policies/private agents to commercialize the forest and from uneven 
forest allocation mat does not reflect village needs. To strengdien the argument, the 
analysis of aggregate finding broken-down per village indicates mat the sample has an 
overall positive attitude toward die role of local institutions for forest maintenance. 
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The villagers most inclined to have a positive outlook on forest condition in the last ten 
years are from Sarmoli, Jainti, Tanga and Shankadhura. Sarmoli and Jainti are under the 
same Van Panchayat and their villagers gave great consensus about the role of die council 
and Sarpanch in conservation and forest maintenance. In the case of Sarmoli and Jainti, 
mis is the result of a very strong Council mat has worked in the last 10 years to prioritize 
livelihood and to fight against external pressures. Furthermore, high community effort and 
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good patrolling are also identified as factors contributing to improve their forest Both 
villages, on average, have die best opinion about the relationship between local institutions 
and forest condition. Furdier analysis in assessing hypodiesis number 3 will explain in 
details the factors for success. Tanga villagers put more emphasis on plantation and walling 
work as crucial factors in explaining forest improvement whereas Shankhadura score 
highest in community effort. Bodi villages are highly reliant on forest and this is a crucial 
trigger to maintain strong local institutions for forest governance. These are positive 
examples of what local institution can do to improve die forest in the eyes of villagers. In 
general, plantation of trees, good leaders, patrolling and community effort can be assumed 
success factors. 
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The above reasons identified by villagers are the factors linked to forest degradation. The 
villages tfiat show highest frequency for negative feedbacks are Sirtola, Suring and Alam. 
Sirtola villagers identify trees cutting resource distribution and population pressures to be 
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negatively correlated to forest preservation. In the case of Suring (village part of the World 
Bank project for forest management), trees cutting, absence of patrol and a bad Sarpanch 
receive widest consensus as causal factors for forest worsening. Alam villagers also 
underline resource distribution and trees cutting as negative feedbacks, in addition they 
identify outsiders consuming resources as another crucial reason for forest deterioration. 
Sarmoli and Jainti, on the contrary, present almost no negative opinions and their Van 
Panchayat is recognized to be very well-managed. 
According to table 1.17 and table 1.15 the picture is complex to grasp since all reasons 
about forest deterioration cannot be explicitly linked only to external pressures or to village 
dynamics in relation to the Van Panchayat. Probably, to some degree, both play a role in 
explaining the negative responses in relation to Van Panchayat Lack of patrol, bad forest 
governance council, outsiders stealing resources and resources distribution can be 
understood as internal problems but it's hard to be conclusive about their possible 
interpretations. Lack of patrol, for example, can happen because Van Pachayat does not 
receive enough financial support to pay a forest guard. It can also occur when the guard, 
appointed by a government agency, resides outside the village and is absent or has not 
knowledge about internal Van Panchayat dynamics. Along with internal problems, the most 
common negative feedback is trees cutting. It is reasonable to assume that the presence of 
dam construction companies in the area under the control of Van Panchayat can be a 
crucial factor contributing to forest deterioration. 
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The assumption of external interferences derives from a general positive consensus about 
Van Panchayat work in the last years. Even though, external pressures from company's 
work or government policies are still at their initial phases there is space to develop a 
general understanding of what direction internal struggles can take, especially in the case of 
trees cutting and loss of forest resources. In this frame, it is interesting to notice how central 
the concept of resource becomes when analyzing villagers' opinions about the constraints 
local institutions and village forest are facing. If resources are under threat, a clear problem 
for the right to livelihood and common good can be identified. The evaluation of 
hypothesis number 3 will extensively link the evidence from the findings illustrated so far 
with external pressures. The next section will, instead, sum all the various findings and will 
evaluate if hypothesis number one holds in its rationale. 
4.6.7 Conclusions for Hypothesis One 
In all three level of analysis the attempt was to understand the relationship between access 
and condition of resources with current practices of decentralization. In the first level of 
analysis issues of distribution seem to be strongly village specific. The inclusion of village 
dummies clearly indicates a general negative correlation with access to resources. This 
implies that a problem in resource distribution exists. This is particularly evident in the case 
of Sirtola, Sarmoli-Jainti and Alam. As shown in the second level of analysis, the reasons 
for these villages can be assumed as limited forest allocation compared to the size of the 
village but in the case of Sarmoli, the overall action of the local institution in relation to the 
forest received positive consensus. In the case of Alam and Sirtola, the problems associated 
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with access to resources can be also linked to an overall negative consensus about the 
inability of local institutions to ensure even distribution of forest resources, bad council and 
the cutting of trees. At tbe same time forest reliance is positively correlated to access to 
resources hence people who strongly depends on the forest are more likely to have their 
needs met. This is interesting because it stresses the importance of forest resources for 
households' livelihood and how its relation with the forest is still very strong. Furthermore, 
the caste dimension does not seem to be significant and poverty level cannot be confidently 
linked with unequal access to resources yet; it is negatively correlated to the perception of 
village forest ability to meet community needs. The assumption of status of oppression is 
not linked to less access to resources at this level of analysis. 
On a second level the problems of distribution assume a much clearer meaning with the 
inclusion of the variables about forest allocation, distance and area along with the dropping 
of village dummies. The division of forest is fundamental in describing access to resources. 
Lower ratios of forest and number of households in the village along with forest distance 
are negative factors to access to resources. Furthermore, the caste dimension also becomes 
significant in this analysis. Scheduled castes' households seem to have less access to forest 
resources on an aggregate level considering the allocation of forest. At this level of analysis, 
it is reasonable to assume that current forest policy arrangements can lead to social 
injustices under the form of unfair spatial division and perpetuation of a caste-based access 
to resources. This interpretation assumes stronger significance since the forest department 
continues to administer most forest area, for commercial purposes, while Van Panchayat 
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autonomy is increasingly under threat. 
The third level of analysis points out that Van Panchayats, on average, are still able to 
administer and safeguard the forest in a very effective manner according to villagers' 
opinions. In the case Van Panchayat does not have enough capacity to preserve and 
manage resources for local livelihood; problems of various natures will emerge and worsen 
the condition of the forest In this frame, Van Panchayat autonomy in communal 
perspective is crucial to preserve the equilibrium between livelihood and forest resources. 
The previous policy arrangements have enabled local institutions to preserve the forest and 
most people have been satisfied with their work. The current legal framework for forest 
governance in Uttarakhand is based on me principle of forest commercialization, 
managerialization of local bodies and increased role of the Forest Department. These 
changes might deteriorate that equilibrium. The imposition of a logic that does not 
prioritize livelihood could lead to disruption of the forest hence to compromise the right to 
livelihood as fundamental principle of social justice. Van Panchayat relative autonomy, on 
the contrary, shows positive consensuses. 
Overall, hypothesis number one holds in its rationale. The pressures on local communities 
and forest resources exist under the form of forest allocation and lead to unequal access to 
resource especially across villages. Furthermore, Van Panchayats are still able to administer 
their forests quite effectively but mere is evidence of pressures on forest resources 
especially in some villages under study. Hypothesis number three will explore more in 
199 
depth whether a link to external agencies and forest commercialization is reasonable to 
explain these pressures. 
4.7 Second Hypothesis: Engagement in Institutional Processes 
The second hypothesis explores the issue of actual engagement in institutional processes 
for forest and village governance. This is crucial to understand how inclusive institutions 
are, especially for the oppressed groups. The hypothesis explores attendance and effective 
participation of villagers during meetings in Gram Panchayat and Van Panchayat The 
rationale is grounded in the assumption that current implementation of decentralization in 
both cases does not provide substantial space for participation for the most deprived 
section in society. 
The evidence will try to give a more descriptive dimension to what are the reasons for not 
participating through regressions, tables and policy analysis. The structure of my empirical 
evidence analyzes patterns and frequencies of attendance, participation intended as 
expressing opinions in meetings and the type of participation or non-participation taking 
place. Furthermore the dimension of knowledge of institutional processes is explored to 
identify how they are internalized from local communities. This contributes to understand 
the interaction of highly structured, externally imposed mechanisms of participation in 
local bodies and local communities. 
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A comprehensive picture of participation can be drawn from the results of open and close-
ended answers codified from individual survey questions linked to participation. In the case 
of Van Panchayat the questions my empirics derive from are: "Do you participate in 
discussion? Do people listens to you? Why and why not?". A summary of all close-ended 
answers received for the question about participation is shown in the table down below. 









In the case of Gram Panchayat the questions my analysis originates from are: "has your 
participation (talking to meetings, expressing opinions) increased in the last 5-10 years in 
Gram Panchayat meetings? Why and how?". A summary of close ended answers is 
provided here below: 









These aggregate measures need to be explored further in following level of analysis. The 
next sections will use regressions and tables to give as much depth as possible to the issues 
within participation in local governance. 
4.7.1 First level of analysis 
The first level of analysis relies upon regressions and is developed around the argument 
that social change needs to address the exclusionary dimension of political participation in 
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decentralized institutional bodies. This becomes crucial to create democratic consciousness 
in the population and to devolve real power to those who lack it The dimension of 
participation is not explored only to investigate the patriarchal structure of the society but 
also to examine the necessity of real change in Panchayati Raj functioning to allow the 
potential for social transformation in local communities and to build alternative practices. 
If evidence shows that inequalities are persisting, then social justice as defined by Article 39 
of the constitution is not accomplished and further analysis will be required to understand 
how to improve current practices. The dimension of analysis for this hypothesis remains at 
the individual level. The central cohorts for the analysis includes as independent variables: 
women, lower income people, lower castes, level of education and political responsibility. 
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The variables are illustrated in the in the next set of tables: 
















Attendance in VP is how often 
each individual go to forest 
institution meetings. 
Attendance in Gram 
Panchayat is how many times 
in a year each individual go to 
village institution meetings. 
Participation in Van Panchayat 
implies how much each 
individual is engaged in 
expressing their opinion and 
whether he/she is listened or 
not. Furthermore why the 
individual is engaged or not is 
explored in an open question. 
Participation in Gram 
Panchayat implies how much 
each individual have increased 
her/his engagement in village 
institutions in die last 5-10 
years. A subsequent open 
question expressly asks the 
reasons behind each individual 
expression (or lack of it) of 
personal opinions and needs 
during the meetings. 
Measurement 
0= Never attend 
0.5= Attend sometimes 
1= Always attend 
0= Never attend 
1= Once a year 
1.5= Sometimes once a year 
sometimes twice a year 
2= Twice a year 
3= Always (every 3 months) 
0=Not participating 
0.5= Little participating but not 
listened 
1= Participating but not listened 
1.5= Little participating and rarely 
listened 
2= Always participating and rarely 
listened 
2.5= Little participating and 
sometimes listened 
3= Always participating and 
sometimes listened 
3.5= Little participating and always 
listened 
4= Always participating and always 
listened 
0= Not participation and has not 
increased 
0.5= Participation has remained 
the same as before 
1= Participation has increased 
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Impact Expected on dependent 
variables 
I am expecting lower caste to be a 
factor that decreases attendance and 
participation. 
I am expecting limited household 
resources to be a factor that decrease 
attendance and participation. 
I am expecting to find women with 
less attendance and participation than 
men. 
I am expecting to find people with 
higher education more prone to 
attend and participate in meetings 
I am expecting to find people with 
higher political responsibility more 
likely to attend and participate in 
meetings. 
Measurement 
It is measured as a dummy 
variable according to what 
caste the person belongs to: 
1= Scheduled Caste 
0= Scheduled Tribes 
According to the poverty 
index the value goes from 0 






2=Junior High education 




0=Never had political 
responsibility 
1 = Elected representative 
of forest OR village council 
2=Elected representatives 
of forest AND village 
governance, or elected 
chief for one local body 
3= Elected member at the 
block level for village 
governance 
4= Elected member at the 
district level for village 
governance 
If the person was elected in 
the term before, the value 
is divided in half. 
The regression analysis will include the above factors to give a quantitative assessment of 
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the relationship between participation and belonging to a deprived section in society: 
AGpn = p0 + pxCn + p2In + p3En+p4Gn + p5Pn + en 
AVpn = (30+ prCn + p2In + P3En+p4Gn + psPn + en 
PVpn =Po+ PiCn + p2In + p3En+p4Gn + psPn + en 
PGpn = fa + pxCn + p2In + P3En+p4Gn + p5Pn + en 
4.7.2 Results first level of analysis 
This first regression describes the relationship between attendance level to Gram Panchayat 
meetings and independent variables linked to the caste, gender, education and political 
responsibility dimension. 
AGPn = /?0 + ftCn + P2In + P3En+p4Gn + p5Pn + £n 
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Table II. 5: Gram Panchayat Attendance 
Variable Name 
Dl= Gender 































R-SQUARE =0.1602 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED =0.1421 
Min=0 Max=3 Average-1.624 Std Dev= 1.117 
'Significant at 10% * * Significant at 5% * * * Significant at 1% 
The relationship my regression shows a very reliable correlation between attendance to 
Gram Panchayat and education level, political responsibility and lower castes. This can 
imply mat lower castes are positively linked to level of turnout to village governance 
meetings since the government does provide benefits and reservation rules for them. 
Furthermore, educated and elected representatives are also more likely to attend. On die 
contrary, the status of women is negatively correlated to attendance. Women are still the 
minority and are little engaged in institutional processes hence the gender dimension 
remains the most excluded in attending Gram Panchayat meetings. 
This second regression describes the relationship between participation in Gram Panchayat 
meetings and independent variables linked to the caste, gender, education and political 
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responsibility dimension: 
PGpn = 0O + fcCn + foln + (33En+/34Gn + p5Pn + en 
Table II. 6: Gram Panchayat Participation 
Variable Name 
Dl= Gender 































R-SQUARE =0.0913 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED =0.0717 
Min=0 Max=l Average=0.507 Std Dev= 0.463 
* Significant at 10% * * Significant at 5% * * * Significant at 1% 
The concept of participation is very hard to convey so the way I articulated it in my surveys 
is through "expressing opinions and dissent during meetings". In this frame, even though 
attendance to village governance meetings implies a form of gender discrimination this 
does not show up in the current regression about participation. Participation seems to be 
more strongly linked to political responsibility and education level. This can also imply that 
some form of greater inclusiveness in political process of oppressed groups is taking place 
through various forms of reservations. At the same time new form of discrimination can 
follow lines based upon political power and education. The limitation of this model is 
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found in its low R square hence it fails to indicate other determinants of participation. In 
the next section a more descriptive analysis of what reasons stands behind participation in 
Gram Panchayat will be explored. 
This third regression describes the relationship between attendance to Van Panchayat 
meetings and independent variables linked to the caste, gender, education and political 
responsibility dimension: 
AVVn = /?0 + & C n + P2In + Mn+Mn + PsPn + £n 
Table II. 7: Van Panchayat Attendance 
Variable Name 
Dl= Gender 






























R-SQUARE =0.1108 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED =0.0917 
Min=0 Max=l Average=0.614 Std Dev= 0.4144 
* Significant at 10% * * Significant at 5% * * * Significant at 1% 
This regression shows the exclusion in attending Van Panchayat meetings for scheduled 
castes and women. Both sections of society along with not-elected members are less likely 
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to attend forest meetings. The reasons possibly lie in the patriarchal and caste-based 
structure of society, which maintains oppressive mechanisms within local institutions for 
forest governance. Ultimately, evidence from uhis regression shows the existence of 
constraints related to attendance for the marginalized groups and it indicates the great 
necessity to give more space to social justice intended as equality in engaging within Van 
Panchayat. 
This fourtfi regression describes the relationship between participation in Van Panchayat 
meetings and independent variables linked to the caste, gender, education and political 
responsibility dimension: 
PVpn = /?0 + firCn + p2In + P3En+pAGn + fisP + enn 
Table II. 8: Van Panchayat Participation 
Variable Name 
Dl= Gender 































R-SQUARE =0.2223 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED =0.2055 
Min=0 Max=4 Average-1.481 Std Dev= 1.566 
* Significant at 10% * * Significant at 5% * * * Significant at 1% 
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Participation in Van Panchayat includes the same dimension of exclusion for women as in 
die case of attendance. The gender dimension in my regressions seems to indicate a strong 
limitation to their participation within forest governance. The patriarchal structure still 
exists and the current political arrangements for Van Panchayat are not contributing to 
substantial social change intended as the creation of more inclusive institutional processes. 
Elected men hold the power and express opinions during meetings while most women are 
busy working in the forest to sustain their family's livelihood. This picture might very well 
change since in 2009 the Uttarakhand state government approved to increase the 
reservation rule for women up to 50%. The implications of possible changes will require 
further study and assessment in the future. For now the oppression of women still persists 
and a more in-depth investigation of the reasons affecting participation in Van Panchayat 
will be presented in the next level of analysis. 
The various models related to participation are not necessarily conclusive and I recognize 
their low significance in grasping full variation of my dependent variables. What emerges 
out of this broad scope analysis is the gender dimension of participation. Women are less 
exposed and engaged in institutional processes and the current policies have not truly 
challenged the patriarchal structure of society. The most oppressed castes are also slighdy 
less engaged only in the case of forest management For the rest, caste and poverty 
dimensions do not seem to constrain participation and access to institutional processes. 
The reservation rule and the benefits are attractive for many people belonging to lower 
castes; hence discrimination in this case is lower. A really significant role is played by 
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education and political responsibility; both factors seem to be fundamental for my sample 
to explain attendance and participation in local institutions. A more in-depth analysis will 
shed some more light on how all these factors impact participation and what form of 
inequalities exist within current decentralization practices. 
4.7.3 Second level of analysis 
The second level explores further the evidence with table analysis to understand the 
reasons behind participation or lack of it. The results above cannot give a comprehensive 
picture without exploring the missing evidence in my explanatory variables through the 
identification of patterns concerning the descriptive dimension of my empirics. 
Participation is a very crucial factor in democratization and the various reasons associated 
with engagement in village and forest governance will be explored in the following tables. 
This relies on the use of more descriptive statistics in understanding the local struggles to 
be part of process for the most oppressed groups and the constraints for more inclusive 
politics at the local level. 
The tables will represent a codification of all reasons at the aggregate and disaggregate along 
the lines of gender, caste, education and poverty level. The status of oppression entails a 
more in-depth discussion about participation intended as expression of personal opinions 
and needs during the meetings. Participation is indeed qualitatively difference compared to 
attendance and a value number cannot be exhaustive evidence of its real complexities. The 
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assumption is to find higher frequency reasons associated to lack of participation among 
marginalized groups as evidence that decentralization practices need to have more pro-
active space for social change in order to be inclusive. The empirics are expected to show 
how reduced is that space for local institution and the consequences for participation for 
the oppressed groups. 
4.7.4 Results second level of analysis 
The first tables describe the implications for participation in the case of decentralized forest 
management in Uttarakhand. The total sample is represented in the following tables; 
aggregate data is broken down per gender, education and poverty level. 
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Table II. 9: Participation in Van Panchayat 
Participation in Van Panchayat 
Give suggestions about: 
• Plantation (15.71 %) 
• Trees (40 %) 
• Guard Patrol (7.14%) 
• Animal Grazing (1.43%) 
• Water (1.43%) 
• Rule enforcement (7.14 %) 
• Outsiders (12.86 %) 
• Van Panchayat preservation (14.29 %) 
During meeting not listened or only listen to others 
Sometimes listened and actively talking 
Do not go but family members or husband goes 
During meeting too shy to talk, or no space for talking 
Not going to meeting because they are far away or because do 
not use die forest 
No information or no interest hence not participation 
Poor and uneducated hence not participate during the meetings 























In the table above the most frequent reasons about participation is linked to various types 
of suggestions about the work of local institutions. Only 40% of die entire sample is 
engaged to some extent in meetings. The residual 60% is not involved in expressing 
opinions or dissents and might be attending but only to listen. This picture of forms of 
participation needs to be analyzed according to die various dimensions of oppression. This 
will guide die reader to understand whedier diere is a coherent link between lack of 
engagement and the issue of marginalization for Van Panchayat. 
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Table II. 10: Participation in Van Panchayat Gender and caste5 
Participation 
Giv z suggestions about 
• Plantation (15.71%) 
• Trees (40 %) 
» Guard Patrol (7.14%) 
» Animal Grazing (1.43%) 
» Water (1.43%) 
• Rule enforcement (7.14 %) 
» Outsiders (12.86%) 
» Van Panchayat preservation 
(14.29%) 
Sometimes listened and actively 
talking 
Not going to meetings because they 
are far away or because do not use 
the forest 
Do not go but family members or 
husband goes 
No information or no interest 
hence no participation 
During meeting not listened or only 
listen to others 
During meeting too shy to talk, or 
no space for talking 
Poor and uneducated hence not 
participation during the meetings 























































For scheduled caste I intend: This category includes in it communities who were untouchables. Even 
though the Constitution of India eliminates the existence of caste and established positive discrimination for 
lower castes, they are still a social reality in many areas of India. In this research, I included Other Backward 
Caste (OBC), as defined by the Constitution, in the category of scheduled caste. 
For scheduled tribes I intend: The term "Scheduled Tribes" refers to specific indigenous peoples and tribal 
groups whose status is acknowledged to some formal degree by national legislation. The most common in 
Munsiari area are named "Shaukas" and a brief description of its characteristics is provided at the beginning 
of this chapter. 
For general case I intend: General Castes are the ones not included in the caste-based reservations guaranteed 
in the Constitutions and are generally all the castes not belonging to scheduled caste, OBC and scheduled 
tribes. 
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From this table, very interesting facts about participation can be drawn. Men seem to be 
four times more likely to express opinions about Van Panchayat issues than their female 
counterparts. Women are more likely to be represented by family members or their 
husbands and they feel more strongly about their status of being poor, shy and uneducated. 
The dimension of gender oppression assumes a clearer notion in this table through the use 
of descriptive statistics. Although some level of significance was identified in the previous 
regression, the codified open answers give clearer meanings to women constraints to 
participation in Van Panchayat In addition, people from general caste once attending seem 
to be more engaged in discussion and in expressing opinions of various sorts than 
individuals from scheduled castes and tribes. The latter recognize some constraints in meir 
lack of education especially in the case of scheduled tribes hence caste discrimination 
emerges a bit more strongly in the table than in the regression. The next table will explain 
more in details if poverty and education is also sources of further inequalities in 
participation within Van Panchayat 
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Table II. 11: Participation in Van Panchayat: The relevance of poverty2,and education5 
Participation in Van Panchayat 
Sometimes listened and actively talking 
Give suggestions about 
> Plantation (15.71 %) 
• Trees (40 %) 
> Guard Patrol (7.14%) 
> Animal Grazing (1.43 %) 
. Water (1.43%) 
> Rule enforcement (7.14 %) 
> Outsiders (12.86%) 
• Van Panchayat preservation (14.29 %) 
Not going to meeting because they are far 
away or because do not use the forest 
Do not go but family members or husband 
goes 
Not information or not interest hence not 
participation 
During meeting not listened or only listen to 
others 
During meeting too shy to talk, or not space 
for talking 
Poor and uneducated hence not 
participation during the meetings 














































The analysis of participation dirough die lenses of poverty and education also provide 
more insights of die various constraints poor and uneducated people face in engaging in 
Van Panchayat Even though die poor are more likely to give specific suggestions diey are 
also less likely to be listened in die meetings and are less engaged in village politics because 
of distance from meetings or low attendance. The significance of education for 
21 The poverty level follows the indications from the poverty index provided at the beginning of the 
Chapter. Low poverty is the value from 1 to 3 and high poverty is the valued from 4 to 6. The very 
poor are usually landless with very limited sources of livelihood whereas the less poor are usually 
employed in government job and have greater household landholdings. 
22 Low education means people who are illiterate or have an education lower than junior high 
school High education means people who have an education equals or higher than high school. 
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participation reemerges, like in the previous regressions, whereas the poverty level assumes 
more relevance in the current table. Discrimination does occur for the poor and 
uneducated in Van Panchayat meetings and the differences in percentages might not be 
"statistically significant" but absolutely real. This indicates how important is to use more 
descriptive statistics for the analysis of participation since it provides a more comprehensive 
picture of oppression and inequalities within decentralized institutions. The next set of 
descriptive statistics gives a more insightful understanding of how participation is intended 
in village governance. The overall sample still shows low participation with around 58% of 
people who express none or very little opinions and dissent in meetings. The reasons 
behind this relatively low inclusion are discussed more in depth in the next tables. 
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Table II. 12: Participation in Gram Panchayat 
Participation in Gram Panchayat 
Expr ess opinions about various issues: 
• Road (25.45 %) 
• Water (23. 64 %) 
• Rules enforcement (5.45 %) 
• Planning (9.09 %) 
• Village (12.73%) 
» School (9.09 %) 
» Benefits Distribution (9.09 %) 
» Pension (5.45 %) 
Increase in knowledge and feeling empowered 
Attendance but only listening and not expressing opinions 
General talk during meetings 
Shy, uneducated and poor hence not participating 
Low attendance and do not talk during meetings 
Not time and interest to get engaged in Gram Panchayat 
Do not attend meetings but not reasons given 
Not listened when trying to express opinions 
Community conflict or not space to talk in meetings 
Household work hence not time to get engaged in Gram Panchayat 
Family members or husband go to meetings at my place 
Political responsibility requires my participation 

































This table gives a more insightful understanding of how participation works in village 
governance. The overall sample still shows low participation with around 56% of people 
who express none or very little opinions and dissent in meetings as table II. 1 shows. The 
reasons behind this relatively low inclusion are presented above. The results are not so 
grim; mere is also a significant number of people who are actually expressing opinions, 
feeling empowered and gaining more interest and responsibility of the processes affecting 
local governance. 
On me other side die majority is still facing struggles in even attending meetings despite 
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almost half part. The dominant reasons are linked to limited talking, poverty and 
education. Part of the sample also identified conflicts within Gram Panchayat that is also 
translated into low level of listening and limited space for constructive discussion. The 
disagreement dimension is not given much space in die overall discussion but it can 
potentially lead to community fragmentation and lower cohesion in the struggle of 
externally imposed self-governance. The next tables will show if low participation can be 
linked to gender, caste, education or poverty. 
Table II. 13: Participation in Gram Panchayat: Gender and caste25 
23 For scheduled caste I intend: This category includes in it communities who were untouchables. Even 
though the Constitution of India eliminates the existence of caste and established positive discrimination 
for lower castes, they are still a social reality in many areas of India. In diis research, I included Otfier 
Backward Caste (OBC), as defined by die Constitution, in die category of scheduled caste. For 
scheduled tribes I intend: The term "Scheduled Tribes" refers to specific indigenous peoples and tribal 
groups whose status is acknowledged to some formal degree by national legislation. The most common 
in Munsiari area are named "Shaukas" and a brief description of its characteristics is provided at die 
beginning of this chapter. For general case I intend: General Castes are die ones not included in die 
caste-based reservations guaranteed in die Constitutions and are generally all the castes not belonging to 
scheduled caste, OBC and scheduled tribes. 
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Participation in Gram Panchayat 
Express opinions about various issues: 
• Road (25.45 %) 
• Water (23. 64 %) 
• Rules enforcement (5.45 %) 
• Planning (9.09 %) 
• Village (12.73 %) 
• School (9.09 %) 
• Benefits Distribution (9.09 %) 
• Pension (5.45 %) 
Talking during meetings 
Increase in knowledge and feeling 
empowered 
Have more time and interest than 
before 
Political responsibility requires my 
participation 
Attendance but only listening and not 
expressing opinions 
Not time and interest to get engaged in 
Gram Panchayat 
Low attendance and do not talk during 
meetings 
D o not attend meetings but not 
reasons given 
Family members or husband go to 
meetings in my place 
Household work hence no time to get 
engaged in Gram Panchayat 
Not listened to when trying to express 
opinions 
Shy, uneducated and poor hence not 
participating 
Community conflict or not space to 














































































This table clearly indicates that the gender bias still exist in participation within die Gram 
Panchayat. Even tfiough it did not show up in die regression as significant factor, I argue 
die model does not grasp die whole picture as much as diis table. At die same time it is 
fundamental to underline a very encouraging increase in attendance and participation of 
women perhaps because of die recent reservation rule that, starting from 2008, mandates 
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50% of all seats should be reserved from women. The empowerment process is recognized 
not only by women but also by individuals in lower castes. This is happening through many 
channels: women groups, more women in politics, reservation rule, better understanding of 
the political game etc. This is probably the most significant process of "social 
reengineering" that the country has ever experienced as Narayana (2005) recognized. 
Although positive signals emerge out of my sample, the struggles remain several, women 
still feel more strongly about their status of low education and shyness and they are more 
likely to sit and listen instead of speak out. In second instance, the caste dimension does 
not seem to be a constraint, yet a significant group of scheduled castes (the most oppressed 
set of castes in my sample) still experience low attendance and engagement in meetings. 
The next table might indicate whether education and poverty might play a more significant 
role than the division in caste to explain lack of participation. 
Table II. 14: Participation in Gram Panchayat: The relevance of poverty24and education2' 
24 The poverty level follows the indications from the poverty index provided at the beginning of the 
Chapter. Low poverty is the value from 1 to 3 and high poverty is the valued from 4 to 6. The very 
poor are usually landless with very limited sources of livelihood whereas the less poor are usually 
employed in government job and have greater household landholdings. 
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Participation in Gram Panchayat 
Express opinions about various issues: 
• Road (25.45 %) 
• Water (23. 64 %) 
• Rules enforcement (5.45 %) 
• Planning (9.09 %) 
• Village (12.73%) 
• School (9.09 96) 
• Benefits Distribution (9.09 %) 
• Pension (5.45 %) 
Talking during meetings 
Increase in knowledge and feeling 
empowered 
Have more time and interest than before 
Political responsibility requires my 
participation 
Attendance but only listening and not 
expressing opinions 
Not time and interest to get engaged in Gram 
Panchayat 
Low attendance and do not talk during 
meetings 
Do not attend meetings but not reasons given 
Family members or husband go to meetings 
at my place 
Household work hence not time to get 
engaged in Gram Panchayat 
Not listened when trying to express opinions 
Shy, uneducated and poor hence not 
participating 


































































Discrimination in participation goes beyond caste and gender as this table shows. Low 
education and poverty are both factors that are determinant in understanding engagement 
in village politics. A significant number of poor people do express opinions and express 
some limited degree of empowerment Yet the majority is more likely only to listen wiuhout 
2° Low education means people who are illiterate or have an education lower than junior high 
school High education means people who have an education equals or higher than high school. 
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ever talking or not being listened at all. They also experience the highest degree of 
consciousness about their status and how it affects their participation. Even though in the 
regressions poverty did not seem to be a significant factor, diis table indicates its 
importance in participation. Furthermore, education plays a very similar role witiiin Gram 
Panchayat Educated people will express most opinions whereas individuals wim lower 
education are more likely to feel shy and unable to express their view during die meetings. 
Uneducated people are still elected in the council but are usually left without substantial 
power to influence decisions of what development projects should be prioritized in the 
community: 
"I am illiterate and cannot count but I was elected council member. I go to 
meetings every time is scheduled but it does not matter what I say. I am forced to 
sign documents uhat I cannot read and because I am an uneducated woman, people 
tfiink I am not capable to understand the needs of my village. (Nanda Devi, 55 
from Suring village) 
Furthermore, many marginalized households also experience limited space to express tiieir 
opinions in regards to what decisions should be made at the village council: 
"I used to go meetings but I stopped because there is always too much screaming. I 
am from a poor household and I do not have voice during meetings. I am never 
listened and it does not matter how much I try, people think I do not exist. I send 
my son and sometimes my daughter in law but they are treated die same way. My 
son is now getting an education and I hope he will be listened in the future" (Neera 
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Devi, 45 from Tanga village) 
Both stories are from women from marginalized households and describe how gender and 
class can influence how little space a meeting can provide to oppressed members of the 
community. 
The sample's findings in the previous tables and the narratives can give more insights than 
the regression analysis about reasons for participation. The constraints that prevent specific 
categories of people to engage into institutional processes are various and encompass 
gender, education and poverty. These three factors seem to be fundamental in explaining 
variations in die level of participation and give a deeper dimension to what each regression 
previously showed. Inequalities in village and forest politics are very real and even though 
there are some positive signs hinting to profound social changes, they are outweighed by a 
still existing deep-rooted division along class and gender. Both factors might perpetuate 
discrimination or lead to further polarization and community fragmentation between rich 
and poor or educated and non-educated in the process of transition to a market economy 
as endorsed by the good governance agenda. 
The implications of mese findings points out tfiat current decentralization policies do not 
substantially prioritize social justice in the form of inclusive representation yet, there are 
signs of improvements in regards to gender and caste participation especially in the case of 
Gram Panchayat. Caste does not seem to significandy impede participation to the politics 
of village and forest governance. Despite some positive evidence, the process of 
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democratization still faces strong resistances from rigid patriarchal structures and confronts 
new challenges in upcoming polarizations along new forms of discrimination along the lines 
of education and poverty. The next level of analysis will describe how these implications 
translate in the mechanism of institutional processes and their impact on the community. 
4.7.5 Third level of analysis 
The third level of evidence is meant to assess how much institutional processes are 
internalized from local communities in the case of Van Panchayat. The distance between 
the externally imposed mechanisms and villages is favoring exclusionary formal institutions. 
The attempt to formalize and managerialize processes that have been communal for 
generations is a depredation to the right to livelihood and self-governance. The complete 
disregard for informal forest arrangements in the current policy changes has great potential 
for struggles. Evidence of how much knowledge about the Microplan for Van Panchayat is 
found in local communities will shed some more light if this process is actually occurring or 
not. 
A Microplan as previously described in footnote 115 is described in Article 12 of the 
Forest Rules for Uttarakhand: 
"It shall be obligatory on the part of the Management Committee to prepare a 
Microplan on the basis of guiding principles given in the Composite Management 
Plan for the management and protection of village forest/Panchayati forest for a 
period of five years with the assistance of the concerned Deputy Ranger/Forester of 
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Forest Guard as may be convenient from administrative point of view, giving due 
consideration to the requirement of the rightholders and ensuring die ecological 
balance of die region. The micro plan will be place before die General Body of all 
the right holders/Self-Help Groups by die concerned Forest Range Officer for its 
for its approval before it is finally sanctioned by die concerned Sub-Divisional 
Forest Officer. It shall be die duty of die Committee to stricdy follow die 
prescriptions of die finally micro plan." (The Uttarakhand Panchayati Forest Rules, 
2005: Art. 12) 
The Microplan as described above is a very complex concept to be internalized by die local 
community. Even tiiough it is a mandatory dimension of die current policy, die next level 
of evidence will expect diat knowledge and internalization is not happening at die local 
level. This article is still crucial since it determines a fundamental shift meant to 
managerialise local institutions and die consequence is tiiat villagers no longer have 
complete autonomy on their own without approval of the forest staff (Sarin, 2001). 
4.7.6 Results third level of analysis 
As previously mentioned a Microplan is part of die legal agreement and die next table will 
provide die average knowledge level of villagers about i t The question in die survey was 
codified 1 for Yes and 0 for No. This is represented in die following empirics divided by 
villages: 
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The average value emerging out of all surveyed villages is around zero. The villages widi 
positive values do include elected representatives of Van Panchayat institutions in die 
sample. Even diough diey are included, they do not significandy change the overall low 
knowledge of what a Microplan is. This indicates how little die Microplan is internalized by 
local communities hence the process of managerialization is not completely accomplished 
at me local level since most participants and local politicians I interviewed have not even 
heard of it. This also shows how distant centralized priorities of forest commercialization 
and productivity are from the needs of people's relying on die forest for dieir livelihood. 
4.7.7 Conclusion Second Hypodiesis 
Participation is a very complex concept to grasp and die evidence showed in this section 
underlines fundamental patterns of existing discrimination for some categories of people in 
engaging widi local institutions. 
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In the case of Van Panchayat the gender dimension is very predominant and women are 
less likely to attend and to participate in meetings. This is shown in the regressions and 
explained in depth in the descriptive tables. Women feel shy and uneducated hence unable 
to get engaged. Furthermore, housework is so intensive that reduces their time to 
participate in meetings. The patriarchal structure, in my field sites, exists along with 
additional constraints for people in the scheduled caste who seem to attend less than 
omers. In the tables differentials in participation between poverty and education levels are 
also significant in Van Panchayat. 
In the case of Gram Panchayat die gender dimension is negatively correlated only to 
attendance and the degree of exclusion of women from participation does not seem to be 
significant in the regression. On the contrary, many women in my sample recognize the 
positive impact of engaging in local institutions. The caste dimension is also positively 
correlated to attendance and scheduled tribes and caste both participate. The positive trend 
in the level of oppressed groups' engagement is encouraging. On the other hand, a strong 
form of discrimination is happening along lines of education and political responsibility. 
Poor and uneducated experience strong degree of exclusion from political processes at the 
village level as described in the tables above. 
On a mird level along with inequalities in engagement within local bodies, there is also 
significant evidence of low internalization and knowledge of the forest policy legal 
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framework on the part of people living in the areas under study. This is interesting because 
it shows how little consideration is given to traditional practices of self-governance by policy 
makers. Most communities have managed their resources for livelihood in a different way 
than what the government envisions. The pressures to commercialize the forest are a 
centralized decision, which does not involve local understanding of livelihood and needs. 
Overall the central argument of hypothesis number two holds its rationale from the various 
evidences presented so far in relation to perpetuation of some forms of exclusive political 
processes. Discrimination along lines of gender, caste, education and political responsibility 
reduce space for the oppressed groups to engage in the process of democratization which 
decentralization should favor. Some encouraging signs as consequence of reservation, 
women groups and increased knowledge about local bodies are opening potential spaces 
for social changes but the struggles for women, the uneducated and the poor are still far 
from being overcome. Institutional processes also need to take more into account local 
communities' practices and priorities in order to become truly inclusive. 
4.8 Third Hypothesis: Marketization Pressures 
The third hypothesis identifies the magnitude of marketization pressures upon local 
communities in the context of decentralized forest management. This refers especially to 
construction work and how the model of development supported at the central level 
strongly clash against the principle of self-governance and right to livelihood. The impact of 
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these market pressures are going to damage the forest and seriously reduce resources and 
limit the power of local communities and institutions to decide what kind of economic 
development to pursue. The main evidence will show that the awareness of local people 
about external agents and what is the expected impact according to their perspectives. This 
is a crucial aspect to analyze because it stresses the development priorities of the state in 
strong opposition to the lack of power of local communities. 
The objective, for this analysis, is to delineate the power structure and concentration in the 
hands of powerful corporations in partnership with the central government Market 
pressures are indeed source of great struggle for local communities and their analysis 
contributes to the critique of the neoliberal agenda behind national policies and to the 
implementation of decentralization in line with the good governance approach. Other 
evidence describes more qualitatively other type of pressures local institutions for forest 
governance are facing along wim massive development projects. For example, many villages 
are required to open joint bank account with government agencies, in order for them to 
integrate in the mainstream money economy, and what evidence was found regarding forest 
commercialization. 
4.8.1 First level of analysis 
The first level of analysis shows the overall opinion from local people about the impact of 
external agencies on the forest and the community. The approach entails the analysis of 
evidence across different communities in comparative perspective. A descriptive dimension 
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to my empirics will be illustrated to clearly define die logic behind die various answers 
received. The implications for the right to livelihood, the notion of common good and 
means of production are all driving concepts in further discussion. 
The impact of external pressures for example will show how social justice is compromised 
within the logic of profit accumulation invoked by central policies. The complete lack of 
power of local bodies is not assessed empirically but it is assumed in face of public-private 
partnerships investing billions of dollars in development infrastructures. The decisions for 
these projects occur without any consultation with local bodies and without assessment for 
local livelihood. These pressures are named by the majority of my sample according to the 
following table: 
Table HI. 1: Agencies identified as external pressures 
Pressures Name 




Mountain tunnel to channel the water 
Not knowledge of any external interference 
Pipeline assembling 










Eighty per cent of the sample recognizes the existence of two main external actors working 
on their areas. The most renowned are NTPC and Himalayan Hydro Private Limited; 
both are public-private partnerships between the Indian government and multinational 
corporations. Most people also identify their work to be related to dam construction and 
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electricity provision. Its creation requires pipelines, tunnel in the mountains and 
powerhouse buildings. 
The empirical evidence about the impacts of these types of constructions will be assessed 
through division of answers in categories widi the assumption that every villager is 
oppressed in this context. The general opinions from all communities are gathered from 
close ended and open answers to the questions: what is the impact of external agencies on 
your community and forest. The following table gives the aggregate opinion from close-
ended answers about their operations: 
Table HI. 2: Overall opinion about external agencies and market pressures 
Impact on community 















The overall feeling is more oriented to recognize the negative impact of external agencies. 
A very significant pool of people are also unaware or not exposed to them, hence mey did 
not develop a specific opinions. This might also imply some fear of repercussion in 
expressing a specific comment about mem, since the resistance to mese pressures is 
becoming increasingly political. Only a handful recognizes their positive implications 
especially for the forest which is at the basis of their livelihoods. The following tables will 
indicate what kind of impacts are perceived from local communities and give a more in-
depth understanding of the struggle they increasingly are forced to deal widi. 
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4.8.2 Results of first level of analysis 
The first set of tables give an overview about the impacts of external agencies on the forest 
and communities. The various descriptive statistics are gathered by codifying the open-
ended answers from the following question: Are there external agencies (companies, 
private traders, corporations for example NTPC, construction companies etc..) in the 
area? If so, what's their impact on the forest? What's their impact on the community? The 
following tables codify villagers' opinions and a final analysis per village can provide a better 
understanding of their operations according to the opinion of local people. 
Table HI. 3: External pressures and negative impacts on the forest 
Negative Impacts on the forest 
Landslides ruin the forest 
Less trees in the forest 
Blasting 
Damage for the forest 
Less land 
River divergence 
Pollution and environment damage 
Less forest resources 
Damage for the animals 
Damage for die mountains 
Stone dust 
Damage for water sources 
Damage for the soil 
Damage for die people 

















% of respondents who 


































In this table evidence shows that negative impacts are much stronger than positive ones for 
the forest People especially recognize landslides and trees cutting as the main causes for 
forest damage. The damage is also identified as multidimensional in nature impacting 
water, soil, animals and mountains. Furthermore the interferences from external 
companies result in less land available for people living in the forest and river divergence 
which compromises agriculture and irrigation. The problems for livelihood are very serious 
and the pollution and environment damage is widely recognized by the overwhelming 
majority of people. 
Table HI. 4: External pressures and positive impacts on the forest 
Positive Impacts on the forest 
Not impact on the forest 
Employment 
Financial compensation 























Very few people give a specific positive opinion about the impact of dam construction on 
their communities. Some say no impact on the forest takes place whereas others recognizes 
some positive implications like financial compensation or increase in connectedness. In 
general the positive comments are quite limited. The next table extends die same analysis 
considering the repercussions of external agencies on the community. 
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Table HI. 5: External pressures and negative impacts on the surveyed communities 
Negative Impacts on the communities 
Pollution and dust 
Damage to people 
Less forest resources available for the 
community 
Landslides/Danger 
Workers from outside creating social 
problems and depleting forest resources 
Displacement and migration because of 
dam construction 
Low wages 
Damage to environment 
Damage to the village 
Damage to the road 
Damage to water 
Damage to houses 
Damage to health 
Not financial compensation 






















































External agencies are still blamed to create great pollution and damages for the people 
living in the communities under study. Various problems related to displacements, 
outsiders depleting local resources and general negative impacts on human health are the 
ones receiving most consensuses as negative feedbacks. Even in this case the damage 
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becomes multidimensional and entails various implications to water, housing, livelihood 
and village in general. The majority of answers received recognize the present and potential 
future harmful consequences of external agencies pressures upon communities. The loss of 
land and die environmental damage will impact not only the forest but also its fragile 
equilibrium with the people. This is probably the most serious struggle everyone face in the 
communities under my study. 
An interesting story to give a more qualitative explanation of the impact of dam 
construction on the forest was told by the elected chief representative of the forest council 
in Tanga village: 
"We invested a lot of resources to build a fish pond in our community. W e thought 
the community effort and a little support from the government could bring fish to 
the community. Our attempt was actually successful; the fish pond was full of fish 
till last year. NTPC arrived and started building on the same area, we objected it 
was going to ruin our village fishpond but we did not receive any answer from the 
company. The dam construction started and the because of river divergence we 
were not able to bring water to the fish pond during the dry season. Now the fish 
pond is dead and the whole area is surrounded by people coming from Nepal living 
in tents and consuming our forest resources while working for NTPC. Altiiough we 
are experiencing social problems with the outsiders, we are more afraid of the 
problems to our water sources caused by the company (Pratap Singh, Tanga 
village)." 
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Table HI. 6: External pressures and positive impacts on the surveyed communities 
Positive Impacts on die communities 
Employment for die community 
Electricity provision from companies 
Facilities for die communities (road, etc.) 
Temple donation from the companies 





























In this table it emerges that a significant pool of people identifies die possibility of 
employment and electricity as positive implications of external agencies operations for the 
communities. A considerable portion of die sample has strong hopes for die prospect of 
higher sources of income along widi an eventual increase in service provision of electricity 
and facilities. The latter consequence is unlikely to happen since most energy from these 
projects will be provided to cities to meet their increasing demand leaving villages dark. 
Employment opportunities are also pretty limited since most labor is short-term and the 
wage is low and uncertain. The group who responded with positive feedbacks is still limited 
compared to everyone else but it shows how the pressures of projects aimed at 
"modernizing" die country can slowly push people already in great struggle and poverty to 
accept these pressures in die hope of a better future. 
So far aggregate measures have been shown widiout considering the contextual specificities 
of every village. Some are more exposed than otiiers hence experience struggles in different 
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ways and to different extents. The first table for further analysis shows the average opinion 
of each community about external agencies operations: 



















































The aggregate data per village show interesting intra village differences in opinion about 
external agencies operations on die community. Even mough most individuals from every 
community have negative opinions about the consequences for their forests, there are 
significant fluctuations in the perception of external pressures for each village. It is 
interesting to notice how people in some areas are unaware or without an opinion about 
diem. This indicates that not enough information, about the potential consequences of 
dam construction for people's livelihood, reaches less exposed villages. The positive 
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consensus, about the impact of external agencies on the community, in Lodhi, Sirtola and 
Tanga is associated to employment. The possibility to earn some short-term income and 
the promises from the companies engaged in construction to deliver electricity has 
convinced a significant amount of people. The interaction with external agents is not seen 
as necessarily bad because there is a fundamental trust that they can contribute to alleviate 
the hardships of people living in diese areas. Yet, many people in odier villages might even 
refrain to express an opinion because of the possible tensions that might create, even 
mough only 20% of die whole sample is unaware of companies' existence. Hence, only 
received opinions about what type of impact for the forest and die community will be 
explored in depdi in die next tables. They are not representative of die whole sample but 
still can indicate, more in details, die opinions per village about external pressures. 
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Most villagers perceive the forest damage to be caused by external agencies construction 
work. As shown in die initial section of this chapter, the villages most directly affected by it 
are Sirtola, Lodhi and Tanga. The others are less exposed to them but still at risk. The 
most widely recognized problem for Jainti, Alam, Lodhi and Suring samples is landslides 
and their impact on the forest. Furthermore, the most exposed villages recognize the lack 
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of trees to be a direct consequence of companies' work. Tanga villagers give strong 
emphasis on river divergence because of soil dumping as another problem caused by dam 
construction. Sarmoli, although not direcdy affected shows to be more exposed to blasting 
and sound pollution than omers. Even though some villages face different problems, the 
struggle is all directed to companies work. The next table shows instead what villagers have 
identified as positive impacts on the forest. 




















































Very few positive feedbacks are received about external agencies in general. Some financial 
compensation along with the perception of low to no impact on the forests is the most 
common reasons to recognize a positive impact of companies' operations in my sample. 
Some answers about employment are overlapping with the same answer for the impact on 
local community so it's questionable whether employment is a valid answer in die case of 
village forest The next table will present the findings about impact on all communities. 
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The negative effects of external interferences on the communities are also village specific 
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like forest impacts. Jainti villagers still highlight the negative consequences of landslides on 
people. The most exposed villages all experience similar struggles closely connected to 
pollution and dust mat is damaging people's health in those areas. Furthermore, me 
opinions identifying negative impacts in Sarmoli and Suring give more emphasis to social 
and resource related problems caused by outsiders depleting them, forced migration and a 
decrease in available forest for the communities. Most villages also recognize die 
dimension of damage to people inflicted by external agencies work as common ground for 
struggle. Next table will provide die counter arguments about their impacts. 















































































Although negative impacts are stronger for many people, mere is a significant section of the 
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sample that recognizes the benefits of companies' work. This is very important to recognize 
since the reasons are pretty homogenous and consistent across villages. Employment 
opportunities and electricity provisions are especially strong arguments to defend 
companies' operations from the communities most affected by them. I find this apparent 
paradox quite insightful because it opens up space for my interpretation from field 
observations and personal experiences. Many villagers from exposed areas are employed as 
cheap daily labor in companies' construction work and they are promised with prospects of 
a better livelihood in the wage economy, little financial compensations for forest losses and 
increased electricity provision for their villages. The villagers more affected by the market 
economy are already experiencing lack of support in pursuing forms of development more 
beneficial for their communities. Big scale projects might look like possible positive 
changes for a areas already isolated and in hardship. At die same time, villages' forest 
resources are depleted by decreased and damaged land used in construction works and 
outsiders coming from poorer areas looking for a job. 
In addition to the social and environmental problems associated with big-scale 
development projects, a struggle of villagers employed as workers from these companies 
also exist. A qualitative example is well described from die words of Basanti Devi from die 
village of Sirtola: 
"I started working for the construction "wala" (means people) one month ago because of a 
financial problem in my family. I have been crushing stones everyday from sunrise to 
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sunset and I was promised 200026 Rupees at the end of the month. I went to get my money 
and I came home. My husband counted the money and it was only 50027 Rupees. Now I 
am in debt and I have shoulders problems but demanding the full amount does not work, 
the company does not listen to us and already hired someone else at my place. I am angry 
but I am poor and uneducated, they look so powerful and they can cheat us, kya karte 
hain?". Kya karte hain means "what can we do"? The struggle of this woman is common 
also to other people I interviewed and it indicates how the interaction between local 
communities and external agents is fairly exploitative. 
The move to a market economy, with various struggles, is leading to a clear shift from 
forest reliance to cheap labor which, in the end will make the most rural communities 
worse off in terms of livelihood. Furthermore, the electricity that will be created is meant to 
reach the growing cities in the plain and the apparent gains from the wage economy embed 
inherent injustices like short term, low and uncertain rates for die villagers and large scale 
displacement In addition to it, the environmental damage is already occurring according to 
many people's opinions. It can become of major proportions and most people are still 
unaware of the consequences for their livelihoods arid forests. Most projects have 20 years 
lifespan and the government is partnering with corporations to favor this form of short term 
and exclusive "economic" development. 
Decentralized institutions do not really have any political authority to challenge these 
26 the equivalent of 45 US dollars 
27 the equivalent of 11 US dollars 
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billion dollar projects and they are forced to cope with them. The limited power at the 
local level impedes awareness spreading and substantial resistance to stop the 
consequences of companies operations mat, from Basanu's experience go beyond the 
numbers discussed far and sounds very real for people's daily lives. In spite of the 
constraints of local institutions, the struggle is becoming more evident Eight Van 
Panchayats in the area under my study have now written to the Union minister of 
Uttarakhand, Jairam Ramesh, to protest against NTPC project28. Although some initial 
resistance exists, if forest governance was implemented according to the principles of social 
justice and common good, the struggles could assume a stronger political dimension and 
become arena of effective negotiation and dissent building. On the contrary, the good 
governance agenda -aligned to neoliberal principles of economic development- emerging 
from the more recent legal framework of Van Panchayat, favors forest commercialization, 
de-politicization and people's as beneficiaries instead of owners of the forest and its 
resources. These pressures create disconnection from local needs, communities' lack of 
information and political engagement through decentralized forest governance. This will be 
explored in the next, more qualitative, section of this analysis. 
4.8.3 Second level of analysis 
The second level of analysis includes a more qualitative analysis of other kind of pressures 
other than the ones discussed before affecting direcdy local institutions. This means what 
28 Down to earth magazine, Science and Environment online: "NTPC dam rattles local elections", 
March 15*, 2010 
(htrp://www.downtoearm.org.ir^full6.asp?foldername=20100315&filename=news&sec_id=4&sid=8) 
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kind of commercial extraction is happening, how influential the forest department is and 
what is the financial devolution to local bodies. The limited autonomy of Van Panchayat in 
the power structure is further constrained by initial attempts to further reduce its historical 
authority over natural resources with policy changes favoring forest commercialization, 
external influences and limited devolution. 
The various pressures to commercialize the forest and the external interference from the 
Forest Department are increasingly more present Even though Van Panchayat enjoys 
more autonomy in remote areas, a significant change is taking place in the relationship 
between local institutions and government agencies. The Forest Department priorities are 
established primarily in conservation and management of the forest according to the 
following lines of actions: 
• "Conservation of forests including wildlife and its habitats. 
• Providing ecological sendees to the citizens including conservation of soil and water 
regime 
• Maintenance and enhancement of tourism values. 
• Production and harvest of forest produce on scientific lines. 
• Generation of employment 
• Participation in developmental initiatives of the Government through activities like 
land transfer for developmental projects, plantation of bio-fuel species, etc.O"29 
29 Forest Department Uttarakhand website: Management Priorities section 
(htrp://www.un^ira]diandforestorg/englisfVmanagenientpriorities.htrn) 
247 
Among the key issues the generation of employment and production of forest produce on 
scientific lines leads to assume that a monetary approach is preferred above livelihood and 
traditional practices. The government is in concerted action to slowly erode Van Panchayat 
autonomy in order to pursue some form of commercialization and productivity-oriented 
approaches. 
In this area, the Foundation for Ecological Security (FES) was operating till 2006 and its 
funding was invested to strengthen institution of self-governance for forest conservation 
through community effort. FES support was also used to write-up the microplan in a way 
that countered pressures to transform local institutions into mere managers of the forest 
The microplan in many villages under study was indeed transformed through the use of 
bylaws into a tool to get money from the Forest Department in order to invest into real 
conservation within a frame of village self-reliance and community full inclusion in Van 
Panchayat work. In my field sites this is widely acknowledged and FES help is recognized 
to have substantially supported communities. The funding from the government eventually 
stopped for political reasons that were in conflict to the course of action the organization 
decided to undertake. Today's financial reliance mainly remains within the Forest 
Department or other government departments. 
4.8.4 Results second level of analysis 
Each table is divided in three sections exploring Van Panchayat financial condition, form of 
commercial extraction and external influences happening in each village under study. The 
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Forest Department plays a crucial role since it is the strongest link between local 
institutions and the government. FD mandate as seen above directs implementation of the 
forest policy favoring an extraction-oriented approach. In the case studies, evidence of 
these pressures emerges out of individual interview with various elected representative of 
Van Panchayat. Furthermore, the opinion of villagers about whemer the Van Panchayat 
has been able to improve the forest or not, links die individual perception to existing 
pressures on forest reliance and livelihood. In this frame, the average opinion of villagers 
about forest improvement relative to its maintenance is also provided as an average of the 
following scale: scale: 1: Worsen, 2: The Same and 3: Better. 




• None but forest 
department gives 
suggestions about the 
cultivation of plants for 
commercial usage. 
Has the Van Panchayat's forest improved 
according to villagers? 
Financial Situation 
• Limited funding 
from the Forest 
Department. 
• FES funding 
ended in 2006 
• Pass system does 
exist for outsiders 
• Not much 
information was 











digging work and 
side preparation. 
• Van Sarpanch 
(elected chief 
representative) 
intends to involve 
me Forest 
Department in 
making die next 
Microplan. 
Average opinion is 1.35. This implies that 
the forest condition has worsened instead 
of improved in recent years. 
Sirtola Van Panchayat does experience some degree of control by the Forest Department 
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and the trajectory seems to indicate diat it is about to increase. Continuous suggestions 
from die government agency and Van Sarpanch intention to receive its support already 
identify a growing relationship. A women's collective is also active in maintaining the forest 
but it does not receive any tangible support from die Van Panchayat. Overall, die condition 
of die forest is perceived as worsening whereas the relationship between the local institution 
and die forest department is expected to increase in the future. I cannot conclusively argue 
that an inverse relationship exist, but there are enough reasons to expect further resource 
commercialization in the case die government agency gains more control over die Van 
Panchayat 
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• Extraction of cinnamon 
leaves and likens are 
sold to die Forest 
Department that 
compensates the Van 
Panchayat with 
occasional cheques. 
The purchased plants 
are sold to external 
contractors. 
• Commercial extraction 
of Cordyceps Cinaensis 
(a type of fungi with 
medical properties) 
provided the 
opportunity to retain a 
5% cut within the Van 
Panchayat. Since 2 
years ago, the Kumaon 
development Agency (a 
regional agency of the 
government) decides 
the contractors and 
does not compensate 
the Van Panchayat. 
Has the Van Panchayat improved according to 
villagers? 
Financial Situation 
• A pass system is 
in place. External 
people from the 
Van Panchayat 
are supposed to 
pay between 20 to 
40 Rupees (0.5 




• FES support 
ended in 2006 
• Another source of 
income is the 
money coming 











should be done 
and appoints the 
guard who should 








The average opinion is 2.1. This implies 
me overall feeling is mat the forest 
remained practically the same during the 
last few years. 
Lodhi Van Panchayat is engaged in commercial extraction but part the Van Sarpanch 
(elected chief representative) also receives some financial compensation from it 
Government agencies are definitely present in local institutions' internal affairs and 
increasingly more engaged in forest commercialization and medicinal plants extraction. 
Even though the Van Panchayat receives some monetary return from it, this is expected to 
decline as for the case of the Kumaon Development Agency. The overall opinion seems to 
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indicate that the forest has neither improved nor worsened substantially even though 
increasing external influences might change its condition. 





Has the Van Panchayat improved according to 
villagers? 
Financial Situation 
• Van Panchayat 
levies a yearly fee 
of 15 Rupees per 
year (0.33 US 
dollars). 
• FES financial help 
stopped in 2006 
• In the last year 
funding received 
from die Forest 
Department was 
not enough for 
die needs of 
conservation 
work. Hence 










not play a very 
predominant role 
in the Van 
Panchayat of 
Tanga. But lack 
of funding and 
support might 
push the local 
institution to 
engage with it. 
The overall perception is 2.49. This 
indicates people perceive the forest has 
improved during the last years. 
Tanga Van Panchayat does not have much external influence from me government Most 
activities are done through community effort and no commercial extraction takes place in 
the village. The forest is ultimately used just for local livelihood and for not other reasons. 
The absence of the Forest Department also implies a shortage of funding that has been 
provided in various forms along with practical support from the Foundation for Ecological 
Security. This issue could become serious to die point of pushing the local institution to get 
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down to compromises with the government agencies. So far, the conservation work done 
through FES and community effort has improved the forest according to villagers' overall 
perception. 
Table ILL 15: Alam Van Panchayat 
Van Panchayat 
Alam 
Has the Van Pane 
villagers? 
Commercial Extraction 
• Van Panchayat sells 
green grass on the open 
market for 1,000-1,200 
Rupees per year (22-27 
US dollars). 
layat improved according to 
Financial Situation 
• Pass system for 
outsiders does 
exist. Alam Van 
Panchayat charges 
50-60 Rupees per 
month for people 
living outside the 
forest. On average 
limited funding 
reach the village. 
• FES funding 
stopped in 2006. 
• Funding is 
planned to come 
from the Forest 
Department for 
the plantation 
work it suggested. 
• Alam Van 
Panchayat plans to 
ask for money to 
Block Panchayat 
to implement the 
microplan. 
The overall percept) 
deem mat the forest 














on is 1.55. People 
condition has 
/ears. 
Alam Van Panchayat is very isolated but interaction with the forest department is 
increasing. The village is already engaged in selling grass in the open market and the 
prospect to increase its presence is stronger because of expected higher funding coming 
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from the Forest Department. The government agency is already suggesting what kind of 
plantation work and even though it is not clear whether for commercial use, it is reasonable 
to assume there is a potential for that purpose. In this frame, the general perception about 
forest condition indicates that it has worsened in the last few years and further forest 
commercialization will probably not help. 





• Commercial extraction 




(medicinal plants). The 
Forest Department is 
not giving permission 
to the VP to sell 
medicinal plants 
outside the village. 
Only the Forest 
Department can have 
full control in selling 
Van Panchayat 
resources. 
Has the Van Panchayat improved 
according to villagers? 
Financial Situation 




program and lot of 
money was 
received during the 
project 
implementation 
from the World 




• Pass system for 
outsiders exist. VP 
charges 100 
Rupees (2.2 US 
dollars) annually to 
people wanting to 
use Suring forest 
resources. 
Forest Department role 
• Van Sarpanch is only 
the agent of the 
Forest Department 
and he does not have 
any real power to go 
against its decision 
• Forest department 
decides the rate for 
labor and how the 
VP guard should be 
organized. According 




often gives wrong 
suggestions on the 
ideal condition for 
plantation. 
The overall perception is 1.56. People mainly 
indicated that the forest has worsened under 
current practices. 
Suring was the part of the World Bank project of Joint Village Forest Management that had 
the objective to give more power to government agencies in relation with Van Panchayat. 
254 
Suring Van Panchayat is the most commercialized of all my field sites. Lot of money was 
poured into planting medicinal plants to be sold in the open market and the Forest 
Department became much more dominant in Van Panchayat affairs. This led to great 
deterioration of Suring's institutional autonomy in managing its forest. Furthermore the 
community recognized that the forest has worsened in the last years and it is reasonable to 
assume diat the World Bank project has created more problems than benefits by taking 
away the authority of Suring Van Panchayat over its forest. 





• None. Van Panchayat is 
explicitly managed only 
for local needs and goes 
against the government 
imposition to extract 
resources for 
commercial purposes. 
Has the Van Panchayat improved according 
to villagers? 
Financial Situation 
• Pass system for 
outsiders exist. 
• Green grass is 
auctioned at the 
village level. An 
average of 16,000 
Rupees (360 US 
dollars) is collected 
on this occasion 
• Fines are hardly 
collected even 
though do exist. 
• Gram Panchayat 
provide some 
money (around 
5,000 Rupees per 
annum which 
equates to 112 US 






not provide any 









rejected from the 
whole 
community. 
The overall perception is 2.3. This indicated 
mat villagers deem the forest condition to 
have slightiy improved under the current 
system. 
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Shankadhura Van Panchayat is highly controlled by die community. External interferences 
are limited and avoided. The influence of the Forest Department is nil since the local 
institution is self reliant in income generation and rejects government agency's suggestions. 
All forest resources are used exclusively for local needs and external pressures are not 
invasive. The sample interviewed for this village recognized that the forest has improved 
under the current practices and Van Panchayat's autonomy. 







• No commercial 
extraction. All 
forest work, is 
done only for 
local needs. 
• Only plantation 
for local needs 












• Sarmoli council was 
extremely able to receive 
money from the Forest 
Department according to 
the terms of the local 
institution. 
• From the Forest 
Department around 
35,000 US dollars for: 
water conservation, 
nature interpretation 
center, path construction, 
toilets, camping platform 
and equipment. 
• Around 15,000 US 
dollars from the central 
government for 
pheasant's conservation. 
• FES funding for water 
conservation and walling 
construction 
• Some money from fines, 
grass auction and 
community based 
tourism program 
Forest Department role 
• Sarmoli-Jainti Van 
Panchayat council do 
not experience much 
interference from the 
Forest Department in 
using the money. 
• Van Panchayat decided 
to write up a microplan 
emphasizing local use of 




processes. This was 
possible through die use 
of bylaws. 
• The forest department 
has been pressured to 
channel the money 
according to Van 
Panchayat's bylaws. 
• Resistance to open a 
joint bank account with 
the Forest Department 
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Has the Van Panchayat improved 
according to villagers? 
Almost everyone agrees that the forest has improved 
under current practices. The overall perception is 2.93 
Sarmoli-Jainti Van Panchayat is a success story. The council was able to create the most 
vibrant Van Panchayat I came across in my research. The Van Sarpanch effort to prioritize 
livelihood and conservation was extremely successful since almost everyone did recognize 
forest improvements under current practices. The use of bylaws was also extremely 
important in order to pressure government agency to accommodate local needs and to 
cope with the struggle of externally imposed formalized institutional mechanisms and 
market oriented pressures. The current policy framework allows for a small window of 
opportunity to strengmen self governance in Van Panchayat The Uttaranchal Panchayati 
Forest Rules of 2001 in article 21 gives the Power to frame bylaws: 
"The Forest Panchayat may frame bylaws for the distribution of forest produce 
among persons entided mereof, for regulating, grazing, cutting of grass and 
collection of fuel, to levy fee to meet its administrative expenditure and for any 
otfier purpose consistent with these rules."(Panchayati Forest Rules of, Art 21). 
In mis frame Sarmoli-Jainti Van Panchayat stressed the importance of livelihood and 
conservation mrough democratic institutions. The forest improved dirough community 
effort and strategic use of die money from the government agency. The use of formalized 
institutional processes against commercialization of the forest improved democracy and 
generated more income for everyone. The political pressures from die council and the 
insistence to use die money to prioritize livelihood against forest commercialization have 
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been crucial factors to raise awareness in the community that the forest is a source of 
wealth for local needs to respect and to protect The successes of this strategy have been 
supported from many communities in the area and have created a network of politicians at 
the state and central level, along with other organization abroad (i.e. Aidlndia), recognizing 
its positive impact 
The Forest Department had to accommodate the resistance to its mandate to favor 
extractive use of die forest, perhaps because of such widespread consensus of Sarmoli's 
Van Panchayat success. The chief elected of Van Panchayat has also been able to draw 
people from outside to learn about conservation and forest and to start a community based 
tourism program in order to generate income for die village. The combination of various 
activities meant to favor local needs and livelihood is showing great results, widely 
recognized and supported by strong community effort especially from the village very active 
and empowering women collective. The current council is still facing great struggles with 
the Forest Department to get enough financial resources to maintain current projects and 
also from public-private partnerships engaged in dam construction that are currently trying 
to boycott democratic processes in the case of Sarmoli-Jainti Van Panchayat (Appendix 2).30 
Despite the continuous struggles, die specific case study of Sarmoli allows the Sustainable 
Livelihood Approach to be used in its analysis widiin a more politicized dynamic. The 
council of Van Panchayat dirough a dedicated effort to prioritize livelihood has managed to 
30 http://www.indianvoice.org/please-endorse-and-circulate-ensure-fair-signatures-p2.html 
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leverage its social, political and cultural capital in a concerted way. The engagement of the 
community has resulted in a very successful push to centralize the discussion on power and 
politics. The firm belief in democracy and open discussion as potential political capital has 
channeled people's priority (along the lines of Norton and Mick, 2001) in creating a form 
of open and systematic resistance against the pressures to commercialize the forest. The 
externalities of diis effort' have brought die community closer and have also strengthened, 
ahhough not exposed in mis section, a process of social change31. As Scoones (2009) 
explained, the political process needs to be reinforced in SLA. The approach is only a 
framework but can be extremely successful if used toward the common good by leveraging 
the community to be engaged in a participatory political dynamic against external pressures. 
This last table for diis hypothesis describes to what extent die current forest policy is 
pushing to integrate various Van Panchayat into the market economy dirough bank 
arrangements widi the Forest Department The new legislation also imposes to all Van 
Panchayats to give 10% of sale proceeds of their resources to die government agency hence 
decreasing local institutions of meir financial autonomy. The following table also links these 
pressures to villagers' opinion about dieir forest in order to understand to what extent 
external interferences impact Van Panchayat condition. 
http://www.aidboston.org/MalikaVirdi/recent.html 
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Joint Bank Account with the 































Sirtola, Lodhi, Alam and Suring have an account with die divisional forest officer 
associated with die Forest Department whereas not village pays die 10% sale proceed to it 
because of die general lack of knowledge of its existence or political dissent. Sarmoli- Jainti, 
Shankhadura and Tanga do not have a Joint Bank Account and show die highest 
consensus about forest improvement. This is significant because it demonstrates die 
importance to maintain Van Panchayat autonomy in controlling die forest External 
pressures of various kinds seem to deteriorate die forest and people's livelihoods. This 
links back to die fundamental need to preserve the right to livelihood as established in the 
Constitution in order to ensure die common good outside of imposed policy objectives. 
4.8.5 Conclusion of die tiiird hypodiesis 
The tiiird hypodiesis tries to understand die complexities and impacts of external pressures 
widi specific emphasis on market ones and how diey impact livelihood, forest and die 
260 
communities under study. 
The first level of analysis showed a very significant perceived damage of multinational 
corporations in partnership with the government of India for Van Panchayat forest. The 
majority recognizes the loss of agriculture land, trees and resources for local livelihood. 
The negative implications are mainly derived from big scale dam construction projects 
which seriously limit die ability of local bodies to cope and resist against the inevitable 
losses. The most common perception about their impact on the community is also 
negative. Yet, there is significant number of people from my sample who identify the 
positive implications of employment opportunities and electricity provisions. The short 
term gains of wage labour are hazy and uncertain and people's hopes for a better future are 
also linked to low awareness about the serious implications of dam construction to their 
forests and livelihood. This is due to the low capacity of local institutions to get involved in 
dissent building and lack of support from other sources to build better alternatives for local 
development Local institutions, instead of being engaged in deciding what forms of 
development should be favored for forest dependent communities, are boycotted when 
resisting to livelihood disruption because of big-scale projects (Appendix 2). I argue that the 
present hardships will most likely get worse in the long term without substantial resistance 
and better options or support to pursue development driven by the principles of social 
justice and right to livelihood. 
The second level of analysis tries to ground the aggregate evidence on a village-based case 
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analysis. The forests most exposed to commercial pressures and with higher interference 
from commercial actors or government agencies are also experiencing a higher degree of 
forest degradation according to villagers' opinions. This is not conclusive evidence, yet it 
signals the effectiveness of community effort and conservation ability when the Van 
Panchayat can enforce its autonomy and priorities. The success story of Sarmoli-Jainti Van 
Panchayat shows the possibility to use formalized institutional processes against their own 
purposes in a democratic and transparent way. The prioritization of livelihood and 
conservation has been successful and received wide recognition for its positive impact on 
the forest and on the community as well. The ongoing struggle of changing laws favoring a 
market oriented approach is not the only one. The same council is also experiencing 
systematic sabotages from the National Thermal Power Corporation in the process of 
democratic re-elections (Appendix 2). 
Overall market pressures within Van Panchayat as institution and as space are present, 
pervasive and invasive as evidence shows. Various struggles are experienced from the forest 
and communities in many ways. The rationale of hypothesis number 3 is strongly backed 
up by the comprehensive analysis provided in this section. The consequence of what 
indicated is leading to profound social injustices, deterioration of institutional autonomy 
and power, negative implications for livelihood and environmental damage. 
4.9 Fourth Hypothesis: Decentralization and Pressures for Market Development 
The fourth hypothesis entails the analysis of decentralization for Panchayati Raj with a 
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specific focus to identify what are the marketization pressures for this policy. The rationale 
behind is grounded in die assumption that good governance decentralization would tend to 
favor institutions that prioritize the expansion of the market instead of allowing more space 
for social justice. The logic of implementing decentralization without devolving substantial 
opportunities for the oppressed groups to benefit in social terms from representative 
institutions is central in this analysis. I expect to find from my empirical evidence, 
institutions that are not substantially changing the condition of the village and does not 
substantially reflect villagers' needs. Furthermore, evidence about how the funding 
structure is channeled will be drawn from single individuals' perceptions about local 
institutions activities. For the sake of a more in-depth analysis, Appendix 3 provides all 
expenditures of each village institution according to the elected chief representatives of 
Gram Panchayat The understanding of the magnitude of the infrastructure bias in Gram 
Panchayat reiterates the logic used for policy implementation from the government. The 
pressures to create or facilitate a market economy are central within the overall argument of 
good governance. 
Positive evidence for the hypothesis implies a disregard of issues regarding the gender 
dimension of development and die continuous oppression of scheduled castes/class 
groups. Furthermore, current practices perpetuate lack of autonomy of local communities 
to make their own decision in regard of funding and projects and most importantly the lack 
of political will, on the part of the central government, to raise the level of democratic 
consciousness in the population. Centralized policy objectives seem to take over the spirit 
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of decentralization as intended in 243-G of die Constitution, which specifically states the 
responsibilities of village institutions to prepare plans and to implement schemes for 
economic development AND social justice. As long as emphasis is given to infrastructure 
and funded by centralized schemes, social justice intended as social change and power 
redistribution is ruled out and inequalities potentially perpetuated. This breaches with the 
mandate of decentralized village governance and the ideal of an egalitarian society as stated 
in Article 39 of the Constitution of India. 
4.9.1 First level of analysis 
The first level of analysis looks at evidence from individual answers and explores the 
priorities of people according to gender, caste and income. Furthermore, their 
understanding of what Gram Panchayat does in the village will show the extent of 
infrastructure bias through aggregate and disaggregate measures. The data representation 
does not require regression analysis but tables in order to visually and empirically show 
what people think is the role of village institutions and what is actually done. The initial set 
of tables give an insight on what people understand to be die priorities for the village in 
relation to decentralized governance from aggregate measures. Further break down in the 
empirical evidence in order to have a deeper understanding of who says what, will follow in 
the second set of figures. 
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4.9.2 Results first level of analysis 
The first figure gives an overview of aggregate and disaggregates measures of what people 
deem as priority for the communities in relation to decentralized governance: 
Figure 1: Aggregate Measure of first priority perception for local institutions 
• Social Justice 
K Infrastructures 
H Social Services 
• Employment 
In uiis figure employment and infrastructure delivery seem to be the top priorities for the 
communities according to people. This finding complies with the objective from higher tier 
of governance to push people into the wage economy through infrastructure development 
and wage labor. Social justice and social services received lower priority; the rationale to 
build die perfect environment for a possible market economy is also identifiable from what 
people prioritize in village governance. A figure in Appendix 5 shows the disaggregate 
understanding of tiiese macro-categories in order to orient the discussion about people's 
priorities. It mainly indicates that the sample seems to favor National Rural Employment 
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Guarantee Act (NREGA) and manual labor above all. This is a very interesting aspect of 
the analysis because it reinforces the idea that people are embracing the role of local 
institutions to develop an economy based on manual labor instead of giving more scope to 
social justice or social services. It also indicates that people do not necessarily see 
infrastructure and employment as a bad thing per se; on the contrary local institutions 
activities fulfills what the sample think is their priority. Perhaps, the activities of local 
institutions are becoming increasingly entrenched in the common perception about Gram 
Panchayat emphasis on infrastructures and wage labor. 
This following table describes a broke down in percentages of what people think to be top 
priority and the top second priority for village governance: 
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Table IV. 1: Disaggregate measures of first and second top priority 
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This table is interesting because it deepens die analysis of what the sample recognizes to be 
their first and second top priority about local institutions activities. The outcome shifts to 
favor social sendees and social justice to be die priority. The differential across categories is 
not too strong but tbere is a significant change that should not be underrated; the sample 
does feel more strongly about local institutions' role in social sendees and social justice. 
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The aggregate measures give a direction and a first level of analysis but a process of 
disaggregation will be helpful to really delve into a more specific understanding of who says 
what. Men and women have different understanding of what the priorities are as much as 
caste and poverty levels. The disaggregate dimension is crucial to weight better the 
implications for data discussion and analysis in the next tables. 







Poverty level 0 
Poverty level 1 
Poverty level 2 
Poverty level 3 
Poverty level 4 






















































This table breaks down by various categories "who chose what" as top priority in their 
communities in relation to local institutions. In first instance, men feel slighdy stronger 
about social justice tiian women. This goes against the expectations; a possible 
interpretation is because of women lower engagement in village politics; they might be 
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more unaware of the potential for social change and empowerment in Gram Panchayat. 
Secondly, it's interesting to notice that the poorest groups (21% and 31% respectively) 
indicated that social justice is more of a priority for decentralized governance than relatively 
better off sections of my sample. They feel more strongly about local institutions duty to 
pursue social justice as first priority for the community. This is significant because it 
underlines how important for people living in abject condition to receive social justice more 
dian everyone else. This is especially true for gender equality and caste representation (as 
the tables in appendix 4 show) that on average are perceived to be the most relevant issues 
within social justice for local institutions. The individuals within this group are usually the 
ones with very little land and almost exclusively relying on agriculture or low diversified 
sources of income. Further data analysis underlines that the poorest feeling stronger about 
social justice, for my sample, are usually women and scheduled castes. 
Along with social justice, infrastructure also shows significant differences across various 
groups. There is not strong evidence about poverty level to be associated with priority for 
infrastructure even though the poorest seem to recognize less than others the role of local 
institutions in that direction. Women, on the contrary, tend to favor infrastructures more 
strongly than men. They especially emphasized water, school and hospital and recognized 
the importance of local institutions to deliver them. On the contrary to infrastructure, social 
services are recognized across most groups to be lowest priority for the community within 
the scope of decentralized governance. Not significant differences or patterns emerge 
across the various groups for social sendees but the tables in appendix 4 show that 
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education and poverty alleviation programs are favored the most from all groups. 
Lastly, employment received most consensuses as top priority for decentralized governance 
in the communities under study. The community feels strong about it and the recognition 
of local institution central role in wage labor is widely embraced. This is interesting because 
it shows that government schemes meant for "economic development" -mandated by the 
Panchayati Raj Act- are prioritized. The common perception about its importance might 
indicate that the communities are positive about the gains from it. It's hard to say whether 
the sample chose employment because they also genuinely feel to be their personal priority 
as much as the top priority for their local institutions and communities. Likely, the 
emphasis of Gram Panchayat to provide employment -used to build local infrastructures-
is increasingly becoming entrenched in the common perception of my sample in priority 
setting. In the table, another significant finding about employment is that scheduled tribes 
are more inclined to prioritize employment compared to other castes. Scheduled tribes are 
also the most dominant section of my sample hence this result have stronger implications 
on the aggregate measures. A possible interpretation to explain the caste differential could 
be that scheduled tribes are more engaged in local institutions in terms of wage economy. 
Scheduled tribes receive special status as much as scheduled castes but experience less 
oppression because they are the overwhelming majority in the area of Munsiari compared 
to other groups. The caste differential, in this framework, is specifically found for National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) and manual labor and this possibly implies 
that, in my sample, scheduled tribes are more likely to receive employment than lower 
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castes in village governance. Lower castes, on the contrary, tend to favor 
companies/government jobs (as shown in Appendix 5) to a greater extent since they 
evidently do not find as much employment witihin local institutions. 
The emphasis on employment and infrastructure changes in the next sets of tables which 
explore patterns of answers about what people chose as second top priority, in relation to 
village governance. This could enhance better understanding the scope of the shift favoring 
social justice over employment and infrastructure in a disaggregate manner. So far the 
aggregate number of women shows to be less inclined to fix social justice as first priority for 
decentralized governance whereas the poorest sections recognize it as an important duty for 
local institutions. The previous table has also underlined a caste differential in perceiving 
employment in priority setting. The next table can shed more light to how the shift in 
priority setting unfolds according to gender, caste and poverty level. 
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In this table, a strong caste differential polarizes social justice as second choice for general 
caste and scheduled caste. The polarization follows the same pattern in the previous table 
but of higher magnitude. It can be interpreted as scheduled tribes' stronger recognition of 
local institutions' role in other dimensions otiher than social justice even in their second top 
priority. Scheduled tribes tend to prioritize social sendees, as tireir second top priority after 
employment A more detailed explanation of the caste differential requires further 
exploration that is not provided in diis analysis. In appendix 5, the tables about social 
justice show how gender equality is seen as most relevant second priority. This is followed 
by cessation of power conflict, which did not show up before, to be perceived as relevant 
issue in social justice for the sample. 
In second top priority women, once again, recognize more tfian men the role of local 
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institution in delivering infrastructures (especially school as the table in Appendix 5 shows). 
The consistency of priority setting for both tables underlines that women tend to have a 
stronger preference for infrastructure even as second top priority. Their continuous 
emphasis on school (3 times more than men) can be interpreted as a genuine concern to 
educate their children. Since many women in my sample recognize the disadvantage to be 
uneducated, especially when interacting with local bodies of village governance, they feel 
strongly to reverse the trend for their kids. Furthermore, the poverty level seems to follow a 
similar pattern. The poorest sections also recognize local institutions' role in infrastructure 
development as second top priority. In the table before, the poorest groups chose social 
justice to be the top one whereas in second priority fixing infrastructures seems to receive 
more recognition. It underlines the consciousness of poorest section to emphasize the 
responsibility for social justice along with infrastructure to be central in local institutions' 
mandate. 
Social sendees receive much greater consensus among male and scheduled tribes as second 
top priority for local institutions. The table might indicate that these groups receive more 
services compared to women or other castes. The table of social services in Appendix 5 
shows a greater preference for education from men possibly because they are more likely 
to receive it than women. A stronger inclination on the part of men to recognize local 
institutions' role in social services can be interpreted because they are more exposed to i t 
Scheduled tribes also chose social services as second top priority more than other castes; 
they are more likely to receive poverty alleviation benefits than general and scheduled 
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castes. General caste are usually excluded from benefits since their status and resources are 
higher whereas the scheduled caste are most likely exposed to oppression of stronger 
degree and consequendy have less access to social sendees. This is not conclusive evidence 
about table's findings but possible interpretations based upon field observations and in-
depth case survey analysis. 
In the table employment receive strong recognition but to a lesser degree than the previous 
table, social justice and social services. Social justice receives slighdy more consensuses as 
second top priority with respect to employment. The shift in preference for local 
institutions indicates more strongly a common perception of its important role for local 
institutions functions. The table in this section and the one about employment in Appendix 
5 shows mat scheduled castes recognize more than others employment as second priority 
especially in die case of National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) and 
pension. This finding is interesting because it represents a stronger recognition, although 
quite significant even in the previous table, of wage labor also on the part of lower castes. 
Most SC households, as shown in the regression in Appendix 6, are more likely to be 
poorer and landless as opposed to scheduled tribes. Even though they would tend to favor 
government/companies job as first preference for employment because of limited 
opportunities to gain from local institutions, they experience more pressure than other 
groups to exclusively depend on manual labor. This emerges from the table about second 
priority which stresses the needs of scheduled caste to cope with the hardships of limited 
resources along with their status of oppression. 
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The analysis of all these tables gave some insights to what it is deemed as priority within the 
context of local institutions. Employment received overwhelmed consensus to be a really 
dominant dimension of Panchayati Raj. In second instance, infrastructure is also widely 
recognized. Social justice and social services receive more consensus as second top priority. 
Yet, poorest sections do recognize the latter more than others as top priority. A possible 
explanation can be that their status of oppression emerges to be a very strong element in 
their experience with local institutions leading to emphasize social justice as top 
responsibility for decentralized bodies. As shown previously, they have less space in 
participation in village governance hence they might feel more excluded. This can explain 
they might want to favor social justice also intended as higher inclusion in the decision-
making process of local institution. The overall evidence from the answers are based upon 
what people believe to be the priority for their communities in the context of local 
institutions and it is reasonable to assume that groups' status can influence priority setting. 
The various interesting insights show that the common perception of villagers in priority 
setting for local institutions is primarily linked to employment generation and infrastructure 
development. This shows that people feel the importance of having local institution that 
can provide the basic necessities but the central question remains: W h o gets what? The 
next section will give an overview of what people think is being done at die village level and 
what mey received from the local institutions. 
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4.9.3 Second Level of analysis 
The second level of analysis describe what people indicated was being done at the village 
level in die last 5 years. This is significant because it can tell us what have people 
experienced in terms of local institutions activities and it also indicates how much actual 
space was given to social justice. Various graphs and tables will show empirical data from all 
villages according to aggregated and disaggregated categories. All evidence is grouped in the 
same way as for priorities setting but new categories for additional answers (not fitting in the 













































Checkdam, walling, digging work 
Women's group building 
Panchayati office building 
Latrines construction 
Bridge work 
Government support and subsidies (ex: woolen work) 
House improvements 
Temple construction/ maintenance 













4.9.4 Results second level of analysis 
The first level of analysis explores the aggregate measures of all tasks carried wimin local 
institutions according to villages. This will be the initial point of further analysis and data 
break down. For the sake of clarity and precision these categories are codified in letters. 
Their frequencies are illustrated in the following graph: 
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As this graph shows, die highest frequency is received for all tasks related to infrastructure 
development. Some also goes to social services with a specific emphasis on poverty 
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alleviation programs. Some response also fit to the various tasks illustrated in the new 
categories labeled under letter "E". Most of these are infrastructure-related but for the sake 
of precision, I feel more comfortable to break them down into separate groups. Issues of 
social justice are not part of the activities of local bodies in village governance. In order to 
complement my quantitative analysis of people's perception, I present the answers received 
from all chief elected representatives in regards to what do they think about social justice in 
village governance meetings. Each Gram Pradhan (elected chief representatives), explains 
what are the most discussed issues in relation to social justice in the villages under 
examination. 
Sirtola Village: 
"There are not major social issues raised in Gram Panchayat in relation to gender matters. 
During my term there were not social issues discussed relating to gender, corruption or 
caste (Past Gram Pradhan)". 
"There are social problems and that I need to take them up during my term. People during 
the last term did not bring social issues in front of the Gram Panchayat (current Gram 
Pradhan)." 
Tanga-Lodhi Village: 
"Gram Panchayat tries to solve conflicts over agricultural land issues. If the husband is 
violent with his wife, the Gram Panchayat will lead both parties to a compromise through a 
written consent. In the case the violence occurs again, the husband will be sent to court 
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Some cases of violence to women are reported to the Gram Pradhan (current Gram 
Pradhan)" 
Alam Village: 
"Some conflicts about boundaries issues with other villages are discussed in Gram 
Panchayat meeting. Women also openly talk about violence in Gram Panchayat meetings. 
I established a monetary fine to contrast household violence due to alcoholism. The fine is 
from 50 (around 1 US dollars) to 100 (around 2 US dollars) Rupees to men who act 
violent against women. If violence persists men are sent to court. Corruption is not 
discussed in meetings but exists and caste issues are also not raised but that does not mean 
they do not exist. The given solutions for social justice are only 2% out of 100% of all 
problems. Water, house problems along with many other issues are a reality in Alam but 
the amount of money received is limited and the needs would require much more financial 
support from external sources. I am young but willing to start speaking up in the block 
Panchayat meetings held in Munsiari to get more support from the government (current 
Gram Pradhan)." 
Suring Village: 
"There are conflicts about land. There are also cases of violence against women discussed 
in Gram Panchayat meetings (4-5 cases per year). The gender issue is seldom discussed in 
meetings but I give my personal suggestions. In the case violence persist, a fee can be 
inflicted or the police can also be called. In the last term women attendance and 
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participation increased and die current people are more open to talk about corruption. I 
recognize die problem of violence against women and if die case persists more dian 3 times 
dien die police will be asked to intervene (current Gram Pradhan)." 
Jainti Village: 
"Many scheduled castes families live in poor condition but die relationship witii odier 
castes is open and not major conflicts are raised. There are not odier major issues of social 
justice brought up in Gram Panchayat meetings like corruption or gender equality during 
my term (Past Gram Pradhan)." 
"There are not caste issues raised and corruption as much as gender equality are not 
problems affecting die community whatsoever. A women collective is present in Jaiti 
(current Gram Pradhan)." 
Sarmoli Village 
"There are not social problems in die community. He does not recognize any gender 
violence, corruption or caste problem. There are some simple quarrels but nodiing diat 
requires serious measures (current Up-Pradhan -vice-chief representative-)." 
"There is a pervasive problem of violence in die village due to alcoholism. She used to 
give personal suggestions but not broad discussion is happening during die meetings. 
According to her opinion, corruption is also increasingly becoming a problem and money 
is retained by higher politicians and not given to die people (past Gram Pradhan)." 
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From the analysis of all interviews, the evidence shows a general aversion to discuss in 
depth issues of social justice during the meetings. Although, many local politicians are 
aware of the existence of some injustices, some refrain to recognize any problem at all in 
die community. From my field experience, the most heart-felt problem, in the villages 
under study, is alcoholism and the violence against women associated with i t Alcohol is 
only an excuse for many men to turn violent although, the issue is much more complex 
and requires a more careful analysis. According to the elected chief of the forest council in 
Sarmoli the issue is described in the following way: 
"Politically, alcohol has a lot of power, it should be seen in a socio-political 
perspective, you can make a whole community useless by just getting them to drink 
more and more and then, are not being able to fight and resist W e know of places 
where people working in a mine, they finish their daily work, they are given very 
little wages and the same mine owner has a liquor store so whatever money they 
have, they pay the man, get drunk, go home, fight and go to sleep. They have not 
time and energy to resist, it is always better to have a half sleepy, half drunk and half 
given up population because they do not need to fight and the state and status quo 
can control you. I think the same thing happen in a place like Munsiari. It's easy to 
blame the individual man who gets drunk, goes back and beats his wife but the 
system seeks to i t It's so much easier because when the men are drunk they are not 
going to resist This creates inequalities; he becomes a victim of his circumstance 
and he also becomes the oppressor because he's beating up his family. If men and 
women have equal opportunities, if economically we were not oppressed and not 
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treated like a colony -like, keep taking resources-, if people have the self-respect 
they were able to drink more carefully. When you are frustrated, when you are 
angry and when you are depressed, alcohol becomes a way to breaking people 
down. Our resistance here is not on blaming the crime, yes we resist violence 
induced by alcohol but that is not the only reason. Men are violent in any case, 
alcohol is only an excuse. Second thing is that the state itself promotes alcohol, it's 
the second highest revenue in the state and it does not stop selling alcohol. W e feel, 
we have to resist at all levels: politically and along with alcohol there exist some 
form of organized crime that goes together. It's not just drinking but the whole 
political problem of alcohol (Malika Virdi, elected chief representative forest 
council in Sarmoli Village and founder of the Ngo "Himal Prakriti")." 
In Malika's words, alcohol is a more complex problem and it has to be conceptualized in 
its political dimension. Although, the violence created and the injustice against women is 
the consequence, the cause needs to be identified in die class structure and how oppression 
can unfold and create further oppression. Local bodies do not seem to have much strength 
to deal with the problem at its roots. As long as the good governance favours institutions 
that are mainly managerial and depoliticized, there will be little space to address the 
structural factors of alcohol and violence. Although, some elected representatives have 
started to deal with the problem, the struggle seems to be very deep-rooted and cannot be 
completely eliminated as long as form of exploitation persists at all levels. In diis frame, 
the focus on infrastructure is real and clashes with limited scope for social justice; in the 
next table a breakdown of all aggregate data is illustrated per each village in order to 
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understand "who receives what at die village level" and to go deeper in the analysis of my 
empirical evidence. 
Table IV. 5: Perception of local institutions activities: Social Justice 
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Social justice is hardly carried out in any form in almost all villages. Most activities are 
addressed to gender equality but a very few amount of people recognize it as part of local 
institutions tangible actions. Corruption and power conflict are hardly considered in the 
range of local institution's actions. 
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Infrastructure is, by far, the most widely recognized action of local institutions. Water, road 
and school are top three activities carried out within the various local institutions. The 
village tiiat has implemented more types of infrastructure work, according to people's 
opinion, is Sarmoli. It also happens to be the biggest of those surveyed and receiving most 
funding (as shown in Appendix 3 for Sarmoli Gram Panchayat). The construction of 
primary schools, on the contrary, is widely recognized everywhere especially where recendy 
built In more remote villages like Sirtola, Alam and Lodhi electricity related activities 
receive less space than in bigger and better connected areas. Hospital is least considered 
given the small dimensions of most villages under study (with the exception of Sarmoli 
Gram Panchayat). It is unlikely a local institution has capacity to provide such a high 
maintenance infrastructure if the population is limited. Overall, infrastructure development 
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is recognized everywhere, although in different degrees, to be a significant task undertaken 
by the village institution. 






























































Social services have relatively less scope than infrastructure. Even diough poverty 
alleviation program are central for local institutions, there is less limited space for livestock 
support, health and education. The former is particularly important for the livelihood of 
local communities under study but the only subsidies are provided through bank loan 
programs. In this case, local institutions in bigger villages have greater capacity to invest in 
social services than small and remote ones (look at table 1.4 for village statistics). A possible 
explanation of intra-village imbalance is that bigger villages usually receive more funding 
and are politically more influential at the Block and District level. 
285 










































































Employment is a central priority but not the overwhelming majority pointed it out as most 
relevant task done at the village level. Infrastructure work is related to employment, 
especially the NREGA scheme, therefore both functions are strongly correlated. Pension 
and employment in general are also acknowledged significandy. Village differential 
indicates, on average, that remote villages will receive less employment benefits than bigger 
and better connected areas. This also shows how the capacity to create wage labor is higher 
where the market can be better established. 
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This table sums up all activities that people indicated other than the one fitting in the four 
categories so far analyzed. Most activities are related to various infrastructure of different 
nature. Checkdams, village institutions offices, households' improvements or temple-
related activities are the most indicated as common tasks done through Gram Panchayat. 
This last set of tables is additional evidence of how much emphasis local institutions give to 
activities that are mainly focused on tangible assets and it underlines a relatively reduced 
space to any program or task of different nature such as social justice. Decentralization for 
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village governance, as intended in the legal guidelines, should entail economic development 
and social justice to have the same space. The case studies show that its implementation 
seems to favor only one side of the picture. According to villagers' opinions a disproportion 
between the various categories emerges and might be interpreted as reduced scope for 
social justice in relation to gender, caste and power conflict The various dimensions of 
decentralization are not mutually exclusive, and people strongly recognize the importance 
of employment and infrastructure development. Undeniably, infrastructures related to 
water access, road connectivity and schools are deemed necessary by many communities 
and local institutions are able to bring significant improvements in that direction. Yet, it is 
reasonable to assume that social change is not expected to happen within a market-oriented 
approach while the dimensions of inequalities, class and gender are not more central in any 
way. 
The various tables have described so far how the activities of local institutions comply only 
partially with what people prioritize in relation to their scope. Infrastructure development is 
the dominant aspect of Gram Panchayat. The provisions of primary education, health, 
sanitation, drinking water etc. are very widely recognized; infrastructures, in this direction, 
have positive implications for marginalized communities. Yet, there is a significant 
imbalance in relation to Gram Panchayat activities on a village level. Remoter communities 
(Sirtola, Lodhi and Alam) seem to perceive social welfare less than bigger and better 
connected villages. Furthermore, employment generation also seems pretty unevenly 
distributed across communities. While communities from more accessible areas (Jainti, 
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Suring, Sarmoli) receive more support from local institution in employment generation; 
remote villages seems to have more inactive institutions in the same regard. Furthermore, 
the next table shows an example that a centralized policy agenda to use good governance 
practices to deliver "development" does not necessarily lead to substantial distribution of 
benefits to poorer households for infrastructure and social welfare. 
The next table shows the validity of my argument through a more detailed analysis of who 
gets what. The data is gathered from the question: "Are your family needs met in Gram 
Panchayat decision? If yes, what?". 
Table IV. 10: Poverty82 and benefits distribution 
What was received? 
Nothing Received (excluding BPL VBPL) 
House Subsidy 
Latrines 
Water and Road 
Pension 
Above poverty line Card (APL) 
Below poverty line Card33 (BPL) 



















The goals of creating a redistributive policy to benefits the poor might hold only in part 
32 The poverty level follows the indications from the poverty index provided at die beginning of die 
Chapter in table 2.1. Low poverty is die value from 1 to 3 and high poverty is die valued from 4 to 
6. The very poor are usually landless wiui very limited sources of livelihood whereas die less poor 
are usually employed in government job and/or have greater household landholdings. 
33 BPL card provides: Healdi benefits (free hospital) and ratio card (1 kg wheat/5 Rupees and 1 kg 
rice/7 Rupees) 
34 VBPL card provides: Healdi benefits (free hospital) and ratio card (1 kg wheat/2 Rupees and 1 kg 
rice/3 Rupees) 
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according to my sample. Around 70% of die poorest households of my sample have not 
received anything from tfieir local institutions of village governance. There is a clear 
imbalance in benefits distribution between people who are relatively poorer and who is 
relatively better off, and tfiis might indicate some degree of elite capturing. House 
subsidies, latrines, water, road and pension benefits seem to be distributed more often to 
people living in less hardship condition than the extremely poor sections of my sample. 
Yet, it is necessary to acknowledge tiiat poorer people are much more likely to receive 
below poverty line cards which guarantee health benefits and subsidized price for food. 
This is not enough; households in the poorest sections live in greater hardship but are less 
likely to receive water, sanitation and proper housing. Even though, diere is a small portion 
of the sample who has received somediing, the majority of people still gained very little 
from their local institutions. While local institutions are engaged in extensive infrastructure 
development, it remains to be seen who is going to benefit from it. A possible explanation 
is tiiat the limited transfer of power and support to die lowest levels of governance for all 
die potential activities tiiat can be carried out tiirough local bodies does not enable 
communities to experience more substantial distribution of benefits. 
4.9.5 Third level of analysis 
The tiiird level of analysis explores how people in my sample have perceived change 
through die action of local institutions. The analysis attempts to give a deeper 
understanding of how local institutions are perceived in the process of village change. This 
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is significant because it can show other dimensions of decentralization for village 
governance and understand the magnitude of its impact on die community. The 
infrastructure/employment bias is well established and confirms the good governance 
agenda of enabling wage labor and die facilitation of a market economy. The last level of 
empirical analysis can give an additional insights to what made a difference, according to 
die sample, in die last 5 to 10 years and how local politics is involved in diis process. 
4.9.6 Result third level of analysis 
The first table explores to what extent villagers perceived a change in dieir communities in 
die last 5-10 years. An average opinion of each surveyed village is initially expressed in a 
number: 0(Not change), l(Litde), 2(Significant change). 













0.65 (Very littie) 







The condition in the village within the context of decentralized village governance has not 
substantially changed and, according to villagers, littie was done. In some areas, a littie 
degree of change was recognized but it is reasonable to argue that local institutions have not 
291 
been able to make substantial differences and improvements according to the sample. This 
leads the discussion to what type of change was accomplished. In the next tables further 
exploration in this direction can shed some light to define more in-depth the impact of 
local bodies according to people's insights. 
The following set of tables explore in depth a first set of open answers to die survey 
questions "how has the village changed in last 5 to 10 years" associated to the categories I 
have included so far. This partially explains what really made a difference in people's eyes 
about village governance. For die first analysis, die number of responses about change 
fitting widi the categories already established is summed to what die respondent already 
identified as activities of local institutions and die total percentage of respondents giving die 
same answers are presented. The change effect would be the difference between answers 
received only in identifying local institutions' activities and the answers, fitting in die same 
categories, about what changed in die village tiirough Gram Panchayat actions. 
Table IV. 12: Change according to original categories 
Category 
Total Answers of 
local institutions 
activities wilh change 
Gender Equality 


































Infrastructure in general 
Hospital 
Total Answers of 
local institutions 























Infrastructures are recognized as the most dominant part of change. Road and water 
improvements are especially seen as what really made a difference within the context of 
decentralized of governance. 
Category 
Poverty Alleviation Program 
Education 
Social Services in general 
Livestock 
Health 
Total Answers of . r ,,, . , . ... ,• %ol • Change 
local institutions . „. 
. . . . . . respondents eilcrl 
















Social Services are also seen as integral part of change. Education in particular becomes 
more recurrent along wiui poverty alleviation program as crucial dimension of change in 
die village. 
Category 




Companies/ Gov.nt Job 
Construction Job 
Total Answers of 
local institutions 























NREGA and employment in general are the most frequent associations with change that 
villagers linked to employment for Gram Panchayat. This is not surprising since local 
bodies are only able to give most emphasis to tasks related to the wage economy and labor 
in particular for infrastructure projects. 
I olid Answers ol ,„ .. 
, , , . . . . . . %oI 
Category < local mhuliiuons , 
. . . . . . respondents 
aclmtx:s with change • 
Checkdam, walling, digging work 
Women's group building 
Latrines construction 
Temple construction/ maintenance 




Government support and subsidies (ex: 
woolen work) 


































The last extra category does not show to be dominant in perception of change on the part 
of villagers. House improvement and latrines are most underlined but not significandy on a 
wide scale. 
My sample indicates mat infrastructures, employment and education are most frequent in 
defining change at the village level within these categories. An additional last table is 
necessary to point out anomer set of answers not specifically related to the items described 
above. The notion of change is far more complex than what described so far and many 
villagers expressed different opinions about it at a more abstract level. This is extremely 
interesting to shape a more multidimensional understanding of how the interaction of local 
institutions, villagers and external actors are changing die condition of the areas under 
study. 
Table IV. 13: Aggregate measures to define change 
Change 
Change as defined in the previous categories 
Not change at all 
Change at a different level 




Even diough the majority as defined change as described in the tables above, mere is a 
significant 45% of the whole sample which gave additional definition to it. The next and last 
table for this section identifies other patterns of answers in order to describe the interaction 
between local institutions and my sample. 
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Table IV. 14: Other answers about change in the village 
Residual open answers about change 
More government help, less extreme poverty and some form of 
development 
Community cohesion and less internal conflict than before 
Not government support, not progress in the village 
Good Council and elected representatives 
Education and poverty divide is on the rise, higher inequalities 
Bad Politicians, corruption and not information 
Community fragmentation, generation conflict, more selfishness 
Higher understanding of political processes, better rights 
enforcement 
























The evidence shows that of die 45% of my sample who identified change at a different level 
odier dian what identified so far, a significant portion has a positive attitude toward it. A 
solid 17% indicated tiiat more government help in concert with local institutions job is 
delivering some form of development35 hence positive changes are occurring. Another 
group of people also finds that community is becoming more cohesive and politicians are 
responsive to dieir needs. This positive evidence is counter weighted by another significant 
group of people who recognize opposite effects. Some feel not to receive enough support 
from higher tier of governance but most interestingly, tihere is a significant pool that is 
recognizing a slow process of community fragmentation and higher divides along the lines 
of education and poverty. The following experiences of two villagers can give a more 
subjective understanding of change witiiin Gram Panchayat: 
In hindi: Gram Vikas 
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"I am old and illiterate and in Gram Panchayat die young educated kids do not 
listen to me. I thought politics was for die wellbeing of everyone but now when I go 
to meetings everyone screams to get money and BPL card. I am sad to see die 
young of tiiis village to be selfish and not listen to old people during die meetings 
(Tej Singh, 15 years old from Tanga)" 
"I am a woman and we were not supposed to go to Gram Panchayat before. Now, I 
was elected and I see many odier women get elected even at Block and Zilla 
Panchayat. I started to go to meetings and have my voice heard. I feel more 
empowered and I am not afraid to say my ideas (Premi Devi, 42 years old from 
Alam)" 
This mixed evidence indicates mat die picture is not easy to grasp and it is impossible at 
diis stage to be conclusive about what force is stronger at die village level odier dian die 
already assessed infrastructure/employment bias of local institutions. This leaves open door 
for further discussion and interpretations since die picture emerging out of descriptive 
evidence is complex and further investigation is needed. Clearly, tiiere is a positive 
perception about local institutions delivering infrastructures, ensuring reservations rules and 
providing employment but die price for community cohesion and inequalities can be 
potentially very high. The need to balance die scope for development intended as 
substantial social change and social justice along widi infrastructure delivery and income 
generating activities seems hard to achieve for local institutions in die current dynamics. 
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4.9.7 Conclusion Hypothesis Four 
The overall evidence presented in this section leads to a very complex picture. The 
Constitutional framework for Panchayati Raj mandates economic development and social 
justice as equally important in decentralization. Decentralized governance for my case 
studies seems to emphasize infrastructure and employment generation above issues of 
oppression and social justice. This is recognized at all levels, from priority setting to actual 
activities carried from local bodies. The general association of village institutions to these 
two dimensions has profound implications for social justice. Even though villagers 
recognize the importance of all dimensions, the good governance agenda prioritize only a 
type of development meant to create the right environment for the capital and die 
empirical discussion reflects the trend. 
The first level of analysis identified the nature of infrastructure bias of local institution from 
people's opinions about what they feel to be the priorities for their communities witfiin the 
context of decentralized governance. The majority emphasized construction works and 
wage labor as first priority, yet social justice was identified as second top especially from 
scheduled castes that, in the communities under examination, are most oppressed. 
Furthermore, the poorest sections stressed more than otiiers the importance of gender 
equality and scheduled castes representation as top priority; both dimensions also attracted 
most consensuses, in relation to social justice, at the aggregate level. The complex relation 
between needs and what is actually happening at the local level is not easy to summarize 
but tiiere seems to be a strong recognition of infrastructure and employment generation. 
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Although they are both important to provide basic facilities it's hard, at this point, to dissect 
the common perception of priority setting for village governance from die real personal 
needs of each individual. It is reasonable to assume mat local institutions are increasingly 
perceived as agents to deliver a specific type of development more oriented to provide 
facilities than social transformation. 
The second level of analysis focuses on what is done in practice through local bodies. 
Social justice has space equal near to zero whereas the overwhelming majority recognizes 
NREGA, roads construction, water sources work and poverty alleviation programs to be 
pursued tire most People do recognize the importance of village assets and local 
institutions are significandy operating in improving the conditions for basic infrastructure 
and in delivering some degree of social welfare (as shown also in Appendix 4). Some of 
tirese projects are bringing some form of development diat people perceive as positive; 
enabling connectivity along with better water access are undeniably important for the 
communities under study. Given dreir positive impact for the communities, it remains to 
be seen whether drey actually reach the poor. The evidence shows that benefits are 
unevenly distributed and the poorest section of my sample are still left without substantial 
support. If local bodies had the capacity to expand their scope also to issues of 
marginalization and if had more voices in how to use the funds received from the state for 
their own local needs, perhaps outcome for social justice would be improved. A substantial 
change in the relationship between local bodies and the state will require reworking the 
power equation. The evidence shows, instead, diat the outcome of decentralization is more 
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attached to the monetary dimension in relation to tangible goods. The lack of substantial 
space for social change and support for autonomous decision-making at the institutional 
level translates into addressing matters exclusively related to infrastructure, labor and 
benefits distribution. Most schemes come from die state level and are meant for purposes 
favoring a form of development diat is by nature more economic and market oriented. 
There is lack of spaces and support for die creation of inclusive alternatives entailing 
greater engagement of local communities in the process of priority setting and decision 
making. 
The third and last level of diis hypomesis describes die nature and die extent of change 
dirough local bodies according to people's opinions. This is die most complex and 
multidimensional issue to understand because it implies different level of analysis. On the 
aggregate level, change is mainly perceived to be quite limited and along the same bias in 
infrastructure and employment generation. A significant amount of people (more than 
20%) did not recognize any form of change. Going deeper in the analysis the evidence is 
more mixed. A significant number of people deem the current trajectories of local 
institution to bring some development but at the same time to bring community 
fragmentation and new inequalities. This outcome reiterates die importance to develop 
basic facilities and social welfare, yet people also recognize internal conflicts about benefits 
distribution and new forms of selfishness and individualism. Community fragmentation is 
being created along with inequalities based on education and poverty as shown in the 
hypodiesis about participation. The need to bring new inclusive locally designed processes 
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of change and development dirough local institutions can reverse die current polarization 
and lead to die creation of more democratic alternatives. As long as die mechanisms are 
externally imposed widiin a specific political agenda, change will most likely not occur or 
will be merely limited to die formation of a market. Issues of social change are disregarded 
from die evidence of my sample in regards to die notion of "change". 
Overall hypodiesis number four shows die existence of an imbalance favoring 
infrastructure through employment generation and reducing space for social justice to 
overcome the various dimensions of oppression existing in die communities under study. 
The Constitutional mandate for Panchayati Raj underlines die importance to have bodi 
dimensions but evidence shows diey are not on die same level. Despite die imbalance, 
diere is a significant section of die sample diat is positive about die operations of local 
institutions and diis result indicates diat social justice and infrastructure development 
dirough Gram Panchayat are not mutually exclusive. Yet, a stronger radical push to 
inclusiveness and resistance to die good governance agenda can lead to more holistic 
positive outcomes and to avoid potential conflicts widiin die community. The process of 
democratization does imply more space for dissent and also more opportunities to create 
and support more communitarian alternatives for development outside die scope of die 
good governance agenda inspired upon neoliberal policies. 
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CHAPTER V 
5.1 How much space exists for social justice within current decentralization practices in the 
case of India? 
The four hypotheses have brought some hard evidence about the link between 
decentralization and social justice for my case studies. Although diis is not conclusive for 
the entire area of Munsiari or Uttarakhand it can provide enough space to make some 
tentative conclusions. I recognize the limitations of aggregate measures and regressions, but 
I also find in them the potential to develop a broad understanding of a possible 
interpretation and validity for my central argument 
It seems social justice is not die outcome of good governance decentralization in India. 
According to my empirical evidence, me essential dimension of social justice in me link 
between development and decentralization does not seem to play a substantial role for 
current practices. The discourse of decentralization is much more complex man good 
governance, but the pressures to managerialize implementation processes through 
depoliticized mechanisms and unrepresentative institutions are happening. Traditional 
patterns of self-governance, self-reliance and local autonomy are replaced with formal 
bodies unable to address social change or forms of oppression. Local bodies are also 
constrained in action to create alternatives and dissent against development inspired by the 
neoliberal logic. There seems to be a fundamental lack of interaction across tiers of 
governance and local needs are not necessarily taken into consideration. This is a form of 
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injustice of imposing mechanisms that are not result of actual democratic discussion and 
perhaps dissent. The power structure at the central level and die imposed goal to create 
efficient bodies as agents to ensure a transparent transition to what international 
organization endorse as "trajectory" to development embeds serious consequences for die 
local communities in rural India. External pressures to prioritize market integration and 
displace communitarian structures are multidimensional in nature and affect decentralized 
bodies at various levels. 
In the case of forest policy, local bodies are forced to become manager instead of owners 
of their own resources. The rhetoric of environmental conservation does not address issue 
of livelihood and current legal changes are reducing community's autonomy to use Van 
Panchayat forest resources according to local needs and practices (microplan). The 
pressures to commercialize the forest are strong dirough increasing interferences from 
government agencies and operations. The involvement of the World Bank and die recent 
changes in the legal guidelines have given more power to the Forest Department and 
reduced Van Panchayat autonomy. Access to resources is also constrained by uneven 
centrally fixed spatial divisions leading to uneven distribution across villages. Local bodies 
in this frame are also facing great environmental damages hence reduction of community's 
resources due to dam constructions and big-scale development projects. The delicate 
balance between people's livelihood and dieir environment is violated from big scale 
projects joindy financed from die government and corporations. Otfier impacts imply 
displacement, forced migration, less agricultural land and social problems. Most local 
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bodies are powerless and are unable to build democratic dissent or knowledge about the 
consequences of die wage economy for people's livelihood. These external pressures are 
forms of social injustices and are complemented by Van Panchayat inability to address die 
persistent exclusion of women and scheduled caste from institutional processes and 
internal conflicts over resource distributions. 
In the case of village governance local bodies face pressures of different nature yet, similar 
in logic. According to my evidence, the good governance approach is also evident in Gram 
Panchayat and die overall implementation process is following die lines of monetary 
schemes meant to enable die market through centralized schemes for infrastructure and 
employment development Altfiough botii are necessary for basic needs and income-
generation, tiiey can potentially become mechanisms to introduce an economy purely 
based on wage labor and converting communities into objects of a specific neoliberal 
political project based on accumulation instead of distribution. In die case studies, die 
overall picture shows uneven distribution of social welfare and quite limited social justice. 
This is reflected on die type of development happening at die grassroot level. The conflicts 
between democratization versus economic and political liberalization is favoring die latter 
force. The good governance rationale does not provide inclusive processes in decision 
making or spaces for alternative development models. The link between decentralization 
and development is indeed constrained widiin a linear logic of what progress should look 
like. This is also translating into limited change at die village level and internal issues of low 
gender attendance, die perpetuation of a significant pool of people not able to engage in 
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discussion and creation of new divisions between rich and poor or educated and 
uneducated. The disregard of a more communitarian perspective and of tackling internal 
forms of subjugation leads to potential for social fragmentation and internal conflicts which 
can ultimately perpetuate exclusion, poverty and oppression. 
The overall consequences of good governance decentralization meant to favor market 
integration as top priority for development and to simplify the complexities of each 
community are restraining social justice as defined in this thesis. My field research shows a 
disruption of livelihood, less access to resources, perpetuation of caste and gender bias, 
new divisions, potential for community fragmentation, environment damage, economic 
dependency, higher political control, lack of democratic awareness, power centralization 
hence lack of social justice. Internal and external mechanisms of oppression are not 
substantially challenged. In this frame, it becomes necessary to improve current practices 
for decentralized governance and to ensure social justice through autonomous, 
representative and politicized institutions that can prioritize local needs and effectively 
interact with the state. I argue better decentralization practices can happen if the Indian 
central government shifts from the neo-liberal rhetoric of inclusive growth to the notion of 
community self-reliance. Such change requires a new political will in creating policies that 
follows the Constitutional definition of social justice more holistically, especially the notion 
of common good. A new synergetic form of decentralization, perhaps along die Kerala 
model, inclusive of a power rebalance between various tiers of governance can favor new 
forms of development based on social transformation and economic development for the 
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benefits of the local community. 
At the same time, it would not be objective to disregard the potential for transformation 
emerging out of what has been achieved so far in regards to decentralization in India. In 
first instance, the improvement of some basic infrastructures is widely recognized and 
supported from the communities under study underlining that social justice is not mutually 
exclusive with supporting the local economy. On the contrary, it is important to expand the 
scope of action of local bodies in order to balance some degree of economic development 
with social justice. Secondly, my case studies show that gender representation is increasing, 
especially in die case of Gram Panchayat, dirough reservation rule and higher political 
engagement of women. This has great scope for empowerment and dissent building since 
their oppression might change die outcome of local politics. Successful cases of resistance 
are also increasing like in die case of Sarmoli Van Panchayat that prioritized livelihood and 
conservation above government pressures to managerialize the forest. In other words, the 
interaction witii external forces or organizations in concert with resistance and women's 
empowerment can seriously challenge the current model of development as envisioned 
from the good governance agenda. 
Theoretical Implications of case analysis for good governance 
This section briefly examines how the empirical evidence can be linked to the theoretical 
frameworks, presented in the literature review, in relation to good governance 
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decentralization. The implications of my study underlines some interesting connection to 
their arguments, in particular related to the Neo-Marxist critique of good governance 
decentralization. 
My evidence empirical evidence can be confidently linked to the Neo-Marxist critique to 
good governance. The class structure seems to be perpetuated; inequalities in participation 
and in the distribution of benefits show how members from poor households are still 
marginalized and have little decision power in village politics. The power structure is also 
maintained by the elites in the way social welfare funds are allocated; they favor households 
mat are relatively better off and still do not reach the most in need. The elites are not only 
within the community, but big-scale development projects also aims at achieving a model of 
development opposed to self-governance and self-reliance and focused on capital 
accumulation before livelihood. The same pressures emerge out of the recent legal changes 
favoring forest commercialization and reduction of institutional autonomy. In the case of 
Sarmoli forest council, the current trajectory in decentralization and development attracted 
dissent, but government officials along with external agencies have reacted to resistance by 
boycotting the democratic process of re-election. The emphasis to create managerial and 
depoliticized institutions is in line with the Neo-Marxist argument of decentralization as 
policy to establish social consensus on modernization. This process unfolds from the 
fragmentation of political practices and the transformation of local bodies into agents to 
fulfill central policy objectives. The little space for democratic dissents and the continuous 
exclusion of individuals most exposed to struggle prevents social conflicts to challenge the 
hegemonic interests within the state and the market. Furthermore, funds allocated at the 
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local level are not untied and mainly focus on maintaining the conditions for production 
through the creation of appropriate infrastructures and employment generation through 
wage labor. Although some recognition of the positive implications of developing basic 
infrastructures, their distribution is not equal across members of the communities and the 
long-term trajectory endorsed from the current government is undeniably focused on 
growth and neoliberalism. In this frame, the Neo-Marxist critique seems to hold especially 
for the evidence showing reduced democratic pluralism and limited action to rebalance the 
power structures. 
The empirical analysis also shows some space to consider die Sustainable Livelihood 
approach as framework of analysis of decentralization, especially in the case analysis of 
Sarmoli village. According to SLA, decentralization is a political capital, along with its 
inherent power structures, and is not seen as endogenous variable. The framework 
traditionally does not offer a systematic critique to the issues of class relations. The more 
recent paper of Scoones (2009) introduces the issue of social relations more strongly. The 
political capital can be used strategically in synergy with the other capitals of a community 
in order to create political pressures against dynamics tiiat negatively affect livelihood. In 
the case of Sarmoli village, allowing people's priorities to be fulfilled can be expanded 
beyond a single limited scope and can be channeled as unifying factor around struggle. The 
micro-macro reformulations of livelihoods can look at class politics and can challenge 
forms of oppression through democratic dissent and social awareness. Livelihood is a 
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central aspect of assessing social justice and SLA offers potential scope to conceptualize 
political processes as force for change. The political capital inevitably intertwines with the 
social and natural dimensions of a community. The power structures, maintained by 
formalized and depoliticized institutions, can exacerbate inequalities at all levels. In the 
case of natural capital, big-scale modernizing projects compromise the reliance of local 
communities on their land, forest produces and surrounding wildlife. Furthermore, 
exclusionary institutional processes maintain power structures, unequal social relations and 
internal conflicts, hence deteriorating the social capital. Political capital can be seen as a 
distinct and endogenous variable, in the analysis of decentralization practices, and can 
critically link structures and processes in understanding the real impact of policies on 
livelihood. The good governance approach is negatively impacting all capitals but also 
offering the space to create resistance and to transform power structures. Similarly to the 
case of Sarmoli village, the political capital -in synergy widi the other capitals- can used to 
oppose against managerial institutional arrangements. The analysis of die outcome of 
resistance, under the SLA lenses, underlines tiiat the success is also passed to otlier capitals 
in a community. 
The Institutional Political Economy does not offer as much space as the Sustainable 
Livelihood and Neo-Marxist frameworks for resistance. Yet, some evidence from my case 
studies also confirms some of the critique developed by the IPE approach to 
decentralization. First of all, funds in village governance are not reaching the marginalized 
groups and they are mosdy centralized. The incapacity of local institutions to be self-reliant 
is also caused by die nature of funds coming from die state. Aldiough some basic 
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infrastructures are developed, the local economy is still constrained by a centralized vision 
for development that reduces the power of local communities to decide how to use local 
resources. IPE also emphasizes that economic elites should be targeted at the local levels 
in order to ensure egalitarian community-based institutions. The evidence shows the 
contrary, members coming from better off households are more likely to get engaged into 
village politics as well as more likely recipient of money coming from government schemes. 
The good governance approach aims at reducing budget deficit through allocative 
efficiency is a reasonable basis of critique about the limited investment of state resources to 
welfare-oriented programs as opposed to infrastructure development. The IPE invokes 
growth as outcome of decentralization but in a more equal and inclusive way, whereas good 
governance does not seem to embed die same objective. 
Although my central problematic is mainly based on the critiques emerging out of the Neo-
Marxist framework, there is also space to extend the analysis of my findings for other 
theories. All three frames underline different issues but the extensive amount of empirical 
evidence allows me to link die broader theories with field reality. The class and power 
structures certainly remains die most crucial dimensions for die analysis of social justice in 
the context of good governance. The next section will explore the theoretical model of 
decentralization according to Gandhi in order to expand the discussion of other 
frameworks that might better address die issues of power structures in decentralization and 
development. 
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5.2 In search of a new approach 
My starting point to explore a new approach of decentralization is based upon Gandhi's 
rejection of the current principles defining civilization that contributed to die present 
model of progress and development, as we know it. The imposition of die western basic 
edios at its very core in its claim "might is right" and "survival of die fittest" have influenced 
most policies in development and all disciplines. The politics of power and self-interested 
economics have become the most dominant approachs in conceptualizing modern 
development policies. Pure materialism in its determinism has left humans widi litde 
freedom, lot of oppression and lack of creativity to cutting new radical edges in 
conceptualizing development. 
Clearly die achievements of modern civilization should not be overlooked and its scientific 
and critical spirit have contributed immensely to understand die natural world, a process of 
diinking diat would still imply die use of abstraction and complex diought processes. 
Gandhi's critique is more focused on die colonial imperialism diat derives mosdy from its 
capitalist tendency of exploitation and diat could be found also today aldiough in different 
form. The current neoliberal policies, for example, are opening new debates about die 
validity and limitations of economics as a real solution for development. The modern 
definition of individual identity is based upon die assumption diat fullest realization of 
human potentialities lies in die progressive improvement of die material condition of 
human existence. The institutionalization of this western assumption has led to separate 
homo spiritualis and homo economicus widi die consequent creation and installation of 
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religious and political structures upon the assumption of a self-defining subject as the 
predominant agency in the world. This separation have led to replace the 
individual/collective connection to any transcendental order with material needs of 
acquiring wealth, power, prestige and status as die main objective for human existence. The 
centrality of self-regarding action in a purely material and rational perspective requires 
continuous satisfaction of human needs and desires yet the incessant expansion of 
productive capacity is proving to create stronger structures of oppressions and inequalities, 
to debilitate human's wellbeing and to endanger the fragile equilibrium with mother earth. 
Gandhi equates industrial civilization with the Upas tree, even though it does provide 
comfortable shade to weary travellers or workers it infects dieir body as well (Joseph, 
2007). 
Within this framework the debate about what best form of governance should be used to 
accommodate the current policies leads to an inherent paradox. The current 
decentralization policy for village governance in India and its current implementation is 
strongly influenced by the neoliberal policies decided at the central level. India's 
decentralization is die emblem of two conflicting processes: industrialization and 
democratization. The emphasis on economic growth favours centralization in policy 
making but democratization clearly prefers a decentralized setting. The former is by far the 
dominant priority and has led to an industrial civilization that has made life very complex 
and multiplex requiring further specialization, expertise and rationalization. 
Decentralization is indeed clashing with a central tendency to establish industrial capitalism 
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and in order to support such a process; its rationale is transformed to accommodate the 
needs of the market. Weaker and oppressed sections of society are the worst off because of 
lacking in material resources necessary for acquiring and mobilizing power hence social 
justice is much constrained. Even if endowed with the power of numbers, they are still 
divided in fragmented groups especially in diverse societies such as India (Malik, 2004). 
Decentralization practices are not uniform across states and most institutions remain at the 
embryonic stage without substantial energy and lacking of adequate powers and resources. 
Furthermore, most funds come from central schemes and local institutions have not 
decision power in how to allocate the money hence conflict and tensions are rising between 
officials and non-officials on petty matter. In a nutshell, no real power is being transferred 
to lower levels of governance especially to oppressed groups (the majority of the 
population) hence die overall functioning is not-inclusive, highly impersonal and 
bureaucratic in nature. 
At the present moment there is not process in place to let people decide their own 
priorities over a wide range of crucial activities and key resources through decentralized 
practices. Only voluntary organizations seem to perform some reactivation of indigenous 
form of self-help and governance. Decentralization's rationale needs stronger value 
integration similarly to Gandhi's model in order to enhance the self-regulating capacity of 
individuals, organizations and communities instead of market-oriented pressures reducing 
local institutions to puppets of unjust central policies. This argument is of crucial 
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importance and demands a shift in understanding of decentralization at the international 
level where policies are imposed and at the national level where policies are implemented. 
5.3 Gandhi's model of Village Swaraj: Delinking from exploitation and equality for all 
Gandhi has a very powerful understanding of decentralization reflected in his model of 
village Swaraj aiming at rebuilding community life, guaranteeing substantive equality and 
complete participation by all. It should be an instrument to invigorate community life as a 
ground for situating freedom and for developing a proper and creative social and 
communitarian orientation. As Gandhi views it: 
"a structure composed of innumerable villages with never ascending circles. Life 
will not be pyramidal with die apex sustained by me bottom but an oceanic circle 
whose centre will be me individuals ready to perish for me villages, till at last the 
whole becomes one life composed of individuals, never aggressive in their 
arrogance but ever humble, sharing die majesty of the oceanic circle of which they 
are integral units. Therefore, the outermost circumstance will not wield power to 
crush die inner circle but will give strengdi to all within and derive its own strengdi 
from it... no one... will be the first and none die last (Pyare, 1958: 580-581)." 
Ghandi's inspiring quote is in convergence widi its pragmatic arguments; villages should be 
economically self-supporting and politically self-governing wim non-institutionalized beliefs 
or religions but an identification widi die universe and with service for all. The system 
should be perpetuating harmony at its core and each one would complement the life of die 
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other and serve the nation in a spirit of true voluntarism. It might sound radically idealistic 
but without a strong inspiring model there is not scope for new approaches hence for 
change. 
Gandhi basically invokes a cultural and spiritual ideal of simple living and high thinking 
and he wants a raise in the standard of life instead of standard of living. This requires a 
decentralized structure of government in which individuals enjoy maximum freedom of 
thought, expression and participation in cooperative decision-making and implementation 
processes. A common effort channelled to raise the levels of humanity within a new radical 
and revolutionary conceptualization of democracy at its core. The ideal society should also 
be de-linked from sources of external exploitation, inequality, class domination, class 
conflict, communal disturbances, strikes and all kinds of violence. Democracy cannot be 
evolved by forcible methods but should come from within and the majority should tend to 
reflect down to the lowest level of institutional structure die collective social will. The 
process of democratization should indeed be put as first priority in decentralized 
governance. Panchayats can and should have local development without external pressures 
to conform to a non-industrial civilization and pursue a model based on rural values and 
informed by notions of modern emancipated consciousness (Roy, 2004). 
Village Swaraj is based upon the principle of self-sufficiency mosdy confined to basic needs 
such as food, clothing and shelter. Gandhi is not against modern science and technology 
per se, his attitude is entirely rational and scientific since he claims they should become 
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functions and not dominators of people. He argues die process of industry mechanization 
should always preserve labour intensity and complement cottage industries instead of 
killing diem and concentrate production in narrow fields/units. Each village should become 
a production centre and a little republic organically linked with higher bodies but enjoying 
maximum freedom of deciding die affairs of die locality. Villages hold a very important 
place in Gandhi's scheme of life and social organization. Indian villages are till today die 
backbone of India and witiiout diem; India will perish or as Gandhi says: "her mission will 
be lost" (Sharma, 1987). Independent India had to make a choice between its ancient 
traditional village setting and urbanization forced by an industrial model of foreign 
domination. In die current industrialization process die centres of power have indeed 
shifted to cities and die central challenge to define what role villages should play now is 
surely discussed and needs even more attention in die various debates about 
decentralization. 
The complexities of India's society have indeed increased in die last few decades and new 
issues are becoming part of die debate (population pressures, market integration, 
environmental damages, energy requirements, further fragmentation in community 
structures, increase in inequalities, die hazy dreams of infinite growth at no cost etc.). 
Decentralization needs to deal widi all diese contextual factors but its central principle 
needs to be revisited especially in die context of international pressures upon India to 
adopt neoliberal policies diat gives by far too much relevance to die economic side of 
human life in an exploitative manner. 
316 
5.4 Potential areas for further research: Madhya Pradesh approach shift 
Madhya Pradesh government amended die Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act of 1993 
and substituted the words "Panchayat Raj and Gram Swaraj" in the place of "Panchayat 
Raj". The operationalisation of Gram Swaraj in Madhya Pradesh is probably one of the 
most significant changes in the system of governance based on "direct democracy" instead 
of indirect representative parliamentary democracy. The experience of Gram Swaraj will 
have serious implications for the discourse on governance, democracy and modernity and 
needs to be assessed. The premise is tfiat village people can assemble and sit collectively 
and dierefore representatives to represent the views, aspirations, needs and interests of the 
people are not required. The new system intends to give power to the people and not to 
their representatives yet the framers of Gram Swaraj was conscious of the hierarchical 
social order and inequitable power relations in the village. Therefore, to protect Gram 
Swaraj from becoming monopoly of the powerful, certain provisions have been inserted to 
safeguard die interest of the larger community and deprived categories in general. 
Secondly, the devolution structure for all Gram Panchayat -the traditional units of 
governance in Panchayati Raj- is different, they are endowed with more untied funds 
coming from the state government and Gram Swaraj are also able to manage its 
expenditure and operational cost drawing money from Gram Panchayt's fund (McCarten, 
2004). 
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Gram Swaraj in Madhya Pradesh has emerged from an extensive process of deliberation, 
refinement and dialogue. There should be more space for analysis of its structure but for 
the purpose of this thesis is enough. The Gandhian ideological framework inspired the 
basic structure and body of this new system of self-governance. The primary objective of 
introducing a new system of Gram Swaraj is evidendy to transfer power to the people and 
take forward the process of democratic decentralisation to its ideal end. The aim is to 
facilitate social, economical and political autonomy at the village level. Gram Swaraj 
attempt to radically restructure the governance space according to the Gandhian worldview 
and also to reduce the increasing conflicts created due to Panchayat elections' process. 
According to the proponents of Gram Swaraj to lose elections is taken as a personal loss in 
a village, often leading to disruption of the social fabric. By strengthening die village level 
autonomy and introduce Gram Swaraj, the Panchayat elections are expected to have less 
adverse consequences and to reinstate its importance as a social unit and community 
(Behar, 2001) 
The implementation of Gram Swaraj in Madhya Pradesh also has some pitfalls and faces 
great resistances. The parallel creation of another body other than the traditional Panchayat 
institutions is leading to confusion, overlapping task and not substantial change in the way 
judicial and police functions are entrusted to the village level. The latter factor seems to be 
crucial in Gandhi's claims to achieve village autonomy. The series of problem at the legal 
and implementation levels are arising and becoming part of a more critical review of its 
impact. Yet much endiusiasm is supporting uiis new approach shift hence the Madhya 
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Pradesh could be the basis for further critical analysis of its internal contradictions and 
potentials giving voice to a new example in the debate about new approaches to 
decentralization in India. 
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1. Village Name 
APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Village, people and politicians survey 
Village Data 
2. Village Size 
0-20 20-50 50-100 100-200 More than 200 
3. Altitude 
Below 2000 2000-2300 2300-2500 2500-2800 Over 2800 
4. Road Access 
0-2 km 2-4 km 4-6 km 6-8 km > 8 km 
5. Primary education facilities access 
0-1 km 1-2 km 2-3 km 4-5 km > 5 km 
6. Secondary education facilities access 
0-1 km 1-2 km 2-3 km 4-5 km > 5 km 
7. Nearest Public hospital 
0-1 km 1-2 km 2-3 km 4-5 km > 5 km 
8. Electricity access (solar, primary etc.) 
Never Rarely Sometimes Very often Always 
9. Is there presence of NGOs in the area? 
Yes No 
10. What are its/their operations for the community? 
11. Is there presence of private companies in the area? 
Yes 
What type? 
What does it produce? 
No 
If so, what land are they working on? 





Van Panchayat Information 
1. Year of foundation 
2. Number of right holders and council member 
3. Forest distance from village 
Less 1 km 1-2 km 3-4 km 4-5 km More than 5 
4. Forest area under Van Panchayat 
5. Number of women in the council 
6. Van Sarpanch 
Male Female 
7. Forest watcher (Chowkidar) 
Yes 
How present is he? 
How is paid? 




When was decided? 
What are contents in the Microplan? (If it is possible to get a copy) 
Microplan 
Primary tree species 
Local needs 
For sale outside the village 
Any plantation work 
Others 
Contents 
09. Does the VP generate 
Yes 
internal funds inside the Van Panchayat? 
No 
10. Does the VP have a joint bank account wim the secretary of the village forest 
(appointed by Divisional Forest Officier)? 
Yes No 

















Yes No When How was it spent? 
(How 
much?) 









1. Year of foundation 
2. Number of permanent residents and council members 
3. Women in council 
4. scheduled tribes and scheduled castes in council 





























castes tribes castes tribes 
7. When was the last election? 




9. Internal Funds (if data available) 






Y N How were they invested? 
10. What development projects have been carried out in the community in die present 








Women and Child development 
Yes No What kind and how many 
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Sanitation 






11. Are any social justice issue discussed in the Gram Panchayat? What kind? 
12. Do people ever bring any social conflict to the Gram Panchayat? What kind? 















Yes No Activities 
1. Name 
2. Gender 




3. Age group 
Under 20 20-30 35-45 45-60 Over 60 
4. Primary source of income for the interviewee and for the family. 
Source of Income 
Agriculture 
Livestock 
Trade/ shop keeping 
Government service/ 
Salaried/Pension 





How much land? 
Holdings? 
How much does your household rely on forest resources from die VP? 









Illiterate Elementary Junior High School Intercollege BA MA 
7. Are you part of me council of die VP? O 
Yes 
Which Position? 
r in me past (wht s i ) 
No 




Van Panchayat Questions 
Dependency and forest access 
1. What do you dunk about forest resources/healdi to meet your household's needs? 
Fuelwood Yes/No 
Very Little Litde Enough In excess 
Water Yes/No 
Very Litde Litde Enough In excess 
Fodder Yes/No 
Very Litde Litde Enough In excess 





3. According to your opinion is the forest area sufficient to meet village needs? 
Not at all Very little Little Enough In excess I don't 
know 
4. What do you think about the forest condition in the last 10 years? 
I don't know Worsen Same Better 
Why? 
Individual Level 
5. As a woman/man who is also righdiolder: 
Do you attend VP meetings? 
Yes Sometimes No 
Do you participate in decision-making? 
Yes Little No 
Are your needs given due consideration and met in die Van Panchayat? 
Never 
Why? 
6. Are there con 
Rarely Sometimes Always 
licts behaviours with other communities? 
Yes No I don't know 
Are there conflicts behaviours within the community? 
Yes No I don t know 
Are there collaborative behaviours with other communities? 
Yes No I don t know 
What kind? 
Pressures 
7. Do you know about die contents of your village's microplan and forest council activities? 
Yes No 
Is being implemented? To what extent? 
No 1 Yes 
8. What do you think about forest department in relation to Van Panchayat? 
338 
Directive Not present Supportive No opinion 
What is the forest department doing? 
9. Are there external agencies (companies, private traders, corporations for example 
NTBC, construction companies etc..) in the area: 
Yes 
What are they 
doing? 
What is the impact 
on the forest? 
What is die impact 
on the community? 
Why? 











10. Are there NGOs in the area? 
Yes No 
What do you diink about dieir operations? 
Gram Panchayat Raj Questions 
Village Level 
1. What do you diink are the priority needs of your community within the context of Gram 


























2. Is there scope for these priorities of the village to be put in the agenda of the Gram 
Panchayat? 
Not at all Little Some Good 
Why and for what activities? 






4. How often do you attend Gram Panchayat meetings? 
Never 




If never, why? 
5. Has your participation increased in the last 5 years? 
Yes Little/Same No 
Why? 
6. Are your family's needs met in Gram Panchayat decisions? 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
What? 
7. Are you above/ below/ very below die poverty line? 
APL (Above poverty line) Below poverty lines (BPL) Very below poverty line 
(VPBL) 
Appendix 2: Market Pressures 
PETITION AGAINST DAM CONSTRUCTION: SIGNS OF STRUGGLE 
To: 
1. Sri S.Raju , IAS 
Commissioner Kumaon Division 
Nainital, Uttarakhand 
2. Shri N.S. Negi, IAS 
District Magistrate 
Pithoragarh District, 
3. Dr. Ramesh Pokhriyal 'Nishank' 
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Hon. Chief Minister, Uttarakhand 
Chief Minister Niwas. Circuit House 
Respected Sirs, 
We , members of Civil Society groups and concerned individuals from all over the country 
write to register our protest and concern at the systematic way in which the Van Panchayat 
elections in Sarmoli Jainti Van Panchayat (Village Forest Council), Munsiari Block, District 
Pithoragarh, have been systematically sabotaged since December 2009. As you may be 
aware, elections in this Van Panchayat were conducted on 3 separate occasions- the 12th 
and 20th of December 2009 and then on die 10th of January 2010. All three times the 
election process could not be completed as they were disrupted by an opposition of local 
contractors and contract workers of the National Thermal Power Corporation. This 
disruption is being raised by the contractor lobby mainly against die Sarpanch of Sarmoli 
Jainti Van Panchayat and die Panchayat Committee, who has been opposing die vicious 
activities of NTPC in the land acquisition process and has clearly been gaining the requisite 
support in the election proceedings carried out tiiree times since December, 2009. 
NTPC is currendy engaged in the construction of a 261 M W Hydropower Project on die 
Gori river in the valley. For the purpose of HEP, die process of acquiring private as well as 
village community land in die region has faced strong resistance communities have been 
making tiieir voices heard and other groups have also supported the opposition of land 
acquisition. The Sarmoli Jainti Van Panchayat has been supporting diose who are losing 
die land so as to conserve die village forest, water, flora and fauna and die natural resource 
base which forms the basis of local livelihoods. The local administration is also in collusion 
with NTPC diat Ms. Malika, die present Woman Sarpanch of Sarmoli Jainti Van 
Panchayat does not get re-elected at any cost. The private as well as village community land 
which would odierwise have been easy to acquire has now got a bit harder for NTPC. For 
the past many years present and past elected representatives of Van Panchayat and odier 
groups supporting die opposition of land acquisition has successfully run an awareness and 
civil rights 
campaign against die ways diat die companies and administration operate. 
The village community and die elected representatives of the PRI- die Gram Pradhan, die 
Kshetriya Panchayat member and die Zilla Panchayat member- all have made a concerted 
effort on all tiiree occasions to ensure free and fair elections. However, diere has been a 
growing threat of violence and a total disregard for democratic processes. Ms. Malika Virdi 
has been facing repeated harassment by vested interests making a complete mockery of the 
Panchayati Raj Process. This is to request you to please ensure free and fair elections in 
Sarmoli-Jainti Van Panchayat and to bring to book the disruptive elements that have forced 
the elections to be cancelled tiiree times already. Specifically, we would like to request to 
you to ensure: 
1. That elections now be held in a safe and neutral place- in die presence of an 
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independent and impartial senior returning officer. 
2. That action is taken against the elements that have disrupted free and fair elections all 
three times. 
3. That the threat of violence against the present Woman Sarpanch, the women supporters 
and the village community by the opposition be stopped with immediate effect by arranging 
for security to be provided at the venue to prevent any untoward incident or brow beating 
of the genuine voters. 
Appendix 3: Gram Panchayat funding and social justice 
SIRTOLA GRAM PANCHAYAT 













How were they invested? 
50% of funds arrive from die central 
government and 50% from the state 
government. 
NREGA is the new scheme: 1 lakh/year 
(2,260 US dollars/year). This money is 
being invested to build water tanks and 
checkdams. 
Financial Commission: 1 lakhs/year (2,260 
US dollars/year). This money is spent for 
water infrastructures (ie: water tanks), road 
and reinforced cement concrete 
construction. 
10. What development projects have been carried out in the community in die present 









Women and Child development 
Sanitation 














What kind and how many 
In the term 2003-2008 
1) School Boundaries (2 lakhs) 
(4,520 US dollars/year) 
2) Junior High School (6 lakhs) 
(13,560 US dollars/year) 
3) Computer room (3.7 lakhs) 
(8,361 US dollars/year) 
1) Water channel construction (3.4 
lakhs) 
1) Pensions: 
2 widow pensions (400 
Rupees/month) (9 US 
dollars/month) 
6 old people pensions (400 
Rupees/month) (9 US 
dollars/month) 
1) Ration cards: 
5 Very below poverty line cards 
16 Below poverty lines cards 










- 1 house (28,000 Rupees=632 US 
dollars) 
1 house repairing (7,000 
Rupees=158 US dollars) 
11. Are any social justice issue discussed in the Gram Panchayat? What kind? 
According to die previous Gram Pradhan there are not major social issues raised in 
Gram Panchayat in relation to gender matters. He specifically said that during his term 
there were not social issues discussed relating to gender, corruption or caste. The new 
elected Gram Pradhan said there are some and that she would take them up during her 
term. 
12. Do people ever bring any social conflict to the Gram Panchayat? What kind? 
People during the last term did not bring social issues in front of the Gram Panchayat. 
TANGA-LODHI GRAM PANCHAYAT 












How were they invested? 2002-2008 
5 lakhs (11,300 US dollars) per year was 
invested in reinforced cement concrete 
road construction, stone patch, checkdam 
and water work. Schemes' names were not 
specified. 
The village development officer (Gram 
Vikas Adhikari) gave 2 lakhs (4,520 US 
dollars) per year for some infrastructure 
job. 
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Others X State level representatives quota: 40,000 
Rupees/ once (903 US dollars) 
10. What development projects have been carried out in the community in the present 



















What kind and how many 
In the term 2003-2008 
1) 3 primary school and 1 junior 
high school (13 lakhs= 29,300 
US dollars) 
2) Teacher hours (2.7 lakhs=6,000 
US dollars) 
3) School boundaries (40,000 
Rupees= 903 US dollars) 
1) Pensions: 
5 pensions (250 
Rupees/month=5 US dollars) 
Financial help to 5 people 
without charging interest (5,000 
Rupees/once= 112 US dollars) 
1) Pipeline repairing (not figure in 
rupees) 
1) 2 disabled children financial 

















1) Road cleaning and grass cutting 
(community effort for free) 
1) Ration cards: 
Very below poverty line cards 
and Below poverty lines cards 
given, not amount specified. 
1) Indirawas house scheme 
6 houses subsidies (30,000 
Rupees) 
1) Water work, checkdams, path 
construction (3 lakhs/ year=6,780 
US dollars) 
1) Gram Panchayat's effort to 
compromise parties 
2) Women reservation to work in 
schools as teacher or as general 
personnel 
11. Are any social justice issue discussed in the Gram Panchayat? What kind? 
Gram Panchayat tries to solve conflicts over agricultural land issues. If the husband is 
violent with his wife, die Gram Panchayat will lead bodi parties to a compromise 
through a written consent. In the case die violence occurs again, the husband will be 
sent to court 
12. Do people ever bring any social conflict to die Gram Panchayat? What kind? 
Some cases of violence to women are reported to die Gram Pradhan. 
ALAM-DARMA GRAM PANCHAYAT 







How were they invested? Current term and 
previous term 









The money is currently invested in building 
chekdams, water conservation and for 
plantation work. 
Not taxation in Alam but not information 
about Darma. 
From die state government money comes 
for die ll l h financial commission (1 
lakh/year=2,260 US dollars) 
10. What development projects have been carried out in die community in die present 














What kind and how many 
In the term 2003-2008 and current 
activities 
1) Primary school floor work in 
Alam (25,000 Rupees=564 US 
dollars) 
2) 1 junior high school in Darma (8 
lakhs=l8,080 US dollars) 
1) Current pensions: 
5 widow pensions in Alam and 
Darma (400 Rupees/mondi=9 
US dollars) 
3 disabled people pensions for 
botii Alam and Darma 
Drinking Water 
Women and Child 
development 
Sanitation 







1) Pipeline maintenance for both 
villages (10,000 Rupees/year=226 
US dollars) 
1) 20 toilet in Alam were built in 
the last term (5,000 Rupees/1 
latrine=113 US dollars) 
2) 70 toilet in Darma were built in 
die last term (5,000 Rupees/1 
latrine=113 US dollars) 
1) Ration cards: 
4 Very below poverty line cards 
in Alam and 6 Very below 
poverty line cards in Darma. 
Health benefits (free hospital) 
and ratio card (1 kg wheat/2 
Rupees and 1 kg rice/3 Rupees) 
are included. (1 Rupees=0.02 US 
dollars) 
25 Below poverty lines cards in 
Alam and 40 below poverty lines 
cards in Darma. Health benefits 
(free hospital) and ratio card (1 
kg wheat/5 Rupees and 1 kg 
rice/7 Rupees) are included. (1 
Rupees=0.02 US dollars) 
1) Indirawas house scheme 
1 houses subsidies (35,000 
Rupees=790 US dollars) 
1-2/yr house repairing subsidy in 
Alam (10,000 Rupees=226 US 
dollars) 
2-3/yr house repairing subsidy in 










1) NREGA and GBA scheme's 
money is used for rural 
development work (checkdam, 
tal-kal etc.) 
Look at 11 and 12 
11. Are any social justice issue discussed in die Gram Panchayat? What kind? 
Some conflicts about boundaries issues with other villages are discussed in Gram 
Panchayat meeting. Women also openly talk about violence in Gram Panchayat 
meetings. The current Gram Pradhan established a monetary fine to contrast 
household violence. The fine is from 50 (around 1 US dollars) to 100 (around 2 US 
dollars) Rupees to men who act violent against women. If violence persists men are sent 
to court. According to the current Gram Pradhan corruption is not discussed in 
meetings but exists and caste issues are also not raised but that does not mean diey do 
not exist. 
12. Do people ever bring any social conflict to the Gram Panchayat? What kind? 
The following answer would suit a different and more generic question about what are die 
current problems discussed in Gram Panchayat and what are die actions forward die Gram 
Pradhan is willing to take to face diem: 
Yes. The given solutions are only 2% out of 100% of all problems. Water, house 
problems along widi many odier issues are a reality in Alam but the amount of money 
received is X and die needs would require much more financial support from external 
sources. Gram Pradhan admits to be young but he's willing to start speaking up in die 
block Panchayat meetings held in Munsiari. He is also applying for more money to die 
government. 
SURING GRAM PANCHAYAT 






N How were tfiey invested? 2003-2008 
The Gram Panchayat has been received a 
monetary subsidy for woollen work of 
around 1 lakh per year of which 50,000 
(1,130 US dollars) Rupees is pure subsidy 
and anodier 50,000 Rupees is loan. 
TSP scheme (tribal schedule population): 6-
7 lakhs/ year (13,560-15,820 US dollars). 









construction and some other infrastructure 
work. 
GRY scheme: 6/7 lakhs/year (13,560-
15,820 US dollars). The money was spent 
for digging and construction work, water 
channel etc. 
Indirawas scheme: 1 lakhs/ year (2,260 US 
dollars). Per year an average of 3 houses 
were built. 
Around 10,000-15,000 Rupees/year (226-
339 US dollars) from taxation was invested 
for temple maintenance, functions such as 
weddings, and road cleaning. 
Financial management scheme: 4 lakhs/year 
= 9,040 US dollars). The money was spent 
especially to provide more facilities to 
scheduled tribes and scheduled castes 
families. 
10. What development projects have been carried out in the community in the present 










What kind and how many 
In the term 2003-2008 and current 
activities 
Seeds for agriculture from the block 
given 2 times/year: 3600 Rupees/2 
times per year. (81 US dollars) 
3) Free uniforms for children in 
poor families 
4) School maintenance and 
cleaning work (1,000 
Rupees/year=23 US dollars) 
5) 1 primary school was built (4 
lakhs=9,040 US dollars) 
1) Emergency transport for people 





Women and Child development 
Sanitation 







(67 US dollars) 
2) Current pensions: 
8 widow pensions in Suring 
Gram Panchayat (400 
Rupees/month= 9 US dollars) 
5 disabled people pensions in 
Suring (400 Rupees/month =9 
US dollars) 
12 old people pensions (400 
Rupees/month =9 US dollars) 
3) The ex Gram Pradhan intended 
temple construction as a social 
welfare activity. (1.5 
lakh/year=3,390 US dollars) 
1) Pipeline maintenance and 
repairing (5,000 
Rupees/year=113 US dollars) 
2) Some rare subsidy to women 
when in need (reason not 
specified) of 1-2,000 Rupees (23 
-45 US dollars) 
3) Some sporadic contribution 
from Gram Panchayat to 
purchase furniture and food for 
kids of poor families 
3) 5-6 subsidies for toilet/year 
(3,000 Rupees=68 US dollars/1 
toilet subsidy) 
4) Community effort to keep the 
village clean. 








8 Very below poverty line cards 
50 Below poverty lines cards 
1) Indirawas house scheme 
3 full house subsidies/ year 
(81,000 Rupees total-1,830 US 
dollars) 
3 house repairance subsidy/ year 
(27,000 Rupees Total=610 US 
dollars) 
2) Subsidy/loan for people to 
purchase animals. Once a family 
buys die animal using the loan 
money it has to repay back widi 
die profit it can gain from it. 
Once it has repaid the loan 
amount, die government will gift 
die family with a subsidy. The 
loan amount changes according 
to die type of animal die family 
needs (cow: 6,000 Rupees (135 
US dollars), horse: 15,000 
Rupees (339 US dollars), goat 
5,000 Rupees (113 US dollars). 
In Suring case in one year 
30,000 Rupees (678 US dollars) 
on average were given as loan 
and 15,000 (339 US dollars) 
Rupees as subsidy. Around 10-
12 people/year applied to get an 
animal in diis way. 
2) GRY money was spent for 
various infrastructure jobs in 
rural development 4-5 dhara 
(water sources) were built for 
50,000 Rupees (1,130 US 
dollars)/each. Reinforced cement 
concrete and stone padi 




Look at 11 and 12 
11. Are any social justice issue discussed in the Gram Panchayat? What kind? 
12. Do people ever bring any social conflict to the Gram Panchayat? What kind? 
There are conflicts about land. The ex Gram Pradhan admitted there are also cases of 
violence against women discussed in Gram Panchayat meetings (4-5 cases per year). 
The gender issue is seldom talked about in meetings but personal suggestions are given. 
In the case violence persist, a fee can be inflicted or the police can also be called. In the 
last term women attendance and participation increased and the current Gram Pradhan 
as well as the past Gram Pradhan acknowledged people are more open to talk about 
corruption. The current Gram Pradhan also recognized die problem of violence against 
women and he underlined mat if the case persists more man 3 times then the police 
will be asked to intervene. 
JAINTI GRAM PANCHAYAT 














How were they invested? 1997-2002 
The new Gram Pradhan does not know the 
names of die schemes from which she 
receives die money and die Gram Pradhan 
from 2003-2008 recendy passed away so 
some data might be inconclusive. 
GRY: 1.2 lakhs/year (2,712 US dollars). 
The money was invested in construction 
work of general scope below listed. 
1 Rupees/ family for administrative fee was 
asked but very few contributed. 
10th financial commission money: 1 
lakhs/year (2,260 US dollars). 
The current Gram Pradhan did not give information about any scheme. She 
mentioned the formation of self-help groups (SHGs) (Panchachuli Samu, Nanda Devi 
Samu etc.) to get money from the block Panchayat and from the State Bank of India 
(SBI). These SHGs have worked for the last 7 years for groups of 6-7 Below poverty 
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lines people; the block has allocated 10,000 Rupees (226 US dollars) per group 
whereas die SBI contributed with 15,000 Rupees (339 US dollars) per group. Once 
the money is received by die SHG die Gram Panchayat will decide how it should be 
invested (wool work, animals husbandry etc.). The full amount will have to be fully 
repaid without interest. Recendy die SBI has decided to allocate 2.5 lakhs (5,650 US 
dollars) for die formation of more SHGs in Jaiti and die only extra expense die SHG 
has to sustain, otiier dian die full repayment, is die opening of a bank account for 20 
Rupees (0.45 US dollars)/mondi within State Bank of India. 
10. What development projects have been carried out in die community in die present 








What kind and how many 
In die term 1997-2002 and some 
information of the work done in the 
term 2003-2008 and die current 
activities. 
1) Plantation work with the Van 
Panchayat 
2) Subsidy to scheduled castes and 
scheduled tribes families for 
agricultural work (5,000 
Rupees=l 13 US dollars/year per 
family and a total of 50 per year 
was subsidized) in 1997-2002. 
3) Currendy an "agriculture seed 
support subsidy" is given to 
Below poverty lines families (as 
much as 4,000 Rupees= 90 US 
dollars per family, in diis 
moment around 15 are 
benefiting from this scheme) 
1) Primary school in 2001 (1.91 
lakhs=4,316 US dollars) 
2) Junior High School in 2007 (6 
lakhs=13,560 US dollars) 
3) In the term 1997-2002 diere was 
a program called literacy 
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program campaign -GRY 
funding- that enrolled three 
private teachers to teach to old, 
handicapped and illiterate 
people basic literacy. (500 
Rupees=11.3 US dollars/month 
per teacher). The program is not 
running anymore because 
according to the Gram Pradhan 
of 1997-2002 mere is a lower 
interest of learning besides being 
able to sign in Gram Panchayat 
meetings. 
4) In 2009 the floor of school's 
kitchen is being rebuilt (50,000 
Rupees=l,130 US dollars) 
1) Pensions 1997-2002 (old rates): 
2 disable people pensions (125 
Rupees=2.8 US dollars/monm) 
5 old people pensions (125 
Rupees=2.8 US dollars/mondi) 
2) Now the pensions amount 
increased to 400=9 US 
dollars/month and uSere are 
about 6-7 old people, 5-6 
widows, 2-3 disable people 
benefiting from it 
1) In 1997-2002 the scheduled-
caste water supply scheme used 
to run (50,000-60,000 Rupees 
(1,130-1,355 US dollars) total 
amount given for the following 
work): 
Women and Child 
development 
Sanitation 




3 water tanks 
Pipeline maintenance 
Stand post constructions 
Water chamber 
That scheme has now completed its 
work (2009). 
2) In 2002-2007 some water tanks 
were built (number not specified) 
for an amount of 35,000Rs=791 
US dollars/piece. 
1) Road cleaning, river cleaning 
(5,000Rupees=113US 
dollars/year as GRY funding) 
2) In 1997-2002, 7 latrines were 
made (2,500-5,000 Rupees(56-
113 US dollars) subsidy/1 
latrine) 
1) Ration cards: 
6 Very below poverty line cards 
in 1997-2002 and the same 
number in 2009 
84 Below poverty lines cards in 
1997-2002 and 80 in 2009 
2) GRY provides employment for 
Below poverty lines families. 
The current rate of labor is 100 
Rupees/day (2.26 US dollars) 
and it is more than double of the 
minimum rate the government 








1) Indirawas house scheme 1997-
2002 
- 3 house full subsidy (12,000 
Rupees=271 US dollars). Now 
the amount more than doubled 
to an amount around 30,000 
Rupees (678 US dollars). 
2 house repairing (9,000 Rupees) 
2) 4 houses full subsidy from GRY 
funding (9,000 Rupees=203 US 
dollars/year), now also the 
amount of this subsidy increased 
substantially to 37,000 
Rupees=836 US dollars/house. 
1) The scheme dealing witfi 
livestock was implemented in 
1997-2002. The scheme 
consisted in subsidizing 
scheduled castes families to 
purchase livestock (calves from 
Haryana). The amount of 
19,000Rs (430 US dollars) was 
75% subsidy and 25% loan and 8 
total families decided to use it. 
1) General construction work 
(reinforced cement concrete, 
stone patii, water channel, 
checkdam) with GRY and 10th 
financial commission funding for 
a total amount of 2 lakhs (4,520 
US dollars) /year in die term 
1997-2002. 
2) The current Gram Pradhan 
listed the most important 
construction being done at me 
present moment (2009): 





- 1 checkdam (1 lakhs=2,260 US 
dollars) 
- 1 bridge (73,000 Rupees= 1,649 
US dollars) 
reinforced cement concrete path 
(30,000 Rupees=677 US dollars) 
- Stone path (25,000 Rupees=564 
US dollars) 
At the current moment some 
money from TSP is also being 
received for reinforced cement 
concrete, stone path, road 
construction and water work. 
The money is project based so a 
precise estimate is not possible to 
disclose. 
Look at 11-12 
1) Some ward members decided to 
give little support to people going 
through crisis (ie: losing a son or 
losing the house etc.) 
11. Are any social justice issue discussed in the Gram Panchayat? What kind? 
12. Do people ever bring any social conflict to the Gram Panchayat? What kind? 
The old Gram Pradhan admitted that many scheduled castes families live in poor 
condition but the relationship with other castes is open and not major conflicts are 
raised. He reported that not other major issues of social justice were brought up in 
Gram Panchayat meetings (like corruption, or gender equality) during his term. 
The current Gram Pradhan said there are not caste issues raised and corruption as 
much as gender equality are not problems affecting the community whatsoever. A 
women collective is present in Jaiti. 
SARMOLI-SHANKADHURA GRAM PANCHAYAT 







How were they invested? 








NREGA(2009): 96,000 Rupees (2,168 US 
dollars) 100-200 people demanding 
Johar Employment scheme: 60,000 
Rupees-1,355 US dollars/2008 
Scheduled Caste welfare department: 4.5 
lakhs=10,164 US dollars/year 
1 Rupees/Family (0.02 US dollars) 
Block level: 50,000 Rupees (1,130 US 
dollars)/2003-2008 
Self Help Groups support: 10 people/5,000 
Rupees (113 USD dollars) monthly from 
government (repayment due) 
10. What development projects have been carried out in the community in the present 












What kind and how many 
In the term 2003-2008 
1) Subsidy to purchase seeds to 
20-25 families ( from Block 
level) 
1) One bathroom for primary 
school (15,000 Rupees=339 US 
dollars) 
2) 1 room for school (50,000 
Rupees=l,130 US dollars) 
1) Economic help from ASA Ngo 
(50 Rs=11.3 US dollars/delivery 
case) 




Women and Child 
development 
Sanitation 











- 40 BPL cards 
35 widow pension (400 
Rupees=9 US dollars/month) 
55 old people pension (400 
Rupees= 9 US dollars/month) 
3 handicap pension (400 
Rupees=9 US dollars/month) 
1) 1 water chamber (20,000 
Rupees=452 US dollars in 
2009) 
2) 1 water tank (15,000 
Rupees=339 US dollars in 
2009) 
3) Pipeline construction (40,000 
Rupees= 903 US dollars in 
2008) 
1) Scholarships from the 
government: 18,000 
Rupees=406 US dollars/year for 
56 children 
1) Ration card: 
12 Very Below Poverty Line 
cards 
40 Below Poverty Line cards 
1) Indirawas house scheme 
- 8 full house subsidy in 2009/ 
38,000 Rupees (858 US dollars) 
each 










Some support from block level 
Panchayat 
3) The current Gram Pradhan 
listed the most important 
construction work done (or 
initiated) in the last term (2003-
2008): 
Reinforced cement concrete 
path(2.31akhs=5,195US 
dollars) 
- 10 checkdam (8 lakhs= 18,070 
US dollars) 
- 24 tal-kal (72,000 Rupees-1,626 
US dollars) 
Panchayat building (3 
lakhs=6,776 US dollars) 
- Stone path (25,000 Rupees=565 
US dollars) 
- Playfield (1 lakh=2,260 US 
dollars) 
Look at 11-12 
11. Are any social justice issue discussed in the Gram Panchayat? What kind? 
According to the current Up-Pradhan there are not social problems in the community. 
He does not recognize any gender violence, corruption or caste problem. There are 
some simple quarrels but nothing that requires serious measures. The Pradhan (elected 
chief representative) elected the term recognized that there is a pervasive problem of 
violence in die village due to alcoholism. She used to give personal suggestions but not 
broad discussion is happening during the meetings. According to her opinion, 
corruption is also increasingly becoming a problem and money is retained by higher 
politicians and not given to the people. 
12. Do people ever bring any social conflict to the Gram Panchayat? What kind? 
According to die Up-Pradhan tiiere are not problems reported in local institutions. 
361 
Appendix 4: Tables Priority Setting 







Poverty level 0 
Poverty level 1 
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Poverty level 3 
Poverty level 4 
Poverty level 5+6 
Average 












































































Poverty level 0 
Poverty level 1 
Poverty level 2 
























































Poverty level 3 
Poverty level 4 

































Poverty level 0 
Poverty level 1 
Poverty level 2 
Poverty level 3 
Poverty level 4 












































































Poverty level 0 
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Average 11.89% 10.30% 0.96% 8.78% 7.13% 39.06% 
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Second top Priority divided in categories for Social Services 







Poverty level 0 
Poverty level 1 
Poverty level 2 
Poverty level 3 
Poverty level 4 














































































Average 10.52% 5.99% 1.25% 4.29% 3.26% 25.31% 
Appendix 5: Figure top priority setting break down 
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Appendix 6: Poverty and Caste 
Povertyn = /?„ + pxDln + p2D2n + sn 
Poverty and Caste (Poisson Regression corrected for autocorrelation) 
Variable Name 
Dl= Scheduled Tribes 
















R-SQUARE =0.0550 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED =0.0483 
Min=0 Max=6 Average-1.453 Std Dev= 1.597 
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